Ensuring accessibility for subcontracted agricultural workers to operational-level grievance mechanisms: a study on Thailand’s sugar industry by Satayanurug, Pawat
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Ensuring accessibility for subcontracted agricultural workers to
operational-level grievance mechanisms: a study on Thailand’s sugar
industry
Satayanurug, Pawat
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-152410
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Satayanurug, Pawat. Ensuring accessibility for subcontracted agricultural workers to operational-level
grievance mechanisms: a study on Thailand’s sugar industry. 2018, University of Zurich, Faculty of Law.
 	 I 
Ensuring Accessibility for Subcontracted 
Agricultural Workers to Operational-level 
Grievance Mechanisms: 
A Study on Thailand’s Sugar Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Universität Zürich 
 
zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der Rechtswissenschaft 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Pawat Satayanurug 
 
von Thailand 
 
 
genehmigt auf Antrag von 
 
Prof. Dr. Christine Kaufmann 
und 
Prof. Dr. Tyler Giannini 
  
 	 II 
Die Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät gestattet hierdurch die 
Drucklegung der vorliegenden Dissertation, ohne damit zu den darin 
ausgesprochenen Anschauungen Stellung zu nehmen. 
 
 
 
Zürich, den 7. März 2018 
 
Die Dekanin: Prof. Dr. Brigitte Tag 
  
 	 III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my family and my late grandmothers 
  
 	 IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to many people and 
institutions for their support and contribution to the completion of my 
PhD. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my main supervisor 
Professor Dr. Christine Kaufmann of Universität Zürich for her constant 
motivation, encouragement, enthusiasm, patient guidance, insightful 
comments, constructive suggestions, and trust. Thank you very much for 
believing in me. I am also deeply grateful to my second expert Professor 
Dr. Tyler Giannini of Harvard Law School for his valuable feedbacks, 
useful critiques and words of encouragement.  
 
I would like to express my gratitude to the Royal Thai Government and 
Chulalongkorn University for the scholarship and financial assistance, 
Former Dean of Law Chula Professor Dr. Sakda Thanitcul for his vision, 
confidence and for securing me this PhD opportunity, Professor Emeritus 
Vitit Muntarbhorn for his inspiration on human rights-related works and 
for being my life-long mentor, and all my previous law professors for the 
knowledge and skills I accrued along the way. Also, I would like to show 
my greatest appreciation to many people involved during my field 
research: Dr. Sarayuth Saengchan and Mr. Boontham Wongprapinkul at 
the Mitr Phol Group, Mr. Pormest Wongsatitporn for being the 
interpreter of the local dialect, and all interviewees. 
 
I would also like to extend my thanks to my friends at Öffentliches Recht, 
Völker- und Europarecht Universität Zürich for their hospitality, 
particularly Rita Schenkel for her kind assistance on administrative 
matters and Miriam Frisenda for her proofreading. Special thanks also to 
my Thai friends in Switzerland for their wonderful friendship, as well as 
my friends at Thai Airways for their warm support and food supply. 
 
Lastly, I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents – Dr. Werawat and Pol. 
Lt. Col. Siraprapha Satayanurug, my sisters – Pawita and Parawee 
Satayanurug and my family for their continuous and unconditional 
support throughout my study. I love you very much. 
 
Zürich, 11.04.2018   Pawat Satayanurug  
 	 I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abbreviations ............................................................................... VII 
Table of Figures ............................................................................ IX 
CHAPTER I  Introduction, Scope, and Methodology ................. 1 
A. Scope of the Research ............................................................. 3 
B. Research Questions ................................................................. 7 
C. Methodology .......................................................................... 11 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER II  Remedying the Victims: Revisiting the Global 
Standards for Access to Remedy ............................................ 13 
A. Creating global human rights standards for businesses ... 14 
1. Developing the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights .............................................. 16 
2. Pillar I: The State duty to protect human rights ................. 18 
3. Pillar II: The corporate responsibility to respect human rights
 ........................................................................................... 20 
4. Pillar III: Access to remedy for victims of business-related 
abuses ................................................................................. 23 
B. Importance of Pillar III – Ensuring the right to effective 
remedy for victims ........................................................................ 24 
C. Doing business responsibly – Creating effectiveness criteria 
for operational-level grievance mechanisms ............................... 31 
1. Effectiveness criteria for operational-level grievance 
mechanisms ........................................................................ 35 
2. Barriers to accessing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms ........................................................................ 40 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER III  Pillar III in Context: Thailand and its Sugar 
Industry ..................................................................................... 43 
A. Thailand’s reaction to the UNGP ........................................ 44 
B. Studying Thailand’s Sugar Industry .................................. 49 
1. Mapping the supply-chain .................................................. 49 
 	 II 
2. Identifying actors ................................................................ 51 
C. Exploring negative impacts in the sugar cane  
supply-chain .................................................................................. 58 
1. Labor-related issues ............................................................ 58 
2. Issues associated with being foreign agricultural  
workers ............................................................................... 62 
D. Existing grievance mechanisms in Thailand ...................... 66 
1. State-based, judicial grievance mechanisms ...................... 66 
2. State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanisms ............... 69 
a. The Sugar Cane Workers Institutes and the OCSB  
Committee ............................................................................. 69 
b. The Rights and Liberties Protection Department   
          (RLPD) ................................................................................... 74 
c. The National Human Rights Commission  
           of Thailand (NHRC) .............................................................. 75 
3. Operational-level grievance mechanisms ........................... 79 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 83 
CHAPTER IV  A Prerequisite to Seeking Access: Identifying 
Admissible Grievances ............................................................. 85 
A. Thailand’s international human rights obligations ........... 88 
1. International Bill of Human Rights .................................... 89 
a. The right to equality and non-discrimination .......................... 90 
b. The right to life ....................................................................... 91 
c. The right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment ....... 92 
2. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles  
         and Rights at Work ............................................................. 94 
a. Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor ......... 96 
b. Abolition of child labor ........................................................... 97 
c. Elimination of work-related discrimination ............................ 98 
B. Human rights protection in Thailand’s national  
legislations ...................................................................................... 99 
1. Affirmation of rights and liberty under the Constitution  
        of the Kingdom of Thailand .............................................. 101 
2. Laws relating to labor protection ...................................... 102 
a. General duties of employers and employees ........................ 102 
b. Equal treatment and non-discrimination based on gender .... 103 
c. Prohibition of sexual abuse ................................................... 103 
d. Regulating general working conditions ................................ 104 
 	 III 
e. Provision of occupational safety, health, and environment .. 105 
f. Guarantee of daily minimum wages ..................................... 106 
g. Provision of welfare .............................................................. 107 
h. Prohibition of unfair dismissal .............................................. 108 
i. Special protection for women and children .......................... 109 
C. Grievances in Thailand’s sugar industry context ............ 110 
1. Grievances as identified by the interviewed  
         subcontracted agricultural workers and subcontractors ... 110 
a. Income below daily minimum wage ..................................... 112 
b. “Mandatory” cooperation for extended working hours ........ 114 
c. “Voluntary” child labor ......................................................... 115 
2. Grievance as reported by the NHRC ................................ 117 
Conclusion .................................................................................... 119 
CHAPTER V  Involving Business Enterprises: Establishing  
the Nexus ................................................................................. 121 
A. Triggering conditions to involve business enterprises ..... 122 
1. Cause ................................................................................ 122 
2. Contribute ......................................................................... 124 
3. Directly linked .................................................................. 126 
B. Establishing linkage between business enterprises and non-
employee complainants beyond the employment condition .... 128 
1. The UNGP’s inclusiveness ............................................... 129 
2. Extending the scope of employer’s obligation and  
         liabilities to non-employees: A brief look at labor laws  
         in ASEAN countries ......................................................... 130 
a. Indonesia ............................................................................... 132 
b. The Philippines ..................................................................... 134 
c. Malaysia ................................................................................ 136 
d. Singapore .............................................................................. 137 
e. Vietnam ................................................................................. 138 
f. Brunei .................................................................................... 139 
g. Cambodia .............................................................................. 140 
h. Laos ....................................................................................... 141 
i. Myanmar ............................................................................... 141 
j. Thailand ................................................................................ 142 
3. Towards the UNGP’s inclusiveness: Strengthening  
         the linkage ........................................................................ 144 
Conclusion .................................................................................... 148 
 	 IV 
CHAPTER VI  Enhancing Effective Access to an Operational-
level Grievance Mechanism: Addressing the Barriers ....... 149 
A. Path to effective access – criteria and practices ............... 151 
1. UNGP’s accessibility criteria revisited ............................ 152 
a. Identifying intended users ..................................................... 153 
b. Being known ......................................................................... 154 
c. Identifying potential barriers to access ................................. 156 
d. Providing adequate assistance ............................................... 156 
2. Facilitating accessibility as seen in the current practice ... 157 
a. International practice ............................................................ 158 
i. OECD’s National Contact Points ..................................... 158 
ii. The World Bank Inspection Panel ................................... 161 
b. Fledgling operational-level grievance mechanisms .............. 164 
i. Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Center for Reflection  
          and Action on Labor Issues (CEREAL) .......................... 164 
ii. Gap Inc. ............................................................................ 165 
iii. Siemens AG ..................................................................... 166 
B. Scoping the eligibility – identifying eligible intended users 
and admissible grievances ........................................................... 167 
1. Defining personal scope – Subcontracted  
         agricultural workers as eligible complainants .................. 167 
2. Defining material scope – Screening  
         admissible grievances ....................................................... 170 
C. Building awareness – making an operational-level  
grievance mechanism known to subcontracted agricultural 
workers ......................................................................................... 174 
1. Dissemination of information ........................................... 175 
a. Methods of dissemination ..................................................... 175 
i. Human Rights Policy ....................................................... 175 
ii. Subcontractors/Suppliers Guide ....................................... 176 
iii. Community Relations Team ............................................ 177 
iv. A Labor-rights Representation ......................................... 178 
v. Training ............................................................................ 178 
b. Ensuring the comprehension of intended users .................... 179 
2. Engaging intended users during the design stage ............. 181 
D. Addressing potential barriers that prevent effective  
access ............................................................................................. 182 
1. Cost ................................................................................... 183 
2. Distant physical location .................................................. 185 
 	 V 
3. Fear of reprisal .................................................................. 188 
4. Cultural Considerations .................................................... 191 
Conclusion .................................................................................... 197 
CHAPTER VII  Conclusion and Recommendations ............... 199 
A. Answering research questions ........................................... 200 
B. Limitations and contributions ........................................... 212 
C. Recommendations ............................................................... 212 
 
 
Appendix A. .................................................................................. 215 
Appendix B. .................................................................................. 217 
Appendix C. .................................................................................. 222 
Appendix D. .................................................................................. 224 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................. 225 
Legal Materials ............................................................................ 234 
 
Curriculum Vitae ......................................................................... 238 
 
 
 	 VI 
  
 	 VII 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
B.E. Buddhist Era 
CANIETI The Mexican Chamber of Electronics Industry 
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
CCC The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand 
CED International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances  
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
CERD International Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
CEREAL Center for Reflection and Action on Labor Issues (a 
Mexican NGO) 
CHF Swiss Franc (currency) 
CMW Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and of their Families 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
C011 Convention concerning the Right of Association and 
Combination of Agricultural Workers 
C014 Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 
C019 Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) 
Convention 
C029 Forced Labor Convention, 1930 
C080 Final Articles Revision Convention, 1946 
C088 Employment Service Convention, 1948 
C100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
C104 Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) 
Convention, 1955 
C105 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 
C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 
C116 Final Articles Revision Convention, 1961 
C122 Employment Policy Convention, 1964 
 	 VIII 
C123 Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, 
1965 
C127 Maximum Weight Convention, 1967 
C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
C159 Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment 
(Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983 
C182 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 
C187 Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety 
and Health Convention, 2006 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ILO International Labor Organization 
LPA Labor Protection Act B.E. 2541 (1998) 
MLC2006 Maritime Labor Convention, 2006 
NAPs OECD National Action Plans 
NCPs OECD National Contact Points 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NHRC The National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand 
OCSB The Office of Cane and Sugar Board of Thailand 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OHCHR The United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
SCM The Supply Chain Management 
THB Thai Baht (currency) 
UN United Nations 
UNGP United Nations Guiding Principles of Business and 
Human Rights 
WBIP The World Bank Inspection Panel 
 
 	 IX 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 -   
Supply Chain of Thailand's Sugar Industry ................................ 50	
Figure 2 -   
Actors of Different Tiers in the Upstream of the  
Supply-Chain ............................................................................... 56	
Figure 3 -   
Relationship between Different Actors in the  
Supply-Chain of Thailand's Sugar Industry ................................ 57	
Figure 4 -   
The Payment Schemes of the Interviewed  
Subcontracted Agricultural Workers ........................................... 61	
Figure 5 -   
Categories of Foreign Workers ................................................... 64	
Figure 6 -   
Entities Overseen by the OCSB .................................................. 70	
Figure 7 -   
Grievance Mechanism Procedures at the Sugar Cane  
Workers Institutes and the OCSB ............................................... 72	
Figure 8 -   
The Grievance Mechanism at the NHRC .................................... 78	
Figure 9 -   
The Grievance Mechanism at Mitr Phol ..................................... 81	
Figure 10 -   
Labor Laws in ASEAN Countries Providing Linkage  
between Business Enterprises and Non-Employee  
Complainants beyond the Employment Condition ................... 147	
 	 X 
 	 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction, Scope, and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against the scorching heat of the mid-day sun, the sea of agricultural 
workers harvesting sugar canes in the rural parts of Thailand has become 
a common sight, especially in the northeastern region. Their work helps 
propel Thailand to become the world’s second largest sugar exporter, 
after Brazil. 1  While local sugar producers and exporters enjoy the 
lucrative benefit of the sizable share in the world’s sugar industry, Thai 
agricultural workers still earn less than the minimum daily wage 
prescribed by the law, and their children sometimes assist them with their 
work at various plantations. Earning below minimum daily wages and 
the use of child labor are only examples of potential grievances 
encountered by agricultural workers. As these agricultural workers are 
employed in the private sector, grievances are likely caused or 
contributed to by private actors such as their direct employers or the 
sugar producers, as well as any other private actor with direct linkages to 
the employers or the sugar producers. States, however, are less likely to 
cause or contribute to such grievances as private actors.  
 
Some of the grievances encountered by the agricultural workers could 
amount to human rights abuses. In other words, while human rights 
abuses could be considered grievances, not all grievances are human 
rights abuses. What constitutes human rights abuses is determined by 
whether human rights obligations under various international human 
rights instruments are violated. Traditionally, under the available 
international instruments States are the main duty-holders of human 
                                                
1 Daniel Workman, Sugar Export by Countries, World’s Top Export (May 17, 
2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.worldstopexports.com/sugar-exports-country/. 
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rights obligations, and thus the current regime of international human 
rights law is only applicable to States. However, cases concerning human 
rights abuses have emerged and revealed that other entities, which may 
not be State entities2, are also capable of abusing human rights especially 
business enterprises. While business enterprises can invoke some human 
rights, such as the freedom of expression, as a rule they currently do not 
have any binding obligations under international human rights law. Also, 
the current international legal system per se does not provide any leeway 
to include business enterprises into the international human rights 
regime. With the aforementioned status quo, business enterprises are not 
obliged to respect human rights law or provide any form of grievance 
mechanisms for the human rights abuses or grievances they may have 
caused or contributed to. Consequently, the abused agricultural workers 
currently have limited access, if at all, to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms provided by business enterprises.  
 
In principle, an operational-level grievance mechanism is an important 
tool in the fight against human rights abuses caused or contributed to by, 
or directly linked to, business operations. Fundamentally, it provides a 
platform for victims to have their voice heard, explain their cases, and be 
justly remediated. The entire scheme must be effective and efficient to 
ensure the delivery of justice and fairness to the victims of human rights 
abuses. This ambition is resonated clearly in Pillar III of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, widely 
referred to as the ‘UN Guiding Principles’ or the ‘UNGP’3, which was 
unanimously endorsed in 2008 by the UN Human Rights Council. In 
brief, the UNGP Principle 31 establishes the “effectiveness criteria” for 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms, including the operational-level 
ones4. For consistency and coherence with the UNGP, this research will 
employ the UNGP term “operational-level grievance mechanisms” to 
refer to the ones administered or operated by business enterprises.  
                                                
2 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 Bangladesh, (June 5, 2017, 10:35 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-
chapters/bangladesh#6a43ba. 
3 U. N. (2011). Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" framework. 
4 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 31, at 33. 
 	 3 
Ideally, having effective operational-level grievance mechanisms will 
provide recourse to remedy to victims of human rights abuses. However, 
this enthusiastic call for “effectiveness” must be confronted with the 
reality of the situation, as different contexts could manifest different 
contributing factors, which may support or hinder the implementation of 
the UNGP “effectiveness criteria”. In other words, a study examining the 
actual implementation of the UNGP against a specific context is 
necessary and inevitable. For this purpose, this analysis selects 
Thailand’s sugar industry as the context. Currently, Thailand’s sugar 
industry is one of its largest agricultural industries, and an abundance of 
useful resources, such as for example the publications of its key players, 
was available to support the completion of this research. 
 
 
 
A. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Under the general theme of Business and Human Rights, this research 
focuses on Pillar III of the UNGP – Access to Remedy. The foundational 
principle of Pillar III is to ensure that those affected by human rights 
violation be remediated in an effective manner. The scope of this 
research is defined as follows: 
 
Material scope: the operational-level grievance mechanisms 
provided by sugar producers – The UNGP Pillar III mentions three 
general channels of access to remedy – State-based judicial mechanisms 
5, State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms6, and non-State-based 
grievance mechanisms7. This research focuses on the last type – non-
State-based grievance mechanisms, and further narrows the scope to 
“operational-level grievance mechanisms”. In brief, the UNGP Principle 
29 suggests that “business enterprises should establish or participate in 
effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and 
                                                
5 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 26, at 28. 
6 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 27, at 30. 
7 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 28, at 31. 
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communities who may be adversely impacted”8. The benefits of the 
operational-level grievance mechanisms, as highlighted in the 
Commentary to the UNGP, are the capability to identify adverse human 
rights impact as a part of an enterprise’s ongoing human rights due 
diligence and the competence to provide effective remedy as early as 
immediately after the victims are abused. 9  The operational-level 
grievance mechanisms in this research refers to the ones administered or 
operated by large business enterprises in a supply-chain. The term 
“business enterprises” is found in the UNGP documents, and is often 
used interchangeably with the term “companies” or “corporations”. For 
clarity and consistency, this research will use the term “business 
enterprises”. In the context of Thailand’s sugar industry, large business 
enterprises are large sugar producing companies, or hereinafter referred 
to shortly as “sugar producers”. Consequently, operational-level 
grievance mechanisms provided by sugar producers in Thailand’s sugar 
industry will be the material scope of this research. Additionally, 
references to large business enterprises in the context of this research will 
be termed “sugar producers”.  
 
Geographical and sectoral scope: Thailand’s sugar industry – As 
previously mentioned, this research will focus on Thailand’s sugar 
industry, as sugar is considered one of Thailand’s top export agricultural 
products.  
 
Personal scope: subcontracted agricultural workers – The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) instruments contain a variety of 
terms relating to “workers”. It is, therefore, indispensable to define at the 
outset on which types of workers this research will base its focus. The 
term “agricultural workers” will be used to refer to the workers operating 
in the agricultural industry.10 The use of this term resonates from the 
Convention concerning the Right of Association and Combination of 
                                                
8 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 29, at 31. 
9 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary to Principle 29, at 32. 
10 Some ILO instruments opt to use the term “rural workers” in a broader 
scope. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., RURAL WORKERS’ ORGANIZATION 
CONVENTION (Convention No. 141), June 23, 1975, art. 2. 
 	 5 
Agricultural Workers (C011) 11 . In defining the term “agricultural 
workers”, C011 takes a broader approach by applying the convention to 
“all those engaged in agriculture”12 in order to clearly extend the scope 
of application beyond the employment condition. 13  Therefore, this 
approach encompasses those employed in the organized sectors such as 
agricultural farms running on a commercial basis (or wage-earners) and 
those not employed by the organized sector including self-employed 
workers.14  
 
This research, however, takes a narrower scope. As many agricultural 
workers who are not directly employed by sugar producers but by third-
party entities such as subcontractors often have less, if not none-at-all, 
access to privileges that are normally accorded to those employed by 
sugar producers, this research utilizes the term “agricultural workers” 
beyond the employment condition as stated in the C011 and limits it to 
the agricultural workers without employment status with sugar 
producers. The limitation of this term reflects the current practice of 
sugar producers subcontracting agricultural work to subcontractors. 
Subcontractors then employ agricultural workers to work in plantations. 
This practice is sometimes referred to as “outsourcing” or “off-shoring”. 
Therefore, the term “agricultural workers” in this research refers to 
workers who are engaged in agriculture, who are employed by third-
party subcontractors, and who are not employed by sugar producers. For 
clarity purpose, the term “subcontracted agricultural workers” will be 
used throughout this research, and self-employed agricultural workers 
(or those in the informal sectors) are excluded from the scope. In the 
supply chain world, this term refers to workers operating in the second-
tier (or Tier Two) companies or suppliers of the supply chain.15 
                                                
11 INT’L LABOUR ORG., CONVENTION CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF 
ASSOCIATION AND COMBINATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (Convention 
No. 11), May 11, 1923. 
12 Id., art. 1. 
13 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, GIVING A VOICE TO RURAL WORKERS, 21 (2015). 
14 Id., at 22. 
15 In the supply chain, there are different terms used to describe companies or 
suppliers based on commercial relationship between the manufacturer and the 
supplier. The commonly used terms are OEM (Original Equipment 
 	 6 
Substantive scope: assessing the accessibility of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms – While the UNGP Principle 31 provides many 
effectiveness criteria16, this research will limit its scope to only study one 
of them – the “accessibility” criterion. At present, while the UNGP 
Principle 29 suggests the involvement of business enterprises in 
providing effective operational-level grievance mechanisms to victims 
of human rights abuse17, this remains merely a suggestion. Currently, 
business enterprises are not obliged under any international human rights 
instrument to provide any form of remediation. The UNGP Principle 15, 
which falls under Pillar II, only mentions that business enterprises 
“should” have “processes to enable the remediation of any adverse 
human rights impact they cause or to which they contribute” 18 . 
Furthermore, the UNGP Principle 13, which provides “requirements” for 
fulfilling the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, does not 
expressly impose either the requirement or the obligation for business 
enterprises to provide remediation through operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. 19  The UNGP Principle 13 only provides for general 
corporate responsibility and distinguishes different levels of corporate 
responsibility based on the depth of involvement between business 
enterprises and adverse human rights impact. Business enterprises that 
cause or contribute to adverse human rights impact are required to avoid 
doing so and address such impacts when they occur20. To a lesser extent, 
business enterprises are required to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products 
or services by their business relationships21. 
                                                
Manufacturer), Tier One, Tier Two, and Other Tiers. The OEM refers to a 
company that manufacture a final product for consumers. Tier One refers to a 
direct supplier to the OEM, and Tier Two is a direct supplier to the Tier One. 
For more information, see David Sarokin, Difference between Tier 1 and Tier 
2 Companies, (Apr. 27, 2016, 4:50 PM), 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-tier-1-tier-2-companies-
25430.html. 
16 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 31, at 33. 
17 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 29, at 31. 
18 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 15, at 15-16. 
19 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 13, at 14-15. 
20 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 13a, at 14-15. 
21 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 13b, at 14-15. 
 	 7 
Though this research acknowledges the ongoing debate on whether the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights extends to require 
business enterprises to provide remediation as such 22, it will not include 
and discuss this debate further. It bypasses such debate, and operates on 
the premise that business enterprises are willing to or obliged to provide 
effective remediation for victims of human rights abuse that they cause 
or to which they contribute through their operational-level grievance 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The questions most frequently asked about the UNGP concern its 
implementation. Essentially most, if not all, aspects advocated by the 
UNGP have faced strong criticisms, resistance, and defiance. In an 
attempt to explore the practical issues of the UNGP’s “forgotten pillar” 
23, this research addresses the implementation of UNGP Pillar III – the 
access to remedy. The analysis of this Pillar will probably start to attract 
more attention, as the OHCHR will soon complete its Accountability and 
Remedy Project setting out recommendations to make domestic judicial 
mechanisms “fairer and more effective”24. 
 
                                                
22 Simon Zadek, The meaning of accountability, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 242 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, 
Justine Nolan eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
23 Sarah Mcgrath, Fulfilling the Forgotten Pillar: Ensuring Access to Remedy 
for Business and Human Rights Abuses, (May 13, 2016, 3:56 PM), 
http://www.ihrb.org/other/remedy/fulfilling-the-forgotten-pillar-ensuring-
access-to-remedy-for-business-and. 
24 U.N. OHCHR, Business and Human Rights: The OHCHR Accountability 
and Remedy Project – An initiative to contribute to a fairer and more effective 
system of domestic law remedies, in particular in cases of gross human rights 
abuses, (May 13, 2016, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/Re
medyWorkPlans.pdf. 
 	 8 
While the State-based grievance mechanisms are often in the spotlight, 
the non-State-based grievance mechanisms are rather neglected and 
operational-level grievance mechanisms receive even less attention. One 
of the most-cited letter documents, among very little literature that even 
mentions operational-level grievance mechanisms, was issued by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
responding to some alleged practical concerns of the Olgeta Meri Igat 
Raits operational-level grievance mechanism25. In the letter, the OHCHR 
acknowledges that the UNGP recognize the importance of the 
operational-level grievance mechanisms as they “may fulfill an 
important role in enabling victims to have their grievance heard and in 
obtaining remedy for harm suffered”26. In addition, the OHCHR stresses 
that this important role by business enterprises must be assessed against 
applicable standards on remedy27. 
 
This research reiterates the OHCHR’s opinion and acknowledges the 
scarcity of academic literature on operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. Consequently, the study aims to provide scholastic 
literature regarding the implementation of the UNGP Pillar III on 
operational-level grievance mechanisms, and will be conducted against 
the context of Thailand’s sugar industry. More specifically, the focus of 
this research will be the access to remedy for subcontracted agricultural 
workers working in the Tier-Two of the supply chain. For organizational 
purposes, the research questions are provided as follow. 
 
                                                
25 U.N. OHCHR, Re: Allegation regarding the Porgera Joint Venture remedy 
framework, (Apr. 27, 2017, 10:50 AM) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/LetterPorgera.pdf,  
(UN OHCHR issued a letter in 2011 to provide an opinion on some of 
procedural and substantive issues raised by the petitioner – the NGO Mining 
Watch Canada (MWC) – concerning the Porgera remediation framework – a 
remediation initiative developed by Barrick Gold Corporation and the Porgera 
Joint Venture for women who have been victims of sexual violence by security 
personnel at the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea.). 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Id. at 6. (an example of applicable standards on remedy is “the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation”). 
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Question 1: 
Are there any operational-level grievance mechanisms that 
are currently available for and accessible to subcontracted 
agricultural workers in Thailand’s sugar industry, and, if 
yes, what are they?  
 
In Thailand, operational-level grievance mechanisms are still at a very 
immature stage. Business enterprises independently draft their own 
procedure for their operational-level grievance mechanisms, if any exist. 
More specifically, it is unclear whether the existing operational-level 
grievance mechanisms extend their scope to encompass all categories of 
agricultural workers, including subcontracted agricultural workers 
working in the Tier-Two of the supply chain. 
 
 
Question 2: 
What are legal and practical barriers that could potentially 
prevent subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand’s 
sugar industry from gaining access to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms, and how can the barriers be reduced 
or eliminated?  
 
After a preliminary mapping of the existing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms in Thailand’s sugar industry, the research further explores 
legal and practical barriers that could potentially prevent agricultural 
workers from gaining access to the operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. It will assess the accessibility of the existing operational-
level grievance mechanisms against one of the effectiveness criteria set 
out by the UNGP Principle 3128 - the accessibility. According to the 
UNGP Principle 31, “accessibility” can be ensured by having the 
operational-level grievance mechanisms “being known to all stakeholder 
groups for whose use they are intended, and providing adequate 
assistance for those who may face particular barriers to access”29. 
Furthermore, barriers to access may include “a lack of awareness of the 
                                                
28 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 31, at 33. 
29 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 31 (b), at 33. 
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mechanism, language, literacy, costs, physical location and fear of 
reprisal”30. 
 
It must be reiterated that assessing the accessibility of the existing 
operational-level grievance mechanisms will be limited to the context of 
subcontracted agricultural workers operating in the Tier-Two of the 
supply chain. Without any legal relationship with sugar producers, 
subcontracted agricultural workers seem to lack preliminary standing to 
gain access to operational-level grievance mechanisms administered or 
operated by the sugar producers and are likely to be more vulnerable to 
legal and practical barriers than the employees of the sugar producers. 
This research will also attempt to establish linkage between sugar 
producers and subcontracted agricultural workers based on the UNGP 
guidelines as well as on other available legal grounds.  
 
 
Question 3: 
Can an operational-level grievance mechanism based on the 
UNGP accessibility criteria and/or guidelines be developed 
in a manner that are contextually appropriate and tailored 
to Thailand’s sugar industry, and, if yes, how? 
 
To answer this question, the research will utilize information gathered 
from the assessment of existing operational-level grievance mechanisms, 
the identification of grievances, the establishment of linkage between 
sugar producers and subcontracted agricultural workers, and the analysis 
of the UNGP accessibility criteria to develop recommendations for sugar 
producers, as well as other interested business enterprises. The 
recommendations should serve as the UNGP-based guidelines for 
developing future pilot operational-level grievance mechanisms. While 
the recommendations will be inevitably based on the context of 
Thailand’s sugar industry, they may also serve as a pilot document and 
reference for future studies on other industries and/or countries. 
 
 
                                                
30  U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary to Principle 31 (b), at 34. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
 
To address the research questions, a number of methodologies will be 
employed throughout. For ease of comprehension, the methodologies 
will be presented in the stages as follow. 
 
1) The research utilizes the documentary research method to study 
the development of business and human rights and the UNGP, 
whereas heightened attention will be given to the Pillar III. 
Further, the documentary research method will be used to 
identify grievances based on international human rights law, 
Thailand’s national legislation, and current practices of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms administered or 
operated by various business enterprises. 
2) To examine the existing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms a qualitative study will be conducted regarding the 
grievances experienced by subcontracted agricultural workers as 
well as the legal and practical barriers that prevent subcontracted 
agricultural workers from effectively gaining access to the 
remedies. At this stage, a series of structured interviews will be 
conducted, with sample interviewees ranging from 
subcontracted agricultural workers and subcontractors, to the 
executives at a major business enterprise in the sugar industry.  
3) This research will then conduct a comparative study to explore 
relevant laws in ASEAN countries regarding the scope of 
employers’ obligations and liabilities towards their non-
employees in the supply-chain.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter I provided an introduction to this research, identified research 
questions and scope, and explained the methodology that will be utilized 
in this research. Overall, this research will study the implementation of 
the UNGP Pillar III’s “effectiveness criteria”. More specifically, its 
scope is focused on the accessibility (substantive scope) of subcontracted 
agricultural workers (personal scope) to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms provided by sugar producers (material scope). The analysis 
will be conducted against the context of Thailand’s sugar industry 
(geographical scope) with legal references to Thailand’s international 
human rights obligations and national legislations.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
Remedying the Victims: Revisiting the 
Global Standards for Access to Remedy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studying the implementation of operational-level grievance mechanisms 
requires the preliminary exploration of the global standards for access to 
remedy, which to date can be found in a number of notable international 
documents. Developed out of the correlation between business and 
human rights that has received international recognition as evidenced by 
a series of meetings and the release of various guideline initiatives, such 
as the UN Global Compact31 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 32 . These documents recognize that activities of business 
enterprises can cause various negative impacts on human rights 33 . 
Subsequently, the most iconic instrument to date relating to business and 
human rights was introduced – the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
                                                
31 U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles. (Developed 
in 2000, the UN Global Compact contains a set of 10 principles relating to 
human rights which companies are encouraged to participate.).  
32 O.E.C.D. (2011), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD 
Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en. (The OECD 
Guidelines are recommendations created by governments to multinational 
enterprises aiming to advocate for responsible business conduct.).  
33 For instance, the UN Global Compact Principle 2 requests companies to 
“make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses”. In addition, the 
OECD Guidelines in their General Policies section suggests that enterprises 
should “respect the internationally recognized human rights of those affected 
by their activities”. 
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and Human Rights34. This chapter aims to provide a brief synopsis of the 
development of this representative instrument. More specifically, it will 
provide justification for the research’s greater emphasis on the Pillar III, 
the access to remedy for victims of adverse human rights impacts caused 
or contributed to by, or directly linked to business enterprises. 
 
 
 
A. CREATING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS FOR 
BUSINESSES 
 
Human rights, as an idea, are inherent in all human beings without 
subjecting to discrimination of any kind. To set standards for human 
rights, many international instruments have codified them in various 
aspects. The most general codification of human rights standards can be 
found in the three core documents known as “the International Bill of 
Human Rights” – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights35, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 36 , and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights37. It 
must be noted at the outset that these core documents, as well as other 
human rights-related international documents, are only binding for 
States38. Only States can be parties, which means they have an obligation 
to respect human rights, to protect individuals and groups against human 
rights abuses, and to fulfill actions to facilitate the enjoyment of basic 
human rights.  
 
                                                
34 U.N.G.P., supra note 3. 
35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), 71. 
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
37 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
38 Justine Nolan, Mapping the movement: the business and human rights 
regulatory framework, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO 
PRACTICE 34 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, Justine Nolan eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
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Evidence reveals, however, that business enterprises can also cause, 
contribute to or have direct links to many adverse human rights impacts. 
From forced or bonded labor working in sweatshop factories to very 
young children working aimlessly at various plantations, these 
unfortunate situations are parts of business operations controlled by 
business enterprises. After observing the discourse in the existing 
international human rights regime, Professor John Ruggie interestingly 
asked, “can multinational corporate conduct be regulated to prevent or 
mitigate such human costs?”39 At the beginning, his quest to find answers 
to this profound question was met with some resistance. For instance, the 
proposal to create new Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises40 was opposed by business 
enterprises, as they regarded the Norms as “the privatization of human 
rights” by transferring States’ obligations to businesses. Had the Norms 
been enacted, they would have imposed some human rights obligations 
directly on business enterprises41 . Despite the initial opposition, the 
emergence of campaigns and lawsuits against business enterprises 
relating to human rights responsibilities prompted business enterprises to 
seek greater clarity on the matter42. As some governments found an 
intergovernmental process unachievable, Professor John Ruggie noted 
that it was high time that “a common terrain” be established 43, paving 
the path towards more studies on this matter. This so-called common 
terrain was materialized in 2005, when Professor John Ruggie was 
appointed the UN Special Representative on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and tasked with the role to help develop 
global initiatives on business and human rights. 
                                                
39 JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, xvi (W. W. Norton & Company, 1st ed. 2013). 
40 U.N. OHCHR, The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). (The Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises was drafted in 
2003 by the UN Sub-Commission of the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights. The Norms was presented to the then Commission on Human Rights 
but was not exercised.).  
41 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xvii. 
42 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xviii. 
43 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xviii. 
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1. Developing the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights 
 
In 2011, the United Nations endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights. Prepared by the team of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations (SRSG) Professor John Ruggie, the official 
name of the guiding principles is “the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework” or in short the UNGP. The UNGP elaborate on the State 
duty to protect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, and the need for effective remedies following human rights 
abuses44. Regarded as a challenging initiative45, the UNGP serve as the 
“authoritative focal point” for actions, which define the parameters 
within which States and business enterprises should further proceed, as 
well as clarifying roles and responsibilities that States and business 
enterprises should uphold46. In addition, the UNGP provide practical 
guidance, endorsed in the global common platform, for all stakeholders 
to ensure consistency in terms of implementation47. 
 
According to the UNGP,  
- “All States have a duty to protect everyone within their 
jurisdiction from human rights abuses committed by companies; 
- Companies have a responsibility to respect human rights – i.e., 
avoid infringing on the rights of others wherever they operate 
and whatever their size or industry, and address any impact that 
                                                
44 U.N.G.P., supra note 3. 
45 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xix. 
46 BUS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORG., The UN 'Protect, Respect, and Remedy' 
Framework for Business and Human Rights (Apr. 29, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf. 
47 Beata Faracik, Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, The European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights 
(DROI) (2017) (Apr. 30, 2016, 10 AM), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_S
TU(2017)578031_EN.pdf. 
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does occur. This responsibility exists independently of whether 
States fulfill their obligations; and 
- When abuses occur, victims must have access to effective 
remedy, through judicial and non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms.”48 
 
The UNGP are intended to apply to all States and all business 
enterprises49. Though the jurisdictional and territorial reach of the State 
duty to protect has not been clearly defined, the UNGP Principle 2 
clarifies that States are not “generally required under international human 
rights law to regulate extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in 
their territory and/or jurisdiction”50. Inferring from this statement, States 
can generally extend the extraterritorial application of the UNGP, 
provided they have a jurisdictional basis. Furthermore, States are 
encouraged to take greater extraterritorial steps in conflict-affected 
areas51. 
 
Despite their authoritative character, the UNGP are currently not an 
international instrument bearing a legal status. While the UNGP are 
formally non-binding, they do have legal effects. Therefore, they are 
considered soft-law52. However, as the UNGP have greatly evolved with 
wide participations from all stakeholders, some critics argue that the 
UNGP can amount to soft-law obligations53. Nevertheless, as many of 
the principles mirror the States’ international human rights obligations 
                                                
48 U.N. OHCHR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2014). 
49 Chip Pitts, The United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework and 
Guiding Principles, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO 
PRACTICE 52 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, Justine Nolan eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
50 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary to General Principle, at 2. 
51 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 7, at 8-9.  
52 Justine Nolan, All Care, No Responsibility?, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS 5, 13-14 
(Lara Blecher, Nancy Kaymar Stafford and Gretchen Bellamy eds., 1st ed. 
2015). 
53 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 124. 
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found in various international human rights instruments 54, the UNGP can 
be implemented through domestic laws enacted by national legislations. 
Essentially, States are obliged to comply with the UNGP when the 
principles are identical to the international obligations to which the States 
are already bound, and business enterprises are encouraged to respect 
human rights, particularly those expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights55. 
 
Conceptually, the UNGP is rested on three pillars, and the following 
sections provide a brief narration of each of them to illustrate how the 
UNGP sets human rights standards for specific actors. 
 
 
2. Pillar I: The State duty to protect human rights 
 
The UNGP Pillar I addresses the State “Duty to Protect”. It reaffirms the 
existing international human rights obligations born by the States, and 
highlights that the States are in the position to take proactive measures to 
fulfill this duty56. The core concept of the duty to protect is the protection 
rendered by States against human rights abuse caused by third parties, 
including business enterprises 57 . This concept is embedded in 
international human rights law, by first committing States themselves to 
refrain from violating human rights of persons within their jurisdiction, 
and second ensuring that all right-holders enjoy the realization of human 
rights enshrined in the international human rights law58. The second 
                                                
54 The UNGP Principle 12 clearly refers the responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights to internationally recognized human rights 
such as the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning 
fundamental rights set out in the International Labor Organization’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.  
55 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 12, at 13-14. 
56 Some proactive measures are stated in UNGP Principle 3, such as enforcing 
laws and policies aiming at requiring business enterprises to respect human 
rights. 
57 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 83. 
58 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 84. 
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prong, thus, obliges States to protect all right-holders against potential 
human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises. 
 
Essentially, this concept does not automatically impose direct 
responsibility on States in instances when business enterprises domiciled 
in their respective jurisdiction and/or territory commit human rights 
abuses. Instead, States may breach their international human rights 
obligations when there is proof that the following occurs: first, States fail 
to take appropriate steps to prevent human rights abuses caused by 
business enterprises; second, States fail to investigate, punish, and 
provide redress after the human rights abuses occur; and third, human 
rights abuses are caused by business enterprises with direct connection 
to States, such as business enterprises that are state-owned or act as state-
agents 59 . Consequently, the UNGP Pillar I provides the following 
guidelines for States to avoid the potential breach of their existing 
international human rights obligations: 
 
1) Protect – States must protect against human rights abuses within 
their territory and/or jurisdiction caused by third parties, 
including business enterprises60. 
2) Prevent – States must take appropriate steps to prevent human 
rights abuses from occurring61. As for appropriate steps, States 
are encouraged to implement as many preventative and remedial 
measures as possible “to ensure equality before the law”62. For 
instance, States should enforce laws or provide guidance that are 
aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business enterprises to 
respect human rights throughout their operations63. 
3) Investigate, Punish, Redress – States must take appropriate 
steps to investigate, punish and redress such abuses through 
effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication64. 
                                                
59 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 84. 
60 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 1, at 3. 
61 Id. 
62 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary to Principle 1, at 3. 
63 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 3, at 4-5. 
64 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 1, at 3. 
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4) Set clear expectations – States should set clear expectations that 
all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or 
respective jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their 
operation65. 
5) Promote – States should promote respect for human rights by 
business enterprises with which they conduct commercial 
transaction66. 
 
 
3. Pillar II: The corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights 
 
The UNGP Pillar II introduces the corporate “Responsibility to Respect”. 
It suggests that business enterprises should have responsibility to conduct 
their business operations in a manner that respects human rights. This 
concept differs from the state duty to protect; it creates a distinct 
responsibility to be born directly by business enterprises. The term 
“responsibility” is used instead of “obligation” to signify the former 
differs from legal duties67, as a certain degree of reluctance by legal 
academia to impose direction obligations on corporations still exists68. 
Under Pillar I, States have the obligation to protect against human rights 
abuses in various forms, including abuses caused by business enterprises 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction69. However, some States may be 
unable or unwilling to enforce this obligation, or the scope of applicable 
conducts may be limited as many States have not ratified all international 
human rights treaties 70 . As a result, introducing the corporate 
                                                
65 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 2, at 3-4. 
66 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 6, at 8. 
67 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 91. 
68 Jernej Letnar Černič, An Elephant in a Room of Porcelain: Establishing 
Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: 
DIRECT CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 144-145 (Jernej 
Letnar Černič, Tara Van Ho eds., 2015); see also Radu Mares and Cedric 
Ryngaert, Address at the GLOTHRO Project Final Conference in Turku, 
Finland (Mar. 27-29, 2014). 
69 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 1. 
70 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 90. 
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responsibility to respect as an independent concept in the UNGP is 
intended to expand the possibility of compliance by business enterprises 
by means of having a separate responsibility. 
 
The substance of the corporate responsibility to respect is derived from 
an existing, well-established social norm71, where society collectively 
expects business enterprises to respect human rights over the course of 
their operations. Being a social norm of “near-universal recognition”72, 
the corporate responsibility to respect is already largely acknowledged 
by business enterprises73  and is already enforced by some means of 
social sanctions74. Instead of codifying this norm, the UNGP refer to 
substantive rights found in internationally recognized human rights, 
particularly those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights 
and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the ILO’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work75.  
 
The foundational principles of the corporate responsibility to respect in 
the UNGP are straightforward. First, business enterprises should avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and address the human rights 
harm that they are involved in76. Measures taken to address the human 
rights harm must be adequate and appropriate77, and must not undermine 
                                                
71 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 91. 
72 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 92. 
73 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 92-93. (Many business enterprises have policies 
“to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to respect the principles of 
relevant international instruments where national law is absent”. Furthermore, 
various CSR initiatives, the joining of the UN Global Compact by many 
business enterprises, and the acceptance of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises are also signs of acknowledgement of the corporate 
responsibility to respect.). 
74 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 93. (For instance, many complaints have been 
filed to relevant authorities, such as the National Contact Point (NCP) under 
the OECD Guidelines, alleging business enterprises for not respecting human 
rights in their operations.). 
75 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 12, at 13-14. 
76 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 11, at 13. 
77 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary to Principle 11, at 13. 
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the States from fulfilling their own human rights obligations78. Second, 
the UNGP canvas the scope of application to encompass both actual and 
potential human rights impacts79, which are caused or contributed to both 
business enterprises themselves and/or by activities conducted by entities 
directly linked to the business enterprises80.  
 
The UNGP formulate the concept of the corporate responsibility to 
respect to be clear and predictable81, thereby aiding business enterprises 
in their comprehension and eventual implementation. Consequently, the 
UNGP Pillar II provides the following guidelines for business enterprises 
to avoid breaching their responsibility to respect human rights: 
 
1) Avoid – Business enterprises should avoid causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own 
activities82, or prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts 
which are directly linked to their operations, products or services 
by their business relationships, even if the business enterprises 
have not contributed to those impacts83. 
2) Have policy commitment – Business enterprises should have a 
policy commitment to respect human rights84. This commitment 
can be expressed in an approved and well-informed statement of 
policy 85 , it must be publicly available 86  and embedded 
throughout their functions without exception87. 
3) Carry out human rights due diligence – Human rights due 
diligence refers to the process of identifying and addressing 
human rights impact that business enterprises may cause or 
contribute throughout their operations88. The process should be 
                                                
78 Id. 
79 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 100. 
80 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 13(b), at 14-15. 
81 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 100. 
82 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 13(a), at 14-15. 
83 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 13(b), at 14-15. 
84 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 15(a), at 15-16. 
85 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 16(a), 16(b), at 16-17. 
86 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 16(d), at 16-17. 
87 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 16, at 16. 
88 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 17, at 17-19. 
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ongoing 89 , involve extensive consultation with all relevant 
stakeholders including experts and affected groups90, and have 
its effectiveness consistently tracked based on qualitative and 
quantitative indicators91. 
4) Provide remediation – Business enterprises must ensure that 
any adverse human rights impact they have caused or 
contributed to will be appropriately remediated through 
legitimate process92. 
 
 
4. Pillar III: Access to remedy for victims of business-
related abuses 
 
Access to remedy has already been embedded in the first two UNGP 
Pillars. As an obligation, States are required to take appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish, and redress human rights abuse through 
many means, including adjudication93. State-based adjudication per se is 
a form of access to remedy, and failing to provide this avenue may result 
in a breach of States’ international human rights obligations. 
Additionally, business enterprises are advised to provide for or cooperate 
in remediation through legitimate process after having caused or 
contributed to human rights abuses94. Whether as a state duty or through 
corporate responsibility, the UNGP recognize the importance of having 
access to remedy as one of the foundational principles in the international 
human rights system by dedicating the last Pillar specifically to this 
matter.  
 
Conceptually, providing effective access to remedy is among the key 
elements to ensure and promote greater accountability. Accountability, 
in principle, consists of two elements – answerability and 
                                                
89 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 17(c), at 18. 
90 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 18, at 19-20. 
91 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 20, at 22-23. 
92 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 22, at 24-25. 
93 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 1, at 3.. 
94 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 22, at 24-25. 
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enforceability95. To put it simpler, holding States or business enterprises 
accountable for failing to fulfill their duty or responsibility is to require 
them to explain their actions or non-actions (answerability) and to punish 
them for human rights abuses they have caused or contributed to 
(enforceability)96. Accountability, therefore, is an essential tool to ensure 
that States and business enterprises perform what they are obliged to do 
or responsible for.  
 
The UNGP Pillar III is designed to install accountability in the business 
and human rights arena. To achieve this, the UNGP identify existing 
grievance mechanisms and categorize them into State-based judicial 
grievance mechanisms, State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms, 
and non-State-based grievance mechanisms. The UNGP explicitly 
highlight that providing access to State-based grievance mechanisms, 
whether judicial or non-judicial, is part of every States’ duty to protect 
against business-related human rights abuses 97 , and advise business 
enterprises to establish or participate in effective operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities who may be 
adversely impacted98. More details on the UNGP Pillar III, which is the 
core subject of this research, will be provided in the following section. 
 
 
 
B. IMPORTANCE OF PILLAR III – ENSURING THE RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR VICTIMS 
 
Fundamentally, all Pillars in the UNGP are equally important and 
intertwined. They form the backbone of this groundbreaking document 
and emphasize the significance of human rights in business operations. 
The coexistence of all Pillars strengthens the complementary roles of all 
                                                
95 Zadek, supra note 22, at 240. 
96 Zadek, supra note 22, at 241. 
97 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 25, at 27-28. 
98 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 29, at 31-32. 
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stakeholders99. On the one hand, States must be able and willing to 
protect against human rights abuses caused by business enterprises 
domiciled in their respective jurisdiction and/or territory. On the other 
hand, business enterprises must respect human rights by refraining from 
causing or contributing to abuses in the course of their business 
operations. When human rights abuses occur, States and business 
enterprises must ensure that the victims have recourse to effective 
remedy in an appropriate forum. 
 
While all three Pillars are fundamentally regarded as equally important, 
past studies on business and human rights have concentrated on the first 
two100 – the substantive parts of the UNGP. During the Fourth Annual 
UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, one of the most prominent 
issues discussed was a concurring observation that the last pillar of the 
UNGP was “still largely overlooked”101. The event called for a concerted 
effort to explore and develop the substance on this so-called “forgotten 
pillar”102. Likewise, the OHCHR Report also highlights that Pillar III 
“has arguably received the least attention”103. Consequently, the Human 
Rights Council adopted a resolution that calls for an improvement of the 
access to remedy104 by encouraging States and business enterprises to 
fulfill their respective obligations and/or responsibilities under the 
UNGP by finding ways to improve the existing grievance 
mechanisms105. Furthermore, the UN Working Group on Business and 
                                                
99 U.N. OHCHR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2014).  
100 GLOBAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIFFORD CHANCE, 
Access to Remedy: The Next Frontier? (Jul. 15, 2016, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.global-business-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Access-
to-Remedy-The-Next-Frontier.pdf. 
101 Mcgrath, supra note 23. 
102 Id. 
103 U.N. Rep. of the OHCHR, Sep. 10. 2016, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/19 (2016), 
at 4. 
104 Human Rights Council Res., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L/19 (Jun. 29, 2016). 
105 Id.  
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Human Rights will feature the issue of access to remedy in its 2017 
report106.  
 
Having effective grievance mechanisms is not only a testament to the 
willingness to achieve the goals of Pillar III, but also strengthens the 
protection and respect of human rights from an accountability 
perspective. Ensuring access to remedy through effective grievance 
mechanisms affirms the accountability for causing human rights abuses 
and a deterrence effect could potentially ensue. By confirming the rights 
to an effective remedy for victims, the UNGP foster this goal in Pillar 
III107 and advocate for the improvement of this aspect also in the first two 
pillars. States have the primary duty to ensure access to remedy. Such 
duty is enshrined and articulated in various human rights treaties, and the 
States can fulfill it by ensuring effective grievance mechanisms and 
reducing potential barriers to the achievement of such goal. Second, 
business enterprises should provide access to effective grievance 
mechanisms. They should identify causes of business-related human 
rights abuses and be proactive in legitimate remediation 108 . These 
interconnections emphasize the importance of the right to an effective 
remedy.  
 
The right to an effective remedy is “a core tenet of international human 
rights law”109. As a human rights obligation, the right to an effective 
remedy typically shares several characteristics, which are different from 
other obligations under the general international law regime 110 . 
Distinctions must be made between obligations under traditional 
international law and those under international human rights law. 
Generally, obligations under traditional international law arise from a 
                                                
106 GLOBAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIFFORD CHANCE, 
supra note 100. 
107 Human Rights Council Res., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
108 GLOBAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIFFORD CHANCE, 
supra note 100. 
109 U.N., supra note 103. 
110 Frederick Megret, Nature of Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 98 (Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014). 
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specific contract between States Parties111 . In other words, they are 
reciprocal among State Parties and exist only to the extent that the State 
Parties have given their consent. From this rather politically motivated 
setting, State Parties are free to delimit the duty perimeter they are 
willing to be bound or obliged to fulfill. Also, a State Party may cease to 
honor its treaty-based obligation when other State Parties do not comply. 
However, treaty-based human rights obligations are set in a different 
context and share some special characteristics 112 . Firstly, the right-
holders, as beneficiaries of human right treaties, are individuals or groups 
of individuals, not States113. While States formally bind themselves with 
international human rights obligations to other States, it is the affirmation 
of human rights of third-party beneficiaries within their respective 
jurisdiction and/or territory that in fact results from this commitment114. 
Secondly, reciprocity is practically invalid in international human rights 
obligations. As such, non-compliance of one or some of the State Parties 
does not automatically permit any State Party to also cease to honor their 
human rights obligations, as this would instead affect the individuals or 
groups of individuals who are the beneficiaries of the rights115. Thirdly, 
human rights treaties are regarded as legislative, or even constitutional116. 
                                                
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 99. (Professor Megret noted that the term “special characters” has 
already been refined by various human rights bodies to reflect the distinction 
of international human rights obligations from those under traditional 
international law.).  
113 Matthew Craven, Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human 
Rights Treaty in International Law, 2000 11 European J. Int’l L., 489, 493. 
114 Megret, supra note 110, at 99.  
115 Id.; See also Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion, 
1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). (The ICJ distinguished between ordinary treaties and 
those with human rights characters: “[T]he contracting States do not have any 
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, 
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison 
d’etre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot 
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the 
maintenance of a perfect contractual between rights and duties.”). 
116 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 1995 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 75. 
(In this case, the European Court of Human Rights described the European 
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Hence, the substance of international human rights obligations resembles 
the community norms to which all community members must adhere, 
rather than contract-based contents created by and only applicable to 
State Parties as found in other general international law instruments. 
Consequently, an obligation to ensure the right to effective remedy is 
mandatory, as a human rights obligation must always be honored and 
fulfilled by the State Parties of the international human rights instruments 
in which such right is embedded, regardless of non-compliance by other 
State Parties. 
 
The right to an effective remedy is one of the most fundamental human 
rights. Embedded in many international human rights instruments, it 
imposes an obligation on State Parties to provide remedies and 
reparations for victims of human rights abuses and serves as an 
underlying platform for constructing the UNGP Pillar III. To start, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 8 expressly 
declares that everyone has the right to an effective remedy117. More 
specifically, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Article 6 affirms that everyone 
within the jurisdiction of State Parties is assured of effective protection 
and remedies against any acts of racial discrimination118. While the term 
“right to an effective remedy” is the most straightforward, other core 
international human rights instruments employ different wording due to 
their application in different contexts, but retain the fundamental idea 
reflecting the right to an effective remedy. For instance, the International 
                                                
Convention of Human Rights as “a constitutional instrument of European 
public order”.). 
117 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 8. (Article 8, “Everyone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”). 
118 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 6, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211. (Article 6, “State 
Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection 
and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State 
institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human 
rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the 
right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction 
for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination”.). 
 	 29 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 14(1)119 and the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) Article 18(1)120 use the 
term “a fair and public hearing”, while the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) Article 37(d)121 uses the term “prompt access to legal 
and other appropriate assistance”, and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Article 13122 uses the term “effective 
access to justice”. 
                                                
119 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 14(1) (Article 14(1), “All persons shall be 
equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be 
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre 
public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the 
private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a 
suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons 
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the 
guardianship of children.”). 
120 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 18(1), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 
U.N.T.S. 93. (Article 18(1), “Migrant workers and members of their families 
shall have the right to equality with nationals of the State concerned before the 
courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against them 
or of their rights and obligations in a suit of law, they shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”). 
121 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(d), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S 3. (Art. 37(d),“Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have 
the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as 
the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before 
a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a 
prompt decision on any such action.”). 
122 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 13, Dec. 13, 
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. (Article 13, “States Parties shall ensure effective 
access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, 
including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate 
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Whichever term the right to effective remedy is referred as, satisfying the 
obligation to ensure this right requires a conceptual understanding of the 
human rights obligation “tripartite typology” – that is, States must 
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights123. Firstly, to respect, States 
must not take any measures that interfere with the enjoyment of human 
rights of persons within their respective jurisdiction and/or territory. 
Hence, States must not take any measures that result in creating barriers 
to effective remedy. Secondly, to protect, States need to take proactive 
measures to ensure that such persons do not suffer from human rights 
violation committed by third parties. Only if it can be proven that States 
failed or “lacked due diligence”124 to prevent the violation, it would 
result in the breach of the States international human rights obligations. 
Thus, States must create an environment or adopt measures that promote 
the enjoyment of the right to effective remedy. Further, States must take 
measures to ensure that no third parties in their respective jurisdiction 
and/or territory, such as business enterprises, create barriers to prevent 
individuals or groups of individuals from enjoying their rights to 
effective remedy125. Finally, to fulfill, States should take positive steps 
to warrant a greater enjoyment of human rights. Such positive steps can 
range from adopting appropriate laws that incorporate States 
international human rights obligations into domestic laws, to training 
States officers to be knowledgeable or capable of preventing human 
rights violations 126 , to providing individuals with adequate food 
whenever they are deprived of their right to food as enshrined in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) “for reasons beyond their control”127. In addition, providing 
                                                
accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and 
indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, 
including at investigative and other preliminary stages.”). 
123 Megret, supra note 110, at 101. 
124 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
4, ¶ 172, 176 (Jul. 29, 1988).  
125 Megret, supra note 110, at 102. 
126 Megret, supra note 110, at 103. 
127 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of 
the Covenant), May 12, 1999 (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html. 
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effective remedy is a suitable example of a States’ obligation to fulfill. 
States are required to create an accountable society where human rights 
violations are consistently punished whether by State-based or non-
State-based grievance mechanisms. If the society is under the impression 
that human rights violations often go unpunished, it may trigger a lack in 
confidence and a breach of States’ human rights obligations to fulfill128.  
 
With the rights to effective remedy embedded in many international 
human rights instruments to which States Parties are obliged to adhere, 
implementing the UNGP Pillar III thus facilitates the greater realization 
of the States human rights obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
right to effective remedy, as well as fulfilling the State duty to protect in 
accordance with the UNGP Pillar I. At the same time, implementing the 
UNGP Pillar III enables business enterprises to fulfill their responsibility 
to respect the right to effective remedy in accordance with the UNGP 
Pillar II. 
 
 
 
C. DOING BUSINESS RESPONSIBLY – CREATING 
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR OPERATIONAL-LEVEL 
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 
 
Recalling the interplay between the UNGP Pillar I and III in the previous 
section, States have a duty to protect human rights, which includes the 
right of victims to effective remedy. Essentially, ensuring access to 
effective remedy facilitates the realization of other rights129, such as non-
discrimination and the rights of the child130. Generally, States fulfill this 
                                                
128 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 124, ¶ 176. 
129 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12, 2000, 2000 
(C 364/1), art. 47. (For instance, Article 47 provides that “everyone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal” and are entitled to legal aid “in 
so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice”.). 
130 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Improving access to 
remedy in the area of business and human rights at the EU level – Opinion of 
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duty by providing remedy through State-based grievance mechanisms, 
which can be both judicial and non-judicial. State-based judicial 
grievance mechanisms are national judicial institutions, such as courts 
and tribunals, overseeing both civil and criminal cases, whereas State-
based non-judicial grievance mechanisms can range from mediation, 
arbitration, and ombudsperson institutions, to those provided by National 
Human Rights Institutions (NHRI), such as the OECD National Contact 
Points (NCP), and other multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) which 
involve States131. Both types of State-based grievance mechanisms are 
not mutually exclusive. In fact, they complement each other by filling 
gaps that could otherwise prevent effective remedy. State-based non-
judicial grievance mechanisms are regarded as quicker, cheaper, and 
simpler than State-based judicial grievance mechanisms132. Depending 
on the situation, State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms may 
serve as a starting point, and at a later stage the case may be taken to the 
judicial grievance mechanisms. Currently, the Council of Europe 
recommends that “Member States should provide for State-based non-
judicial grievance mechanisms that meet the effectiveness criteria listed 
in the Principle 31 of the UNGP” and “facilitate the implementation of 
their decisions” 133 . Moreover, “bodies such as labor inspectorates, 
National Human Rights Institutions, and equality bodies, should be 
evaluated as to the ‘adequacy and availability’ in general and the 
remedies they afford”134. 
 
                                                
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2017/business-human-rights, at 19. 
131 GLOBAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIFFORD CHANCE, 
supra note 100, at 7; see also Handbook on European law relating to access to 
justice, Luxembourg, Publications Office, European Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) (Jan. 2016). 
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133 COUNCIL OF EUR., Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
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However, relying solely on State-based grievance mechanisms may 
jeopardize the possibility of accessing remedy in an effective manner. 
This is because there are multiple barriers associated with State-based 
grievance mechanisms. For instance, in a situation where a subsidiary 
company of a multinational corporation violates human rights in a host 
State, in which the subsidiary company operates, victims typically seek 
redress from the subsidiary company in this host State. If this fails, 
victims are still unable to seek redress in the home State, where the 
multinational corporation (as parent corporation) is domiciled135. Under 
the doctrine of limited liability and separate corporate personality, parent 
corporations can easily escape from their liability for human rights 
abuses caused by their subsidiary company operating in countries with 
weak or ineffective legal systems 136 . This is because the parent 
corporation and the subsidiary company are, in fact, two different 
companies. Moreover, there are jurisdictional issues arising from cross-
border claims, since the domestic court of a home State does not have 
jurisdiction over claims that occur in the territory of a host State, which 
means the claim is outside of the home State’s territorial jurisdiction. 
Despite several attempts to recommend137, whether by being regulated 
by the so-called “Brussels regime” among the EU Member States138, or 
by invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens in common law 
jurisdictions to give discretion to courts to grant a stay of proceedings139 
                                                
135 Id. (The UNGP Commentary 26 also recognizes this legal barrier as it states 
that this legal barrier can arise where “claimants face a denial of justice in a 
host State and cannot access home State courts regardless of the merits of the 
claim”.). 
136 Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for 
Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1769 (2015). 
137 COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 133, at ¶ 35. 
138 Commission Regulation No.44/2001 (recast as (EU) No.1215/2012), the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Denmark on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters and the Lugano Convention, Convention on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, O.J. L339/3.  
139 Christine Kaufmann, Holding multinational corporations accountable for 
human rights violations: litigation outside the United States, in BUSINESS AND 
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in favor of a forum where the case may be “tried more suitably for the 
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice”140, a practical obstacle 
regarding the jurisdictional barriers continues to be the potential practice 
of potential “forum shopping”141 where multinational corporations may 
choose to establish their subsidiaries in countries with weak judicial 
systems, especially in countries outside the Brussels regime or in 
countries whose courts are known to be hesitant to assert jurisdiction 
through some available doctrines. 
 
With several barriers associated with State-based grievance mechanisms 
identified, resorting to non-State-based grievance mechanisms, 
especially the ones at the operational level, may be more efficient and 
favorable in ensuring the right to effective remedy. The UNGP Pillar II 
is innovative in that it embeds the right to effective remedy into one of 
the responsibilities that business enterprises should respect. According 
to UNGP Principle 22, business enterprises must ensure that any adverse 
human rights impact they have caused or contributed to will be 
appropriately remediated through legitimate process142. This mirrors the 
UNGP’s categorization of different scenarios, for which business 
enterprises are expected to take responsibility. First, a business enterprise 
is responsible to ensure legitimate remediation when it causes adverse 
human rights impact, whether through its action or omission143. Second, 
a business enterprise has to take responsibility when it contributes to 
adverse human rights impact through its own activities and “as a result 
of its business relationship with other parties”144. Lastly and seemingly 
less stringently enforced, a business enterprise is required to seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impact when such impact is 
directly linked to its operations, products or services through its business 
relationships145.  
                                                
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 254 (Dorothée Baumann-
Pauly, Justine Nolan eds., 1st ed. 2016).  
140 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex [1987] A.C. 460, 476. 
141 E.U. FRA, supra note 130, at 32. 
142 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 22, at 24-25. 
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144 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary Principle 13, at 15. 
145 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 13(b), at 14-15. 
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By extending the scope of implementation beyond the State-nexus 
sphere, the UNGP creates a whole new platform for this right to be 
realized, as, in some situations, obtaining the cooperation of non-State 
entities, including business enterprises, to foster grievance mechanisms 
may be more appropriate, practical, and effective. As a type of non-State-
based grievance mechanisms, operational-level grievance mechanisms 
are administered or operated by business enterprises to resolve cases 
concerning business-related human rights abuses and should be 
accessible “directly to individuals and communities”146. Alternatively, 
operational-level grievance mechanisms may be provided “through 
recourse to a mutually acceptable external expert or body”147.  
 
The benefits of using operational-level grievance mechanisms, as 
highlighted in the Commentary to the UNGP, are the capability to 
identify adverse human rights impact as a part of business enterprises’ 
ongoing human rights due diligence and the competence to provide 
effective remedy immediately after the victims are abused. 148 
Formulating from this view, the UNGP, therefore, provides effectiveness 
criteria and guidance on best practices for operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. The following sections discuss the effectiveness criteria 
defined in the UNGP, followed by some prominent barriers that prevent 
access to operational-grievance mechanisms.  
 
 
1. Effectiveness criteria for operational-level 
grievance mechanisms  
 
Traditionally, providing remedy has been regarded as the fundamental 
role of States through their judicial systems. While the UNGP recognizes 
the utility of State-based judicial grievance mechanisms, it also suggests 
to the States to complement such mechanisms by ensuring the 
availability of effective non-State-based, non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms, including operational-level grievance mechanisms. From 
                                                
146 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary of Principle 26, at 29. 
147 Id. 
148 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 29, at 32.  
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the business enterprises’ point of view, resorting to an operational-level 
grievance mechanism for dispute resolution reduces the risk of long, on-
going litigation and negative public campaigns, where chances of 
successfully winning over both potential scenarios are typically rendered 
as too optimistic149. Hence, business enterprises are likely to be better off 
when they identify and address grievances early before they escalate into 
larger publicity damage. Initially, Professor John Ruggie in a 2008 
Report to the Human Rights Council suggested that an operational-level 
grievance mechanism should focus on direct or mediated dialogue, 
which should be administered by representatives of the groups who may 
need to access it150. This 2008 Report further provided an initial list of 
effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms; whereby 
such mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, 
rights-compatible, and transparent 151 . A year later, Professor John 
Ruggie officially clarified in his 2009 Report that by suggesting that an 
operational-level grievance mechanism be based on dialogue and 
mediation, it should not be adjudicated by business enterprises152. The 
final list of effectiveness criteria became official when the Human Rights 
Council endorsed the UNGP in 2011.  
 
To measure the effectiveness, the UNGP Principle 31 suggests that 
effective operational-level grievance mechanisms should be: 153 
 
(a) Legitimate: enabling trust from the shareholder groups for 
whose use they are intended, and being accountable for the 
fair conduct of grievance processes; 
(b) Accessible: being known to all stakeholder groups for whose 
use they are intended, and providing adequate assistance for 
those who may face particular barriers to access; 
(c) Predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an 
indicative time frame for each stage, and clarity on the types 
                                                
149 Human Rights Council Distr., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008), at 93.  
150 Id., at 95. 
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152 Human Rights Council Distr., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009), at 
99. 
153 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 31, at 33-34. 
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of process and outcome available and means of monitoring 
implementation; 
(d) Equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have 
reasonable access to sources of information, advice and 
expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, 
informed and respectful terms; 
(e) Transparent: keeping parties to a grievance informed about 
its progress, and providing sufficient information about the 
mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its 
effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake; 
(f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies 
accord with internationally recognized human rights; 
(g) A source of continuous learning: drawing on relevant 
measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism 
and preventing future grievances and harms; 
 
Operational-level mechanisms should also be: 
(h) Based on engagement and dialogue: consulting the 
stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended on their 
design and performance, and focusing on dialogue as the 
means to address and resolve grievances. 
 
Each criterion addresses different aspects of an operational-level 
grievance mechanism. First, for legitimacy, being trusted by intended 
users or aggrieved parties is the ultimate goal. The perception of 
legitimacy among intended users can be improved through trust-building 
and by fostering formal governance of an operational-level grievance 
mechanism, such as including formal procedural provisions and 
involving intended users in the design process154. Second, accessibility 
focuses on ensuring that intended users know about the operational-level 
grievance mechanism. Merely publicizing the existence of such 
mechanism is insufficient; there must be measures in place to ensure that 
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Grievance Mechanisms: A Report of Lessons Learned, in CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE, (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy School of 
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the intended users are well aware of its existence155. Third, predictability 
emphasizes the need for a clear time frame for every stage of the 
procedure as well as the rendering and implementation of the outcome. 
In principle, this requires the creation of a balance between formalization 
and flexibility. Occasionally, the original time frame might need to be 
extended to accommodate further required investigations. In this case, 
clear explanations should be given to all parties involved156. Fourth, 
equitability should ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access 
to sources of information, advice, and necessary expertise. Initially, this 
was a critical challenge, as business enterprises often lack resources to 
provide full assistance to the aggrieved parties. The use of the terms 
“reasonable” and “necessary” however softens the otherwise rigorous 
requirement and makes it more achievable for business enterprises to 
fulfill157. Fifth, transparency, as opposed to predictability, focuses on 
informing the aggrieved parties of the post-submission status of their 
complaint and how efficiently the operational-level grievance 
mechanism, to which they submitted their complaint, is performing. This 
principle must also take confidentiality into consideration, as it may be 
necessary to prevent possible retaliation against the aggrieved parties158. 
Sixth, the rights-compatibility principle does not imply that all 
grievances always amount to alleged human rights abuses. Rather, it 
ensures that the identification and the resolution of grievances prevent 
them from possibly escalating to the level of human rights abuses159. 
Seventh, as source for continuous learning, data received from running 
an operational-level grievance mechanism, such as number of reported 
grievances, feedbacks from users and performance tracking, will help to 
improve the mechanism in the future. It might even prevent potential 
future harms and grievances160. Lastly, an operational-level grievance 
mechanism should be based on dialogue and engagement. In doing so, 
situations, in which a business enterprise simultaneously assumes the 
role of judge and defendant can be prevented. Further, unilateral 
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decisions made by a business enterprise and conceived as an outcome are 
precluded161. In any case, if an adjudication becomes necessary, it must 
be provided by a legitimate, independent third-party mechanism162. 
 
In summary, the UNGP Commentary highlights three important basic 
features that an operational-level grievance mechanism should 
incorporate; it must be designed in a way that groups of people for whose 
use an operational-level grievance mechanism is intended are aware of 
its existence, have trust in it, and can use it in a practical manner163. In 
addition, an operational-level grievance mechanism should not replace 
or preclude access to other types of grievance mechanisms such as 
judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms, as well as legitimate 
trade union procedures in labor-related disputes164. 
 
While all of the UNGP effectiveness criteria are, in principle, equally 
indispensable for building operational-level grievance mechanisms that 
are trustworthy, widely utilized by victims and that serve as useful 
references for future operational-level grievance mechanisms, 
examining every criterion will require a magnitude of tasks to be 
performed. In fact, it has been argued that “there is not a one-size-fits-all 
approach” 165  to effective operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
Henceforth, this research chooses to focus on the last of the three basic 
features – that is, the requirement that groups of people are able to use 
such mechanisms in a practical manner. Mirroring this feature is the 
Principle 31(b) on “Accessibility”.  
 
 
                                                
161 Id., at 24-26.  
162 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary of Principle 31, at 35. 
163 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary of Principle 31, at 34. 
164 Rees, supra note 154, at 9. 
165 Van Genugten et al., Company-community conflicts: the effectiveness of 
outcomes of non-judicial conflict resolution. An explanatory report. Report 
prepared for ACCESS Facility, The Hague (2013), at 56. 
 	 40 
2. Barriers to accessing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms 
 
Access to operational-level grievance mechanisms may be hampered by 
several barriers. While the use of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms may circumvent certain barriers found in State-based 
judicial grievance mechanisms, other barriers continue to exist. The 
UNGP Commentary, thus, identified several barriers that might 
jeopardize the accessibility to operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
Among these are “a lack of awareness of the mechanism, language, 
literacy, costs, physical location and fear of reprisals”166. Furthermore, it 
recognized the imbalance of financial competence between business 
enterprises and victims – which means that the latter are often unable to 
obtain financial support throughout the case, thus restricting the 
likelihood of being able to benefit from a “fair process”167. More notably, 
many operational-level grievance mechanisms often suffer from a lack 
of trust and credibility, as they are owned and operated by business 
enterprises, which allegedly caused or contributed to human rights 
abuses involving their intended users168. In some cases, claimants to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms may be required to waive their 
rights to pursue possible future legal action against the business 
enterprises169. While there is currently no prohibition on legal waivers, 
the OHCHR believes that such legal waiver “should be as narrowly 
                                                
166 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary of Principle 31, at 34. 
167 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary of Principle 31, at 35. 
168 Colleen Freeman and Esther de Haan, Using Grievance Mechanisms: 
Accessibility, Predictability, Legitimacy and Workers’ Complaint Experiences 
in the Electronic Sector (Amsterdam, Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale 
Ondernemingen SOMO: Center for Research on Multinational Corporation, 
2014). 
169 EarthRights International, Survivor of Rape by Barrick Gold Security 
Guards Offered “Business Grants” and “Training” in Exchange for Waiving 
Legal Rights (Sep. 11, 2017, 1:40 PM), 
https://www.earthrights.org/media/survivors-rape-barrick-gold-security-
guards-offered-business-grants-and-training-exchange. 
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construed as possible, and preserve the right of claimants to seek judicial 
recourse for any criminal claims”170. 
 
Other documents have also identified barriers to access that can be added 
to the UNGP list. For instance, the Harvard Kennedy School Working 
Paper for Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative No. 40 titled 
“Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights”171 identified 
several interesting barriers to access in connection with non-State-based 
grievance mechanisms. First, claimants may face certain restrictions 
preventing them from being parties to the operational-grievance 
mechanism. Such restrictions can range from requiring membership to a 
specific organization or initiatives ruling out third parties who are not 
authorized representatives 172 . Second, an operational-level grievance 
mechanism, especially one with efficient fact-finding procedures, may 
be too “resource intensive” and costly to operate. In practice, business 
enterprises may not be able to staff competent departments and dedicate 
human resources specifically to the handling of their operational-level 
grievance mechanisms. Furthermore, business enterprises with limited 
resources may have to create additional measures or impose barriers to 
limit the number of incoming case filings173.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
170 U.N. OHCHR, supra note 24.  
171 Caroline Rees, Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: 
Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
INITIATIVE, WORKING PAPER NO. 40 (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy 
School of Government. Harvard University, 2008). 
172 Id., at 12. 
173 Id., at 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter II provided a preliminary exploration of the global standards on 
access to remedy prior to studying the implementation of operational-
level grievance mechanisms in the context of Thailand’s sugar industry. 
To start, Section II.A outlined the fundamental principles relating to 
business and human rights and explained the conceptual justification and 
development of the UNGP and the three Pillars. Section II.B focused 
mostly on Pillar II – Access to Remedy – and justified the importance of 
revitalizing this so-called “forgotten pillar” to promote and ensure the 
right to effective remedy. The research conceptualized grievance 
mechanisms in accordance with the UNGP Pillars structure – state duty 
to protect and corporate responsibility to respect. Whereas States are 
obliged to fulfill their duty to protect by providing remedy through state-
based grievance mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial, business 
enterprises may fulfill their responsibility to respect human rights by 
implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms in their business 
operation. Section II.C first discussed the barriers associated with State-
based grievance mechanisms and suggested the use of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms as an alternative to circumvent such barriers. 
Then, the research discussed the UNGP effectiveness criteria and 
reiterated the scope of the study in accordance with the “accessibility” 
criteria. This research argued that the access to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms, if executed effectively, can serve to ensure the 
right to effective remedy for the victims, including the subcontracted 
agricultural workers who are the focus of this research. This Chapter 
concluded by exploring several potential barriers that might jeopardize 
the accessibility to operational-level grievance mechanisms. Further 
information on the UNGP accessibility criteria and identification of 
potential barriers will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Pillar III in Context: Thailand and its 
Sugar Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementing the UNGP has not been an easy endeavor. Constant 
resistance from stakeholders, particularly from governments and 
business enterprises, has become a familiar feature. Some repressive or 
authoritarian governments may not be capable or willing to protect the 
fundamental human rights of the people in their jurisdiction and/or 
territory174. Likewise, business enterprises that disregard human rights or 
even cause or contribute to human rights abuses are less likely to bind 
themselves to any form of accountability 175 . In the past, numerous 
academic works have attempted to study the implementation of the 
UNGP 176 , and the results reveal that several private sector actors, 
including business enterprises 177 , are increasingly prepared to 
incorporate human rights into their everyday operations. While this 
willingness is unquestionably welcome news, finding ways to further 
increase the capacity of business enterprises to respect human rights and 
to provide access to remedy is undoubtedly a commendable, yet 
                                                
174 Justine Nolan, Business and Human Rights in Context, in BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 3 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, 
Justine Nolan eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
175 Id.  
176 For instance, Faracik, supra note 47; Maddalena Neglia, The 
Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Some Reflections on European and US Experiences, Working Paper No. 
2014/35, Maastricht School of Management (2014), 
https://www.msm.nl/resources/uploads/2014/09/MSM-WP2014-35.pdf. 
177 Faracik, supra note 47. 
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challenging task. This research intends to support the endeavor by 
conducting an implementation study specifically on ensuring greater 
accessibility to operational-level grievance mechanisms administered or 
operated by business enterprises. This analysis is supported by a 
qualitative study performed in the context of Thailand’s sugar industry. 
To provide background information on Thailand and its sugar industry 
and contextualize this research as well as support further analysis, this 
Chapter will discuss Thailand’s reaction to the UNGP, map the supply-
chain of Thailand’s sugar industry, identify actors, explore negative 
impacts on human rights in the supply-chain, and map the available 
grievance mechanisms including the operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 
A. THAILAND’S REACTION TO THE UNGP 
 
Located in Southeast Asia, the Kingdom of Thailand has areas covering 
513,120 sq.km., bordering Myanmar to the West, Cambodia and Laos to 
the East, and Malaysia to the South. Its economy largely depends on 
various types of export, including agricultural products. The GDP per 
capita in 2016 was approximately at 16,800 USD, and its labor force at 
38.45 million makes Thailand the World’s 17th178. Thailand is a party to 
all international bills of human rights and six additional international 
human rights instruments: International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)179 ; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)180; International Convention on Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)181; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
                                                
178 CIA World Fact Book, Thailand (Sep. 8, 2017, 8 AM), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html. 
179 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36. 
180 I.C.E.S.C.R., supra note 37. 
181 C.E.R.D., supra note 118. 
 	 45 
(CEDAW) 182 ; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 183 ; 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment (CAT) 184 ; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD)185; and International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (CED)186. The last core 
human rights treaty that Thailand has not yet signed or ratified is the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
of their Families (CMW)187. With its dualist approach, Thailand has to 
implement its international human rights obligations into its domestic 
legislations.  
 
The government of Thailand has had some formal responses and made 
reference to the protection of human rights as well as subsequently to the 
issue of business and human rights on various occasions. Initially, 
Thailand made an international pledge to voluntarily affirm human 
rights, and stated: “Thailand is firmly committed to the respect for human 
dignity, justice, compassion, non-discrimination, and a sense of mutual 
obligations to the fellow human beings”188. In addition, Thailand has 
illustrated its firm commitment to cooperate with the Human Rights 
Council and reaffirmed its belief that “all human rights are indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated” and Thailand will continue “to promote 
and protect all human rights, be they civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights, and the right to development on an equal footing”189. 
Thailand’s constant participation, cooperation, and report submission to 
the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights also illustrates its 
                                                
182 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
183 C.R.C., supra note 121. 
184 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment, Feb. 4, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112. 
185 C.R.P.D., supra note 122. 
186 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. 
187 C.M.W., supra note 120. 
188 The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Thailand’s 
Voluntary Pledges and Commitments in the field of human rights, Letter 
No.56101/643 (Apr.24, 2006). 
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commitment to the duty to protect human rights190. Currently, Thailand 
is in the process of developing its version of an OECD National Action 
Plan with specific focus on business and human rights191, and the cabinet 
released a Ministerial Resolutions in May 2016 to regulate Thailand’s 
outbound investment and recommend compliance with the UNGP192. 
 
Thailand has been gradually introducing the UNGP to the Thai public 
mainly through a series of research conducted by the National Human 
Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC). The NHRC commissioned 
groups of researchers to translate the UNGP and conduct preliminary 
research on the implementation of the UNGP in various aspects. As of 
2017, the finished analyses, all of which are available in the Thai 
language, are: (1) Introduction to Business and Human Rights under the 
UN Framework of Protect, Respect, Remedy 193 ; (2) International 
Standards of Business Operation that Respect Human Rights194; (3) The 
Role of the National Human Rights Commission to Protect Human 
                                                
190 For instance, U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights Committee considers the Report 
of Thailand on Mar. 14, 2017 (Sep. 8, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21
377&LangID=E. 
191 U.N. OHCHR, State national action plan (Sep. 8, 2017, 8:50 AM), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx. 
192 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Cabinet gives 
greenlight to outbound and domestic investment and must respect human 
rights (Sep. 8, 2017, 9 AM), http://www.nhrc.or.th/News/Information-News/ไฟ
เขียวผลักดันมาตรการหนุนธุรกิจเอื:อสิทธิมนุษยชน.aspx; see also Wora Suk, Writing the 
Rulebook: Will Thailand Force its Businesses to Respect Human Rights? (Sep. 
8, 2017, 9 AM), https://www.earthrights.org/blog/writing-rulebook-will-
thailand-force-its-businesses-respect-human-rights. 
193 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Introduction to 
Business and Human Rights under the UN Framework of Protect, Respect, 
Remedy (Sep. 8, 2017, 9:20 AM), 
http://library.nhrc.or.th/ulib/document/ebook/E08289/ebook.html#p=8. 
194 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, International 
Standards of Business Operation that Respect Human Rights (Sep. 8, 2017, 
9:20 AM), http://library.nhrc.or.th/ulib/document/Fulltext/F09042.pdf 
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Rights Violation by Private Sectors195; (4) Impact of Retail Businesses 
on the Protection of Human Rights 196 ; and (5) Human Rights Due 
Diligence197. Furthermore, Thailand’s Ministry of Justice recently hosted 
an academic conference entitled “the Dissemination and Implementation 
of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights” on May 31, 2017, where Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha 
reaffirmed the importance of the UNGP and their correlation with the 
Sufficiency Economy Philosophy – a Thai development approach 
advocated by His Majesty the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej of 
Thailand. At the event, the Ministry of Justice together with 7 other 
entities – National Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, The Federation of Thai Industries, The 
Thai Bankers Association, The Thai Chamber of Commerce, and Global 
Compact Network Thailand – signed a Declaration on the 
Implementation of the UNGP198. 
 
Past the celebratory introduction, the actual implementation of the 
UNGP will need to be executed and enforced. Until now, Thailand, as 
part of its duty to protect, has implemented various non-binding 
initiatives to encourage business enterprises to respect human rights, and 
has provided both judicial and non-judicial, State-based grievance 
mechanisms for victims of business-related adverse human rights impact 
to seek remedy. For instance, the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 
(1977) recently amended in B.E. 2560 (2017) grants special investment 
promotion privileges, such as exemption on imported duties, to eligible 
business enterprises provided that the submitted investment project 
                                                
195 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, The Role of the 
National Human Rights Commission to Protect Human Rights Violation by 
Private Sectors (Sep. 8, 2017, 9:30 AM), 
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196 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Impact of Retail 
Businesses on the Protection of Human Rights (Sep. 8, 2017, 9:40 AM), 
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197 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Human Rights Due 
Diligence (Sep. 8, 2017, 9:45 AM), 
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contains appropriate measures to protect and monitor so as not to cause 
damage to the quality of the environment, for the benefit of people’s 
livelihood and the sustainability of human and nature 199 . Another 
initiative is the Thai Labor Standard (TLS) issued by the Ministry of 
Labor. The current version, TLS No. 8001-2553 released in 2010, 
contains several guidelines on corporate social responsibility and the 
improvement of the quality of life of laborers200. Future initiatives are 
expected to be introduced, at least according to the official commitment 
announced at the Cabinet Meeting on 16 May 2017, when the 
Government approved the NHRC’s proposal on serious measures and 
guidance to promote social responsibility and respect for human rights 
by business enterprises 201 . On seeking remedy, judicial grievance 
mechanisms are generally available at the Court of Justice, as well as 
specifically at the Labor Court. State-based, non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms are available at the National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand (NRHC) and the Rights and Liberties Protection Department 
(RLPD). More details will be provided subsequently in Section III.D 
regarding “Existing grievance mechanisms in Thailand”. 
 
Notwithstanding the pledge of the Thai government to address the 
business and human rights-related issues reflecting the initial 
commitment on the State duty to protect, more topics still need to be 
tackled. Especially with regard to access to remedy, the study on the 
implementation of the UNGP effectiveness criteria for operational-level 
grievance mechanisms in Thailand is still in its infancy. This research, 
therefore, deals with this remaining gap and explores the accessibility to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms in a specific context – 
Thailand’s sugar industry. 
 
 
 
                                                
199 INVESTMENT PROMOTION ACT B.E. 2520 (1977) (amended B.E. 2560 
(2017)), art. 19 (Thai.). 
200 MINISTERIAL ANNOUNCEMENT Concerning the Thai Labor Standard 
No.8001-2553 B.E. 2553 (2010) (Thai.). 
201 Royal Thai Government, supra note 198. 
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B. STUDYING THAILAND’S SUGAR INDUSTRY 
 
The sugar industry is one of Thailand’s leading and most important 
processed agricultural products industries. Its strength emanates from the 
use of raw materials commonly found domestically – sugar canes. The 
annual production is abundant – so much so that it can support both 
domestic consumption and international export. Each year, the sugar 
industry financially supports approximately 200,000 households, 
generating approximately 200,000 million THB (CHF 5,800 million) 
annually202. Moreover, Thailand’s geographical location in the center of 
Asia provides logistical advantages for exporting sugar to many sugar-
importing countries in the region 203. 
 
Sugar cane is harvested throughout Thailand, but many plantations are 
concentrated in the northeastern region. The sugar cane harvest season 
lasts from November to January of the following year, allowing for 
multi-use of the same land plot for other crops in other seasons. The 
researcher visited sugar cane plantations in Buriram and Khon Kaen 
provinces in the northeastern region to conduct structured interviews. 
The details of these interviews, including the methodology, questions, 
consent forms, and demography of interviewees, are provided in 
Appendices A to D respectively. In the following sub-sections, the 
research maps the supply chain and identifies all actors involved in the 
supply chain of Thailand’s sugar industry. 
 
 
1. Mapping the supply-chain 
 
The Office of Cane and Sugar Board of Thailand (OCSB) provides a 
general illustration of the supply-chain of Thailand’s sugar industry. The 
OCSB categorizes the supply-chain into three stages according to 
terminology used by the Supply Chain Management (SCM): upstream, 
                                                
202 Food Intelligence Centre (Thailand), Industry Overview (Oct. 25, 2016 3:25 
PM), http://fic.nfi.or.th/foodindustry_ceo_view.php?smid=904. 
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midstream, and downstream204. At the upstream stage, sugar cane is 
harvested in the plantations and then transported to local processing 
factories. Afterwards at the midstream stage, the sugar cane is processed 
to become sugar and then transported to distribution centers. Finally, at 
the downstream stage, consumers purchase the packages of sugar for 
their consumption. Figure 1 illustrates the supply-chain of Thailand’s 
sugar industry 205. 
 
Figure 1 -  
Supply Chain of Thailand's Sugar Industry 
 
 
 
 
In this supply-chain, agricultural workers are operating at the upstream 
stage. They harvest sugar canes at plantations for subcontractors. Then, 
the harvested sugar canes are transported to nearby processing factories 
or sugar mills owned by sugar producers. The entire upstream stage can 
be categorized into different tiers based on the commercial relationship 
between manufacturers (in this case, sugar producers) and 
subcontractors206. The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) refers 
to a company that manufactures a final product for consumers. Tier One 
refers to a direct subcontractor to the OEM, and Tier Two is a direct 
subcontractor to the Tier One207. In this context, the OEM refers to sugar 
producers. Tier One refers to subcontractors, and Tier Two refers to 
subcontracted agricultural workers.  
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It must be noted that the OCSB-version of the supply-chain only 
illustrates the overall scale of the sugar industry, from upstream to 
downstream. To study the supply-chain specifically at the sugar 
producing stage, a study of the supply-chain within the upstream and 
midstream stages is necessary. For this, a sugar producing supply-chain 
of the Mitr Phol Company, which is considered one of the biggest sugar 
companies in Thailand employing approximately 6,500 employees208, 
provides a relevant example. Illustrations of actors in different tiers of 
Thailand’s sugar industry supply-chain and of the relationship between 
the different actors in Mitr Phol’s supply-chain will be subsequently 
provided after the following subsection, in figure 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
 
2. Identifying actors 
 
Identifying all relevant actors of a supply-chain is an indispensable task, 
as it facilitates a better understanding of the overall process. In 
Thailand’s sugar industry, there are several key actors ranging from 
subcontracted agricultural workers working in plantations to sugar 
producers with headquarters located in city centers. The interconnections 
between all the identified actors will be explained below, when each 
actor is identified. For clarity purpose, this research will identify actors 
using Mitr Phol’s supply-chain, as most, if not all, Thai sugar producers 
have similar patterns in their supply-chains. 
 
Sugar producers – In accordance with the UNGP term, “business 
enterprises”209 in the context of this research are sugar producers, and 
this research will use the term “sugar producers” throughout to avoid 
confusion with other actors which may also be business enterprises per 
se (such as subcontractors). As sugar producers are the main buyers of 
sugar canes, the level of their influence in the sugar industry is inevitably 
high. In Thailand, there are four major sugar producers, whose combined 
                                                
208 Interview with representatives from the Mitr Phol Group, in Bangkok. 
209 For instance, U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 1, 2, and 11.  
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market shares comprise more than 50% of the total210. These major sugar 
producers, namely Mitr Phol Group, Thai Roong Ruang Group, Thai 
Ekalak Group (KTIS) and Tamaka Group (KSL), enter into agreements 
with local subcontractors to procure sugar canes. Having sourced the 
sugar cane supply, they produce sugar in many of their processing 
factories (or locally referred to as “the sugar mills”) in the region and 
distribute sugar to domestic consumers or export internationally. Sugar 
producers are the OEM in the supply-chain. 
 
Subcontractors – Subcontractors can be a small group of people or a 
small-to-medium enterprise (SME); the latter would fall into the UNGP 
term of “business enterprises”. For clarity purpose, this research will use 
the term “subcontractors” to avoid confusion with the larger business 
enterprises in this context, namely “sugar producers”. Alternatively 
referred to by locals as “vendors”, “suppliers” or “middle persons” (a 
direct, literal translation from the Thai term “por-kar-kon-klang”), the 
subcontractors’ position in the supply-chain lies between sugar 
producers and subcontracted agricultural workers. On the one hand, they 
subcontract the harvest work from the sugar producers, typically by 
concluding a buy/purchase of sugar cane agreement with sugar producers 
which includes negotiated terms on various issues such as prices, 
volumes, and quality. Once such agreement has been concluded, the 
subcontractors are obliged to procure the agreed amount of sugar cane to 
the sugar producers. To fulfill this obligation, the subcontractors employ 
local subcontracted agricultural workers to perform the harvest work at 
their sugar cane plantations through a hire of work contract, or 
alternatively called “an employment contract”. The subcontracted 
agricultural workers are typically Thai nationals, but in some cases 
subcontractors also hire foreigners sourced from neighboring countries. 
Depending on the negotiation, subcontracted agricultural workers are 
obliged to harvest an agreed amount of sugar cane, or to work a specific 
number of hours regardless of the amount of sugar cane harvested. 
Normally, subcontractors come from middle-class families who own a 
                                                
210 Wareerat Petchseechoung, Thailand Industry Outlook 2016-2017: Sugar 
Industry (Jul. 28, 2017, 1:30 PM), 
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lot of land used for plantations and are well funded211. In application of 
the supply-chain terms, the subcontractors are in the Tier One of the 
supply-chain. 
 
Agents – While most subcontractors directly subcontract the harvest 
work from the sugar producers, some subcontractors who have limited 
connections with sugar producers or are new to the industry usually 
resort to the use of agents. Agents are experienced subcontractors who 
have accumulated expertise and developed a strong network of 
connections with the sugar producers. Typically, agents charge a 
commission fee for facilitating the conclusion of the buy/purchase 
agreements between subcontractors and sugar producers. Alternatively, 
agents, who subcontracted the harvest work from sugar producers, 
further subcontract it to smaller subcontractors to perform the harvest 
work.212 In this scenario, the agents thus become the first-tier 
subcontractors, and the smaller subcontractors become the second-tier 
subcontractors. Using the supply-chain term, the agents (or first-tier 
subcontractors) are in the Tier One, and the second-tier subcontractors 
are demoted to Tier Two. 
 
Subcontracted agricultural workers – “Subcontracted agricultural 
workers” are workers who are engaged in agricultural work and are 
employed by subcontractors, not sugar producers. Principally, these 
subcontracted agricultural workers are not legally related to the sugar 
producers. Subcontracted agricultural workers are obliged to provide 
labor for harvesting sugar cane to subcontractors. They are typically 
sourced from villages in the area, and are often blood-related 213. 
Additionally, they may be sourced from neighboring countries. 
Subcontracted agricultural workers who are non-Thai nationals generally 
earn less than their Thai counterparts 214. As non-employees to sugar 
producers, sugar producers are not obliged to provide fundamental labor 
protection and welfare to subcontracted agricultural workers, as 
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prescribed by relevant laws including the Labor Protection Act (the LPA) 
due to the lack of formal employer-employee connection. In the supply-
chain, subcontracted agricultural workers are in Tier Two, or in even 
lower tiers, if their employers (subcontractors) are second-tier 
subcontractors. 
 
In this supply-chain, the most vulnerable actors to potential adverse 
human rights impact are subcontracted agricultural workers. This 
statement resonates the purpose of the UNGP as well as their preceding 
documents215, whose main focus lies in the protection of human rights. 
Since the inception of the UNGP emphasis has been placed on protecting 
the rights-holders, as for example they define adverse human rights 
impacts as “sweatshop conditions and bonded labor in factories”, 
“indigenous people’s communities displaced without adequate 
consultation or compensation”, “seven-year-old children toiling on 
plantations” and so on216. Moreover, a reference to victims was clearly 
included in the first report developed by Professor Ruggie to the Human 
Rights Council, the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”, as the 
Framework rests on three pillars and the last pillar being “the need for 
greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-
judicial”217. From another angle, the pre-UNGP and now the world’s 
largest CSR initiative – the UN Global Compact – encourages company 
participants to promote many causes including “socially responsible 
human rights and workplace standards”218. 
 
As mentioned, this research will focus on the rights of subcontracted 
agricultural workers in Tier Two of this supply-chain. Considering their 
working conditions, subcontracted agricultural workers are more prone 
to a variety of mistreatments, which could potentially amount to adverse 
human rights impacts. On a global scale past cases of alleged adverse 
human rights impacts involving agricultural workers generally included 
                                                
215 For instance, U.N. OHCHR, supra note 40. 
216 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xv-xvi. 
217 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xx-xxi. 
218 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at xxvii. 
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arbitrary land grabbing219, child labor220 and forced labor221. For this 
research, information on the working conditions of subcontracted 
agricultural workers was gathered through structured interviews. The 
details of their working conditions will be provided in Section III.C. Such 
details, however, do not serve to allege certain actors, particularly sugar 
producers, of human rights violation. Whether actions or activities 
carried out by certain actors explained in this research amount to human 
rights violations is neither absolute nor definitive, and depends largely 
on official interpretation by relevant authorities.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates actors of different tiers in the upstream of this supply-
chain. In addition, Figure 3 provides a complete illustration of the 
relationship between different actors in the supply-chain of Mitr Phol 
Sugar Corp in Section III.D.3. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
219 Kuch Naren, Thai Representatives Meet with Koh Kong “Blood Sugar” 
Families, THE CAMBODIA DAILY (Sep. 15, 2017, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/thai-representative-meets-with-koh-
kong-blood-sugar-families-11884/; see also, Maureen Harris, Human Rights 
Violation in Koh Kong Sugar Plantation Confirmed by Thai Human Rights 
Commission, EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL (Sep. 15, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.earthrights.org/media/human-rights-violations-koh-kong-sugar-
plantation-confirmed-thai-human-rights-commission. 
220 D. C. NANJUNDA, CHILD LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PROSPECTIVE 92 
(2008). 
221 Summary Report of the Social, Environmental and Human Rights Aspects 
of PepsiCo’s sugar cane supply-chain in Brazil based on Third-Party Audits 
(Sep. 15, 2017, 8:50 AM), https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/policies-
doc/pwp/pepsico-brazil-sugarcane-supply-chain-assessment.pdf?sfvrsn=0; see 
also, Anni Piiroinen, Forced Labor in the Global Sugar Industry, University of 
Warwick (Sep. 15, 2017, 9 AM), 
https://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/po901/entry/forced_labour_in/. 
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Figure 2 -  
Actors of Different Tiers in the Upstream of the Supply-Chain 
 
OEM: 
sugar producers 
 
 
Tier One: 
subcontractors / 
first-tier subcontractors 
 
Tier Two: 
subcontracted agricultural workers / 
second-tier subcontractors 
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Figure 3 -  
Relationship between Different Actors in the Supply-Chain of 
Thailand's Sugar Industry 
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C. EXPLORING NEGATIVE IMPACTS IN THE SUGAR CANE 
SUPPLY-CHAIN 
 
Negative impacts encountered by subcontracted agricultural workers 
arising in the sugar cane supply-chain may occur in various levels of 
severity and forms. This section explores and reports the situation at the 
operational level. The research employs a structured interview method to 
gather information on site. The structured interviews reveal that the 
subcontracted agricultural workers are vulnerable to several negative 
impacts – some of which could potentially amount to adverse human 
rights impacts. In addition, the subcontracted agricultural workers 
currently have little recourse to remedy. In the following is the 
preliminary exploration of issues that the researcher encountered in the 
field research. 
 
 
1. Labor-related issues 
 
Visits to sugar cane plantations in Buriram and Khon Kaen provided the 
researcher with the opportunity to gather useful first-handed information. 
Having interviewed subcontracted agricultural workers and 
subcontractors on site, several concerning issues were revealed. This 
section contains a narration of the relationship of two actors in the supply 
chain – subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers – as they 
interact at the sugar cane plantations. 
 
When supplying sugar cane to sugar producers, ensuring the all-time 
availability of the product is the most important task of the 
subcontractors. To do so, subcontractors recruit and employ 
subcontracted agricultural workers to harvest sugar canes for them. In 
the supply-chain term, this practice is equivalent to Tier Two 
(subcontracted agricultural workers) supplying products to Tier One 
(subcontractors). Subcontracted agricultural workers are more dependent 
on subcontractors than the other way around222. This is because, firstly, 
                                                
222 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
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there are many locals competing to work as subcontracted agricultural 
workers as opposed to the more limited number of available 
subcontractors. In economic terms, the supply exceeds the demand for 
subcontracted agricultural workers. Secondly, subcontracted agricultural 
workers often lack fundamental knowledge of agriculture, e.g. crop 
harvesting, and/or the financial capability to become subcontractors 
themselves. Therefore, they must rely on existing subcontractors for their 
income-generating work opportunities223. Generally, subcontractors 
source subcontracted agricultural workers from the rows of villages in 
the nearby area and provide transportation to and from the plantations224. 
Since most of the subcontracted agricultural workers live within the same 
remote area and do not have the financial ability to afford any type of 
vehicle, the provided transportation becomes a necessity225.  
 
Subcontractors regulate the subcontracted agricultural workers’ working 
conditions. As learned in the interviews, the decision on how the wages 
are calculated affects these working conditions. There are currently two 
options: the flat rate and the quantity rate226. The flat rate (or “per day”) 
option guarantees the amount of payment subcontracted agricultural 
workers receive per day. In principle, the subcontracted agricultural 
workers agree to work 8 hours per day, starting from 8 AM until 5 PM 
with a one-hour lunch break. If opting for the flat rate, the subcontracted 
agricultural workers receive the payment after the 8 working hours are 
completed, regardless of the amount of sugar cane harvested. In this 
payment scheme, the subcontracted agricultural workers may bring their 
own lunch or can have it provided by the subcontractors. This affects the 
amount of payment. The current flat rate for the “with-lunch” option is 
at 200 THB (CHF 5.50) per day, compared to 240 THB (CHF 6.50) 
without lunch. In contrast, the quantity rate (or “per ton”) option offers 
the subcontracted agricultural workers more flexibility in their time 
management. They can define the working time that suits their personal 
or family requirements. For instance, one subcontracted agricultural 
worker indicated that she preferred to work from 4 AM to 9 AM then 
                                                
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
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again from 4 PM to 7 PM to avoid the mid-day heat. A different worker 
preferred to work from 5 PM to 8 PM, so he could also pursue another 
full-time job elsewhere. To meet these personal requirements, the 
quantity option becomes more appealing and suitable. According to the 
interviews, the subcontractors offer 120 THB per ton of fresh sugar cane 
harvested. Normally, an average subcontracted agricultural worker 
harvests 2 tons of sugar cane per day, so the daily income usually 
amounts to 240 THB (CHF 6.50) – which is equivalent to the flat rate 
“without-lunch” option227. Nevertheless, all of the daily wages described 
above are lower than the rate prescribed by law. Currently, the minimum 
daily wage, as declared by the Committee on Wages of the Ministry of 
Labor should range from 300 to 310 THB depending on the locations. In 
the northeastern provinces, where many sugar cane plantations are 
located, the legal minimum daily wage is 305 THB, and 308 THB in 
Khon Kaen province. This minimum rates have just become effective as 
of 1 January 2017228.  
 
On some occasions subcontractors may ask the subcontracted 
agricultural workers to extend their working hours due to a surge in 
demand, when subcontractors receive more contracts to procure more 
sugar cane for sugar producers229. Occasionally, this means that the 
extended working hours exceed the maximum legal working hours of 8 
hours a day and no more than 48 hours a week230. Figure 4 provides an 
illustration of the payment schemes. 
 
 
                                                
227 Id. 
228 Comm. On Wages, Ministry of Labor, Declaration of Minimum Wages No. 
8, 
http://www.mol.go.th/sites/default/files/downloads/pdf/aihmprakaasatraakhaac
chaangkhantam_khamchiiaecchng_ch8.pdf. 
229 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
230 LABOR PROTECTION ACT B.E. 2541 (1998), art. 23 (Thai.). 
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Figure 4 -  
The Payment Schemes of the Interviewed Subcontracted Agricultural 
Workers 
 
 The flat rate The quantity rate 
Number of 
working hours 
8 hours Flexible 
Work duration 8 AM – 5 PM Flexible 
Lunch Optional No 
Amount of daily 
wage 
With lunch: 
200 THB (CHF 
5.50) 
 
Without lunch: 
240 THB (CHF 
6.50) 
120 THB per a ton 
of fresh sugar cane 
harvested 
Transportation Yes Optional 
 
 
In some sugar cane plantations, the presence of young subcontracted 
agricultural workers is a normal feature. These “junior” workers may 
sometimes be as young as 10 years old. These children normally 
accompany their parents to the sugar cane plantation and “help” do the 
work. The current law stipulates a legal minimum age for labor at 15 
years231, whereas older workers from 15 to 18 years of age may only 
perform work that is not prohibited by law232 and/or in locations not 
prohibited by law233. More details on the working conditions and the 
evidence of “junior” workers will be subsequently provided in Section 
IV.C.1. 
 
 
                                                
231 Id., art. 44. 
232 Id., art. 49. 
233 Id., art. 50. 
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2. Issues associated with being foreign agricultural 
workers 
 
Foreign agricultural workers, mostly arriving from the neighboring 
countries of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, are working in many sugar 
cane plantations in Thailand. Generally, they are not employed by sugar 
producers, but rather by subcontractors of the sugar producers. As a 
result, like Thai subcontracted agricultural workers, foreign agricultural 
workers have no formal employment relationship with any sugar 
producers. In the supply-chain, they are also in Tier Two. As foreign 
agricultural workers usually receive smaller wages, subcontractors tend 
to prefer employing them at the plantations rather than their Thai 
counterparts234. 
 
Generally, a foreigner, including a foreign agricultural worker, can apply 
for a work permit to work in Thailand legally provided he or she meets 
either of the following criteria.  First, he or she has a domicile in 
Thailand. To have a domicile in Thailand, one must seek authorization 
from the Immigration Commission and approval from the Minister of 
Interior235. Or second, he or she has been granted a Temporary Stay in 
Thailand for reasons not based on tourist or transit grounds236. Grounds 
to permit a Temporary Stay for those who hold a valid passport or other 
document used in lieu of passport237 are diplomatic or consular mission, 
official duties, business, and activities under investment promotion, 
among others238. Having met either of the above criteria, he or she must 
seek approval to work at the Registrar and subsequently be issued a work 
permit239. Consequently, foreigners who, despite having been legally 
granted a Temporary Stay, perform work in Thailand without a valid 
work permit are considered “undocumented foreign workers”.  
                                                
234 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
235 IMMIGRATION ACT B.E. 2522 (1979), art. 41 (Thai.). 
236 EMERGENCY DECREE CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN 
LABORS B.E. 2560 (2017), art. 60 (Thai.). 
237 Id., art. 12(1). 
238 Id., art. 34. 
239 Id., art. 59. 
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The categorization of foreign workers’ legality gets more complex in the 
Social Security Funds (SSF) scheme. To be eligible for the SSF, a foreign 
worker must have been granted a Temporary Stay and a work permit. 
Additionally, the SSF scheme extends to foreign workers who might 
have entered Thailand illegally, but have passed the Nationality 
Verification (NV) and have been issued a temporary passport or a 
certificate of identity as well as a work permit240 . Further, the SSF 
scheme extends to previously undocumented foreign workers who have 
already worked illegally in Thailand and have been arrested. The selected 
undocumented foreign workers who receive pardon by the Cabinet 
Resolution to continue working temporarily while awaiting deportation 
are entitled to the SSF on a case-by-case basis241. Figure 5 illustrates the 
categories of foreign workers. 
 
 
  
                                                
240 Thai Electrical and Mechanical Contractors Association, Social Security of 
Foreign Workers (Nov. 12, 2016, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.temcathai.com/download/magazine/volume_20_issue_4/55.pdf. 
241 CABINET RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF NATIONALITY 
VERIFICATION AND DEFERRAL OF DEPORTATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS OF 12 
JUNE B.E. 2555 (2012) (Thai.). 
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Figure 5 -  
Categories of Foreign Workers 
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y
p
e 
Criteria for applying for a 
work permit 
(*an applicant must meet either 
of the following criteria) 
Work 
permit 
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Status 
Eligibility 
to Social 
Security 
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Considered 
documented 
Yes 
4 n/a Can be both Yes 
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No Undocumented No 
 
 
Generally, all documented foreign workers are entitled to the SSF242. 
Employers are required to register the employees at the Social Security 
Office within 30 days after the beginning of employment 243. For every 
wage payment, employers must deduct 5% of the wages of the insured 
employees to pay to the SSF. In addition, the employers must pay 
contributions of the same amount (5% of the wages) to the SSF. The 
combined amount shall be paid to the Social Security Office on every 
fifteenth day of the month244. Under this scheme, the employers incur the 
cost for the contributions to the SSF.  
                                                
242 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT B.E. 2533 (1990), art. 33 (Thai.). 
243 Id., art. 34. 
244 Id., art. 47. 
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In the sugar cane supply-chain, subcontractors typically employ 
undocumented foreign agricultural workers due to their attractively low 
wages. Undocumented foreign agricultural workers often face continual 
frustration at the hands of their subcontractors. Being sourced from their 
country of origin by private parties (also called “recruiters”), they are 
forced to pay a “facilitating fee” to the recruiters for receiving illegal 
entry assistance and concluding an employment contract with the 
subcontractors. Upon entry into Thailand, the recruiters confiscate their 
passports or other forms of identification, if they possess one. They seize 
these documents out of fear that the undocumented foreign agricultural 
workers could flee and search for new jobs within a matter of days after 
starting their employment 245 . Inevitably, as the foreign agricultural 
workers are undocumented, they are not covered by the SSF scheme. 
Consequently, they receive low wages, are reportedly subjected to longer 
working hours, no access to the SSF, and limited opportunities to seek 
better jobs.  
 
However, the use of undocumented foreign agricultural workers is 
becoming less attractive (as of July 2017 at the time of writing), owing 
largely to the strengthening of the relevant laws regulating foreign 
workers, including the new Emergency Decree Concerning the 
Management of Foreign Labors B.E. 2560 (2017)246. The new 
Emergency Decree imposes a hefty fine for employers who employ 
undocumented foreign workers (without possession of a work-permit)247. 
The fine ranges from 400,000 to 800,000 THB (CHF 11,350 to 22,700) 
per foreign worker. Undocumented foreign workers face a fine of 2,000 
to 100,000 THB (CHF 60 to 2,900) if arrested. The newly imposed 
punishable fine rates are so high that they, almost immediately, caused a 
mass exodus of undocumented foreign workers fleeing Thailand as they 
                                                
245 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
246 EMERGENCY DECREE, supra note 236. 
247 EMERGENCY DECREE, supra note 236, at 9. 
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cannot afford to pay the new fines 248, and at the same time deterred many 
employers from hiring new undocumented foreign workers 249.  
 
 
 
D. EXISTING GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THAILAND 
 
After the preliminary exploration on the negative impacts encountered 
by subcontracted agricultural workers – both Thai and foreign nationals 
– this section will provide a general overview of the grievance 
mechanisms in Thailand that are currently available to subcontracted 
agricultural workers. All possible types of grievance mechanisms will be 
addressed. 
 
 
1. State-based, judicial grievance mechanisms 
 
Traditionally, the role of providing grievance mechanisms to victims of 
human rights abuses falls to the State. Generally, States exercise this role 
through their judiciary arm. Moreover, States can also allocate their 
judicial power to one of their administrative entities by means of 
decentralization. Thailand is not an exception and this sub-section 
provides a description of the existing State-based judicial grievance 
mechanism, i.e. the judiciary. 
 
In Thailand, cases concerning general disputes not specified within the 
jurisdiction of specific courts, being the Constitutional Court, the 
Administrative Court, and the Military Court, fall within the scope of the 
Court of Justice. Adjudicating civil and criminal cases, there are three 
instances at the Court of Justice: Court of First Instance, Court of Appeal, 
and the Supreme Court250 . Victims of human rights abuse generally 
                                                
248 Thailand’s new labor rules send thousands of migrant workers fleeing (Jul. 
7, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-migrants-
idUSKBN19O0B6. 
249 Interview with representatives from the Mitr Phol Group, in Bangkok. 
250 STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE B.E. 2543 (2000) (Thai.), art. 2. 
 	 67 
instigate a claim at the appropriate Court of First Instance, unless the 
substance of the case falls within the jurisdiction of a different 
specialized court251. The right to instigate a case is affirmed by the Thai 
Constitution252 and the Civil Procedure Code253. 
 
In the context of this research, the most relevant specialized court is the 
Labor Court, which oversees disputes involving labor law and 
practice254, such as labor disputes arising from employment contract and 
payment of compensation, as well as disputes concerning unfair 
dismissal 255 . Proceedings in the Labor Court contain several unique 
features. First, the composition of the panel of judges must include an 
equal number of representative(s) from each party (employer and 
employee), in addition to the ordinary judges 256 . The inclusion of 
representatives as members of the judging panel is based on the 
presumption that the representatives possess greater knowledge of the 
situation and can ultimately advice the ordinary judges on the issues of 
facts. Second, the entire proceedings at the Labor Court, from the lodging 
of claims to the passing of judgment, shall be exempted from relevant 
court fee257. This is to ease the financial burden particularly on the part 
of the claimants, who may be deterred from instigating claims by the 
financial cost if such exemption is not granted. Lastly, the proceedings 
may take place at the location where the injury occurs or at other places 
deemed appropriate, instead of being held at the Labor Court 258 . 
Furthermore, the proceedings may take place at the appropriate time, 
which may fall on holidays or off office-hour259. These features are 
                                                
251 Pawat Satayanurug and Nattaporn Nakornin, Courts in Thailand, in ASIAN 
COURTS IN CONTEXT 433 (Jiunn-rong Yeh and Wen Chen Chang eds., 1st ed. 
2015). 
252 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E. 2550 (2007) (Thai.), 
section 40. 
253 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF THAILAND (Thai.) section 55. 
254 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LABOR COURT AND ITS PROCEDURE ACT B.E. 2522 
(1973) (Thai.), art. 8. 
255 Id., art. 49. 
256 Id., art. 17. 
257 Id., art. 27. 
258 Id., art. 28. 
259 Id., art. 28. 
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intended to eradicate potential obstacles which may prevent effective 
access to judicial remedy. Nevertheless, no matter how many attractive 
and party-friendly features at the Labor Court may be implemented, the 
major prerequisite before instigating a claim at the Labor Court remains 
that both parties must have legal relationship through an employment 
contract. As a result, subcontracted agricultural workers who are not 
employees of sugar producers do not have a legal standing to instigate a 
claim at the Labor Court against the sugar producers. They are, however, 
still able to instigate a claim against their own employers – the 
subcontractors – at the Labor Court.   
 
In addition to the judicial proceedings, the Court of Justice incorporates 
mediation into its proceeding260 and may encourage both parties to resort 
to it. Alternatively, disputed parties can resort to other methods of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), such as arbitration 261 . The 
Ministry of Justice established the Thai Arbitration Institute (TAI) under 
the Court of Justice to offer arbitration services to interested parties262. 
Viewed as a more business-friendly mechanism 263 , arbitration in 
Thailand can be performed both in and outside of the courts. In the in-
court or “court-annexed” arbitration, parties to the court proceeding can 
agree to select certain technical matters to be resolved by a group of 
arbitrators which usually comprises specialized experts and leaves 
remaining legal issues to be decided by the judges in the normal court 
proceeding 264 . The court-annexed arbitration provides a timely 
enforcement, as parties can directly ask the judges to enforce the arbitral 
award without having to instigate a different claim265. The out-of-court 
                                                
260 Satayanurug and Nakornin, supra note 251, at 435. 
261 Satayanurug and Nakornin, supra note 251, at 434.  
262 Satayanurug and Nakornin, supra note 251, at 435.  
263 RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS LAW 57 
(Richard M. Buxbaum, eds., 1996). 
264 Satayanurug and Nakornin, supra note 251, at 436; see also Central 
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court and Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE-JTRO) in Asian Law Series, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Thailand (Sep. 19, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://elib.coj.go.th/Article/ADR.pdf. 
265 Vichai Ariyanuntaka, Court-annexed ADR in Thailand: a new challenge 
(Sep. 19, 2014, 10:30 AM), www.thailawforum.com/articles/adr.html. 
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arbitration can be performed institutionally or via the ad hoc approach. 
The TAI offers an institutional arbitration service based on the 
Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002), which is modeled after the Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration prepared by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)266. While the 
ADR may appear to be a “friendlier” method of dispute resolution, 
awareness of the existence of this possibility is generally limited within 
the world of lawyers. Subcontracted agricultural workers typically have 
never heard of the term due to the insufficient dissemination of 
knowledge and the perceived complexity of the ADR operation. More 
measures need to be taken in order to promote the use of the ADR, and 
potential barriers to access the ADR need to be addressed. However, this 
issue is not within the scope of this research. 
 
 
2. State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
 
In addition to the available State-based, judicial grievance mechanisms 
discussed in the previous sub-section, in the context of this research there 
are three State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanisms available as 
potential channels for subcontracted agricultural workers to seek remedy 
in Thailand: the Sugar Cane Workers Institutes and the OCSB 
Committee, the Rights and Liberties Protection Department, and the 
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. 
 
 
a. The Sugar Cane Workers Institutes and the 
OCSB Committee 
 
Categorized according to the UNGP as a State-based, non-judicial 
grievance mechanism, the Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (OCSB) 
provides an existing grievance mechanism for agricultural workers 
                                                
266 Thailand Arbitration Institute, Decoding Arbitration, in COLLECTIONS OF 
ARTICLES, REGULATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, LAWS, AND 
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS RELATING TO ARBITRATION COMMEMORATING 
15 YEARS OF TAI 15 (Thailand Arbitration Institute, 2006). 
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through its municipal branches throughout Thailand. The OCSB is a 
department under the Ministry of Industry, with objectives to oversee 
and regulate the cane and sugar industry by ensuring fairness and good 
governance among all actors, including agricultural workers, business 
enterprises, and consumers.267 At present, the OSCB has the 
responsibility to oversee the following entities, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 -  
Entities Overseen by the OCSB268 
 Type Quantity 
1. 
Sugar cane worker 
institutes 
28 
*these institutes are administered 
by different entities 
 
 - 12 by the Esarn (Northern 
Thailand) sugar cane worker 
association 
- 7 by the Thailand sugar cane 
worker association 
- 8 by the Thailand sugar cane 
worker union 
- 1 by Thailand agricultural 
cooperatives 
2. Sugar mills 52 
3. Sugar export companies 
8 
 
 
                                                
267 Office of Cane and Sugar Board of Thailand, Objective of the OCSB (Oct. 
26, 2016, 2:35 PM), 
http://www.ocsb.go.th/th/board_enactment/mission.php?id=254&SystemModu
leKey=mission. 
268 Office of Cane and Sugar Board of Thailand, Structure of the OCSB (Oct. 
26, 2016, 2:50 PM), as of May 2017, 
http://www.ocsb.go.th/th/board_enactment/structure.php?ID=281&SystemMo
duleKey=structure. 
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These 28 sugar cane worker institutes are established based on their 
geographical locations. Their objectives are to provide assistances to 
farmers in difficult situations, such as in times of drought and epidemic. 
Moreover, the institutes also serve as platforms for instigating initial 
claims relating to sugar productions, based on the Cane and Sugar Act 
B.E. 2527 (1984). The Act stipulates the duties of all stakeholders, 
including agricultural workers269 and sugar mills270, and accords power 
to the OCSB Committee271 to settle disputes272.   
                                                
269 CANE AND SUGAR ACT B.E. 2527 (1984) (Thai.) art. 36. 
270 Id., art. 44. 
271 Id., art. 9. 
272 Id., art. 58. 
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Figure 7 -  
Grievance Mechanism Procedures at the Sugar Cane Workers 
Institutes and the OCSB 
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As illustrated in Figure 7, aggrieved subcontracted agricultural workers 
can instigate a claim against their employers – the subcontractors – at the 
sugar cane workers institute of which they are members. Instigating a 
claim against sugar producers is not feasible due to the lack of a formal 
employment relationship. After a claim is filed, a set of preliminary 
investigating committee members will be appointed to perform fact-
finding and recommend possible solutions. If no solution can be reached, 
the claim will then be forwarded to the committee established by the 
OCSB for further investigation273. The OCSB Committee has the power 
to issue orders demanding compliance from the respondents within a 
specified period 274. Should one of the parties remain dissatisfied with the 
order, they can appeal within 15 days from the release date of such order 
to the OCSB Committee, and the OCSB Committee must consider and 
reply to the appeal within 30 days from the date of appeal275. If such 
parties are still dissatisfied with the appeal outcome or the OCSB 
Committee does not release the appeal outcome within the required 
period of 30 days, the dissatisfied parties may file a claim to the Court 
within 15 days from the date of receiving the appeal outcome or the date 
when the required period has lapsed276 for further proceedings.  
 
While the proceedings at the sugar cane worker institutes and the OCSB 
provide a channel to resolve grievances, its effectiveness remains 
contested. The process is legitimate, equitable, and predictable, as its 
establishment and details are promulgated by law. However, other 
aspects of effectiveness, as recommended by the UNGP, remain 
problematic. For instance, transparency is questioned because the 
preliminary investigating committees mostly comprise representatives 
from owners of plantations – the subcontractors in the supply-chain277. 
Trust-building, therefore, remains difficult to achieve. Rights-
compatibility is also not well anchored, as the law does not clearly and 
specifically address what would constitute a grievance. Furthermore, 
                                                
273 Id., art. 58. 
274 Id., art. 58 para. 2. 
275 Id., art. 58 para. 4. 
276 Id., art. 58 para. 5. 
277 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
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accessibility is hindered because the OCSB Committee hearings 
normally take place centrally in Bangkok; a long-distance journey is 
therefore required for many claimants in cases, which elevate to the 
OCSB Committee278. As a result, the State-based, non-judicial grievance 
mechanism provided by the OCSB is not a preferable option among 
subcontracted agricultural workers due to lack of trust and limited 
accessibility279. 
 
 
b. The Rights and Liberties Protection Department 
(RLPD) 
 
Established in 2002 under the Ministry of Justice, the Rights and 
Liberties Protection Department (RLPD) serves as a specific body to 
address issues on inadequate human rights protection. The mission of the 
RLPD is “the promotion and protection of rights and liberties, in 
accordance with the Constitution of Kingdom of Thailand and human 
rights principles, through public participation, aiming for harmonization, 
protection and guarantee of people’s rights and liberties in line with 
international human rights standards”280. The RLPD has been active in 
carrying out initiatives based on its mission, from public education 
training to extending and improving its accessibility 281 . The RLPD, 
however, does not provide a grievance mechanism that has power to 
adjudicate claims itself. Rather, subcontracted agricultural workers can 
contact the RLPD and it will serve as a coordinator between aggrieved 
parties and the relevant official bodies. According to its most recent 
Annual Report published in 2016, the focus of the RLPD remains the 
promotion of witness protection in criminal cases with a total of 20,746 
complaints received through its Service Point between 1 October 2015 
                                                
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 RLPD, Vision and Mission (Sept. 21, 2017, 8:15 AM), 
http://www.rlpd.go.th/rlpdnew/2012-06-20-05-54-34/2012-06-20-06-02-18.   
281 RLPD, Annual Report 2016 (Sept. 21, 2016, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.rlpd.go.th/rlpdnew/images/rlpd_6/2560/59th%20Annual%20Repor
t%20on%20the%20Protection%20of%20Rights%20and%20Freedoms..pdf. 
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and 30 September 2016282. In addition, the RLPD Hot Line (Call 1111, 
press #77) received 18,206 calls over the same period; 4,204 of which 
were productive calls, whereas the 5,219 calls were left on the answering 
machine and 8,753 calls were nuisance calls283. The RLPD has recently 
initiated a proposal to combine its Hot Line with that of the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in order to streamline the 
accessibility284. This process is still on-going at the time of writing.  
 
The State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanism provided by the 
RLPD is commended for its accessibility and rights-compatibility. The 
RLPD Hot Line is available 24/7, and the online tracking system has 
been installed to accommodate the claimants’ requests. Also, its 
objective to promote and protect people’s rights and liberties in line with 
international standards are clearly affirmed285. However, with its lack of 
adjudicative power and its reliance on the cooperation of relevant 
authorities, the predictability of the RLPD grievance mechanism cannot 
be fully guaranteed. As a result, the RLPD may not be the most 
appropriate channel for subcontracted agricultural workers to voice their 
grievances. 
 
 
c. The National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand (NHRC) 
 
The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC) is an 
independent institution created by the Constitution. The Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) establishes286 and imposes 
the following duties and powers on the NHRC: (1) to examine and report 
facts on human rights violations without delay, and to suggest suitable 
measures and recommendations to prevent and redress human rights 
                                                
282 Id., at 56.  
283 Id., at 47. 
284 Id., at 29. 
285 RLPD, supra note 280. 
286 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E. 2560 (2017) (Thai.), 
section 246. 
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violations including the provision of remedy to the person affected by 
such violation, to the relevant State agencies or private sectors; (2) to 
prepare an evaluation report on the human rights situation in the country 
and submit to the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers and 
to disseminate it to the public; (3) to issue recommendations on measures 
or guidelines for the promotion and protection of human rights to the 
National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and relevant State agencies, 
as well as on the revision of any law, rule, and regulation in order to 
conform with the human rights principles; (4) to explain and report facts 
without delay when there is an incorrect or unfair report on the human 
rights situation in Thailand; (5) to promote awareness of human rights in 
every sector in society; and (6) to have other duties and powers 
prescribed by law 287 . The role of the NHRC to provide grievance 
mechanism is within the scope of the first category of power.  
 
The NHRC is a major focal point of contact for receiving complaints 
regarding potential human rights violations 288 . Information on the 
complaint filings is well displayed on the NHRC’s website289. Eligible 
complainants are persons affected by human rights violations or their 
representatives, persons having received unfair treatment, and private 
human rights organizations witnessing human rights violations. 
Evidently, this includes subcontracted agricultural workers. 
Furthermore, the NHRC can instigate a claim as it sees appropriate. 
Channels to file complaints include the NHRC Hot Line (Call 1377 or 
02-141-3978-83), registered post to the NHRC address, fax, an electronic 
form available on the NHRC website, email (help@nhrc.or.th), personal 
walk-in to the NHRC or via other private human rights organizations290. 
The complaint must include the names and valid addresses of affected 
persons, information on the alleged human rights violators, details of the 
alleged human rights violations, and the signature of the complainants or 
their representatives. 
                                                
287 Id., section 247. 
288 Pawat Satayanurug, Thailand, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASEAN 
– A BASELINE STUDY 414 (Human Rights Resource Center, Jakarta, 2013). 
289 NHRC, How to File Complaint (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.nhrc.or.th/Complaints/How-to-complaints.aspx. 
290 Id. 
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Once the NHRC receives a complaint, the human rights protection 
coordinator department verifies the merit of the complaint and 
acknowledges receipt of such complaint to the complainant within 3 days 
from the date of receipt. The human rights protection coordinator 
department then submits a summary of complaint to the Secretary-
General of the NHRC. A panel of primary committee then conducts a 
preliminary examination of the complaint. When the panel finds that the 
complaint requires human rights redress, it forwards the complaint to 
relevant sub-committees of the NHRC. The assigned sub-committee 
conducts another examination and submits its findings to the verification 
committee. The final, verified report is then submitted to the Board of 
the NHRC291 . The Board of the NHRC then produces a report and 
recommends relevant State agencies or private actors to comply with its 
recommendations. In the event of non-compliance, the NHRC shall 
report directly to the Prime Minister for further actions. Despite its non-
adjudicative character, the magnitude of its recommendation has an 
acknowledgeable impact on deterring adverse human rights impacts. The 
case regarding alleged land grabbing in Sakhon Nakhon province 
provides an illustrative example 292. 
 
As a State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanism whose mandates are 
enshrined in the Constitution, the NHRC grievance mechanism is 
legitimate and rights-compatible. It can be accessed through multiple 
means, and the subsequent process is predictable. The NHRC provides a 
channel for tracking the progress of a claim and allows parties to gain 
access to sources of information, thus fulfilling the equitability and 
transparency criteria. Figure 8 displays the process of the NHRC 
grievance mechanism. 
 
  
                                                
291 NHRC, Receiving complaints procedure (Sept. 22, 2017, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.nhrc.or.th/Complaints/Duty-and-process.aspx. 
292 See Section IV.C.2 “Grievance as reported by the NHRC”. 
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Figure 8 -  
The Grievance Mechanism at the NHRC 
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3. Operational-level grievance mechanisms 
 
Currently, the available State-based, both judicial and non-judicial, 
grievance mechanisms for subcontracted agricultural workers in 
Thailand have limitations that prevent them from being effective 
channels to seek remedy. Thus, operational-level grievance mechanisms 
could be alternative channels to find remedy, which, if executed 
effectively, could ultimately become  preferred channels providing 
remediation for victims of adverse human rights impacts. However, the 
number of operational-level grievance mechanisms in Thailand, 
especially in the sugar industry, remains limited. Being non-State-based, 
existing mechanisms are typically driven by individual business 
enterprises. In other words, there is currently no industry-wide 
operational-level grievance mechanism to provide remedy for victims of 
adverse human rights impacts in any agricultural industry in Thailand. 
At the same time, if they exist, such operational-level grievance 
mechanisms are only provided at the OEM level of the supply-chain, and 
not in other tiers further down the supply-chain. 
 
To date, the most-prominent, business-run grievance mechanism at the 
OEM level of the sugar cane supply-chain in Thailand is the procedure 
operated by Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. Ltd.. The researcher interviewed Mr. 
Boontham Wongprapinkul, Vice-President and Human Resources 
Department at Mitr Phol Group, to learn about the implementation of its 
grievance mechanism. The interview questions are provided in Appendix 
II. The interview showed that Mitr Phol already operates an internal 
system to provide an operational-level grievance mechanism to its 
employees. 
 
The operational-level grievance mechanism at Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. 
Ltd. (the Mitr Phol mechanism) was created as a result of the company’s 
intention to eradicate corruption and to promote transparency, fairness, 
and accountability for management and employees at all levels293. To 
start, all Mitr Phol employees can initiate a claim based on a broad 
spectrum of issues, such as corruption and bribery, illegitimate payments 
                                                
293 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT OF 2015, MITR PHOL GROUP 18 (2015). 
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and dishonest conduct. Furthermore, if an employee finds that he or she 
does not receive “fair treatment”, or believes that his or her working 
condition is “unfair”, these general grounds are already sufficient for 
initiating a claim within the Mitr Phol mechanism. A dedicate 
department named the “Corporate Governance Department” (CG) is 
responsible for receiving and processing claims from the employees. The 
CG department provides the following channels through which the 
employees can submit a claim: a dedicated email-address through their 
intra-network and a complaint box for a hard copy version. Alternatively, 
employees can schedule an appointment with a staff member at the CG 
department to provide information. The CG department must reply to the 
complainant within the date of receipt. If the CG department finds merit 
in the claim and decides that further action becomes necessary, it will 
provide a “recommendation” to the following departments for further 
action: The Human Resources Management (HR) to examine potential 
breach or violation of company rules, and the Audit Department to 
examine potential acts of corruption or dishonest conduct. Responses 
from these departments must be returned within a specified time frame. 
The CG department then establishes an investigating committee, which 
will examine the facts, consider imposing punishment and report the 
findings directly to the complainant’s supervisor, HR and the CEO. 
Finally, the CG department reports the result of the procedure to the 
complainant. Follow-up checks may be made should the CG department 
find it necessary. Throughout the proceedings, the complainant’s identity 
remains anonymous until the CG department decides to take action 
against the relevant departments. At present, this is the only grievance 
mechanism that is available to the Mitr Phol employees, and it does not 
extend to non-employees, such as subcontractors and subcontracted 
agricultural workers in its supply-chain. Figure 9 illustrates the 
procedure. 
  
 	 81 
Figure 9 -  
The Grievance Mechanism at Mitr Phol294 
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The Mitr Phol mechanism is an example of an operational-level 
grievance mechanism. To determine its effectiveness, this research refers 
to the UNGP effectiveness criteria. The Mitr Phol mechanism attempts 
to ensure legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, and transparency in its 
system. The company’s anti-corruption policy is an example of how it 
tries to establish trust among its employees, thus increasing the 
legitimacy of the Mitr Phol mechanism. Furthermore, there are multiple 
channels through which potential complainants can gain access to the 
Mitr Phol mechanism, and outlining its operational stages clearly in the 
company’s internal communications ensures the predictability of the 
process. Also, the complainants can request to be informed on the 
progress to make the Mitr Phol mechanism more transparent.  
 
Nevertheless, the equitability and rights-compatibility of the Mitr Phol 
mechanism still warrant some improvement. The complainants currently 
do not have access to sources of information, advice and expertise 
because the investigations are mostly done at the management level. 
Also, not all eligible grievances are specifically mentioned, as the 
general language of “others” used for eligible complaints issues is not a 
sufficient indicator of the incorporation of all internationally recognized 
human rights. Lastly, the Mitr Phol mechanism is currently not based on 
engagement and dialogue; it remains a vertical-directional operational-
level grievance mechanism.  
 
From this initial observation, the Mitr Phol mechanism currently does 
not fully meet all the UNGP effectiveness criteria. However, it is an 
illustration of a hopeful benchmark that can be further developed for 
other operational-level grievance mechanisms in the Thai agricultural 
industry. What remains to be explored is the possibility of extending the 
applicability of this model to allow non-employees in the supply-chain – 
subcontracted agricultural workers – to have effective access to the 
operational-level grievance mechanism.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter III was dedicated to explaining the context of this research – 
Thailand’s sugar industry – in preparation for further analysis in the 
subsequent chapters. First, Section III.A discussed Thailand’s reaction to 
the UNGP and outlined its commitment and achievements. In Section 
III.B, the supply-chain of Thailand’s sugar industry was mapped and all 
actors identified including the personal scope of this research – 
subcontracted agricultural workers. Then, Section III.C illustrated the 
negative impacts in the current supply-chain as experienced by 
subcontracted agricultural workers from the information obtained 
through a series of structured interviews. To avoid potential controversy, 
it must be reiterated that the information on the negative impacts as 
illustrated in this research does not constitute a formal allegation of 
human rights violations against sugar producers. In fact, the information 
merely served as a trigger point to evidence the necessity of enhancing 
access to operational-level grievance mechanisms for subcontracted 
agricultural workers. Lastly, Section III.D explored the grievance 
mechanisms that are currently available to subcontracted agricultural 
workers. The findings revealed that all types of grievance mechanisms 
are available to subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand’s sugar 
industry: the judiciary, the state-based non-judicial grievance mechanism 
as administered by the OCSB, the RLPD, and the NHRC, and an example 
of an operational-level grievance mechanism operated by the Mitr Phol 
Group. While access to the judiciary and other state-based, non-judicial 
mechanisms is open to all subcontracted agricultural workers despite 
having some limitations, access to the Mitr Phol mechanism is limited 
only to its employees. This limitation reflected a major obstacle for 
subcontracted agricultural workers to access any operational-level 
grievance mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A Prerequisite to Seeking Access: 
Identifying Admissible Grievances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grievance mechanisms provide victims of human rights violations with 
platforms for justice to be served, as they mitigate and remediate 
damages that have caused victims undue grievances. As such, having 
effective access to grievance mechanisms is a human right per se, and it 
is legally enshrined in many international human rights treaties295. While 
judicial grievance mechanisms, such as formal litigation, have 
traditionally played a major role in providing remedies, they are often 
regarded as “costly, lengthy, difficult, or even impossible” 296  to get 
                                                
295 I.C.C.P.R, supra note 36, art. 2 (Article 2, “Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall 
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the 
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial 
remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted.”); European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 13 (Article 13, “Everyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”). 
296 Gwynne Skinner et. al., The Third Pillar. Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (Jul. 7, 2017, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.biicl.org/documents/182_the_third_pillar.pdf. 
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access to. Hence, it has become necessary to explore other remedy 
options, requiring that they be more accessible and effective. This 
research argues that operational-level grievance mechanisms, which are 
administered or operated by business enterprises, fulfill such 
requirements. To ensure that operational-level grievance mechanisms are 
functional and widely utilized, they must be easily accessible for the 
intended users. In this research, the intended users are subcontracted 
agricultural workers – the non-employees of the sugar producers in the 
supply-chain of Thailand’s sugar industry297. 
 
Nevertheless, the previous chapter illustrated that the existing 
operational-level grievance mechanism in Thailand’s sugar industry – as 
shown from the Mitr Phol example – still requires claimants to have an 
employee status, which, in effect, prevents access to the mechanism for 
subcontracted agricultural workers. Therefore, this research will examine 
possible solutions to address or circumvent this limitation. 
 
To address this limitation, the present research argues that it is necessary 
at the initial stage to clearly identify on what grounds a grievance can be 
considered as admissible to the operational-level grievance mechanism. 
Having a clearly defined list of admissible grievances facilitates 
accessibility, as it lessens the burden of interpreting whether a grievance 
is admissible for every claim. Thus, the list reduces one major barrier to 
access – uncertainty of admissibility, as potential claimants, including 
subcontracted agricultural workers, will be able to utilize it as basis for 
submitting their claims. This chapter is dedicated to examining this issue. 
 
Grievances occur in a variety of forms. Their magnitude can range from 
a minor discomfort arising from undesirable working conditions to a 
human rights violation based on internationally recognized human rights 
standards, such as the ones enshrined in the International Bill of Human 
Rights. In other words, human rights violations are grievances, but not 
every grievance is based on a human rights violation. This research, 
therefore, only deals with human rights violations within the context of 
the UNGP. The UNGP establish the responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights and base it on internationally 
                                                
297 See Section III.B.2 “Identifying actors”. 
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recognized human right standards, which are “understood, at a minimum, 
as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International 
Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work” 298 . Moreover, the UNGP advise States to encourage and 
monitor the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in many 
ways, including setting clear expectations 299 and enforcing laws that are 
aimed at or have the effect of requiring business enterprises to respect 
human rights300. For States to justify such compliance requirements, the 
UNGP’s references to internationally recognized human rights in a 
country-specific context must be based on the International Bill of 
Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (hereinafter referred to as the “ILO Declaration”) as 
ratified or acceded by that country. Consequently, this section will 
explore internationally recognized human rights enshrined in the 
International Bill of Rights that Thailand has ratified, as well as the ILO 
Declaration which Thailand is committed to respect and promote by 
means of its membership in the ILO301. Thailand’s other international 
human rights obligations beyond the ones just mentioned will also be 
touched upon, as appropriate, in order to provide a holistic picture of all 
of Thailand’s obligations, despite them being outside the scope of the 
UNGP.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
298 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 12, at 13-14. 
299 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 2, at 3-4. 
300 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 3, at 4-6. 
301 International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, June 18, 1998 (Aug. 7, 2017, 
10:55 AM), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang-
-en/index.htm, preamble 2. 
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A. THAILAND’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
Human rights, while being “indivisible, interdependent, and 
interrelated”302 per se, have become more apparent largely through their 
codification by the international law regime303. Moreover, those attaining 
the preemptory norm status become law sans codification304. Formally, 
the sources of international human rights law are listed in Article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). They are 
international conventions, international custom, the general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations, and, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law, judicial decisions and the teaching of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations 305 . 
Notwithstanding the multiple sources from which international human 
rights law may be derived, the dominant sources today are international 
and regional treaties306. In the context of this research, only selected 
sources of internationally recognized human rights law will be examined. 
As mentioned, they are based on the International Bill of Human Rights 
and the ILO Declaration as ratified or acceded to by Thailand, pursuant 
to the UNGP.307 The essence of the human rights enshrined in these 
international documents forms the basis or, in a more general term, a type 
of checklist to determine whether a claimed grievance is admissible 
before the operational-level grievance mechanism.  
 
 
 
                                                
302 Theo van Boven, Categories of Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 143 (Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014). 
303 Henry J. Steiner, International Protection of Human Rights, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 754-755 (Malcolm D. Evans, 2nd ed. 2006). 
304 Id. 
305 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946. 
306 Christine Chinkin, Sources, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 77 
(Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014). 
307 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 12, at 13-14. 
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1. International Bill of Human Rights 
 
The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)308 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 309  and its two Optional 
Protocols310. The UNGP affirms this composition in its Commentary of 
Principle 12311. Thailand (then called “Siam”) has been a signatory to the 
UDHR since its inception in 1948, as well as a party to both the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR. Moreover, Thailand is also a party to six additional 
international human rights instruments, namely the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) 312 ; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)313; the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)314; the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CAT)315; the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)316; and the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances (CED)317. The remaining core human rights treaty that 
Thailand has yet to sign or ratify is the Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and of their Families (CMW)318. 
 
                                                
308 I.C.E.S.C.R., supra note 37. 
309 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36. 
310 U.N. OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1) The International Bill of Human 
Rights (Sept. 26, 2017, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. 
311 U.N.G.P, supra note 3, Commentary Principle 12, at 14. 
312 C.E.R.D., supra note 118. 
313 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
314 C.R.C., supra note 121. 
315 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment, Feb. 4, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112. 
316 C.R.P.D., supra note 122. 
317 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. 
318 C.M.W., supra note 120. 
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Sugar producers, as business enterprises in the context of this research, 
primarily have the responsibility to respect the internationally recognized 
human rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights. The 
respect of the human rights enshrined in other international instruments 
to which Thailand is a party is encouraged, but not required by the 
UNGP. At the same time, subcontracted agricultural workers should be 
entitled to seek remedy for violations of human rights based on the 
International Bill of Human Rights. The following subsections will 
highlight major internationally recognized human rights that might be 
violated with regard to subcontracted agricultural workers and would 
constitute admissible grievances within the context of the UNGP.  
 
 
a. The right to equality and non-discrimination 
 
The first article of the UDHR, which states, “all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights” 319 , expresses the foundational 
importance of the right to equality and non-discrimination. This right is 
also guaranteed in other international and regional human rights 
instruments320. The crux of this right is the list of prohibited grounds of 
distinction. In the absence of straightforward and exhaustive list, the 
determination of what grounds of distinction shall be prohibited depends 
largely on the morality and political views of each determiner 321 . 
However, there is at least a consensus of what prohibited grounds of 
distinction are. Regarded as autonomous norms, the following grounds 
of distinction shall be prohibited: race, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
These grounds are embedded in the International Bill of Human Rights 
(the UDHR 322  and the ICCPR 323 ). The right to equality and non-
                                                
319 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 1. 
320 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 1, 2(1), and 7; I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 
2, 3, and 26; I.C.E.S.C.R., supra note 37, art. 2(2) and 3; ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration, Nov. 9, 2012, art. 1, 2, 3 and 9.  
321 Daniel Moeckli, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 163 (Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014). 
322 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 7. 
323 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 26. 
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discrimination requires that no one shall be treated “less favorably than” 
the other person “in comparable circumstances”324, based on one or more 
prohibited grounds. Consequently, subcontracted agricultural workers 
who encounter inequality and discrimination based on the grounds listed 
above and as a result of their work in the supply-chain are entitled to seek 
remedy. At the same time, sugar producers have the responsibility to 
respect the right to equality and non-discrimination based on the grounds 
provided above.  
 
In addition, sugar producers are encouraged to respect the right to 
equality and non-discrimination based on additional grounds prescribed 
in other international human rights instruments to which Thailand is a 
party. For instance, The CEDAW specifically addresses the issue of any 
form of discrimination against women irrespective of their marital status 
325. Other prohibited grounds of distinction include disability (CRPD)326 
and sexual orientation and gender identity (CRC)327. Extending the scope 
of the right to equality and non-discrimination that sugar producers are 
expected to respect beyond those under the International Bill of Human 
Rights provides subcontracted agricultural workers with more legal 
grounds to seek remedy. 
 
 
b. The right to life 
 
Respect for human dignity forms the basis and is connected to other more 
specific human rights, such as the right of a person to life, which is 
inherent, equal, and inalienable328. It is the foundational principle of 
human rights enshrined in the preambles of the International Bill of 
Human Rights, as well as in various other international human rights 
                                                
324 Moeckli, supra note 321, at 164.  
325 C.E.D.A.W., supra note 182, art. 1. 
326 C.R.P.D., supra note 122, art. 2, 3, and 4.  
327 C.R.C., supra note 121; see also International Human Rights Instruments 
Vol II, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol 
II) (May 27, 2008), General Comment 4 at 410. 
328 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, Preamble. 
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instruments329. Everyone “has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person”330, and this right is considered “the supreme human right”331 and 
the “fountain from which all human rights spring”332. Furthermore, the 
use of the wording “inherent right to life”333 suggests that the right to life 
attains a status of customary international law334. While in practice, the 
right to life is often associated with issues of protection against the death 
penalty and against the killings by security forces 335 , the general 
requirement of the right to life remains that “no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of life”336. Therefore, none of the actors in the supply-chain may 
arbitrarily deprive subcontracted agricultural workers of their right to 
life, and sugar producers have the responsibility to respect the right to 
life of the subcontracted agricultural workers in their supply-chain. 
 
 
c. The right to be free from torture and inhuman 
treatment 
 
Similar to the right to life, the right to be free from torture and inhuman 
treatment is founded on the notion of respect for human dignity. The 
basic prohibition found in the International Bill of Human Rights states 
that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”337, and this right is guaranteed in 
                                                
329 For instance, in U.D.H.R., supra note 35; I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36; 
I.C.E.S.C.R., supra note 37. 
330 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 3. 
331 International Human Rights Instruments Vol I, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I) (May 27, 2008), General 
Comment 6 at 176. 
332 Rep. of the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions, 
U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/16 (Jan. 31, 1983), para 22. 
333 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 6(1). 
334 Nigel S. Rodley, Integrity of the Person, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 185 (Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014). 
335 Id., at 185-188. 
336 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 6(1). 
337 U.D.H.R., supra note 35, art. 5. 
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other human rights treaties to which Thailand is a party338. Determining 
whether an action amounts to torture, instead of merely an inhuman 
treatment, is a complex task. Typically, what distinguishes “torture” 
from “inhuman treatment” is the element of severity of pain and 
suffering339. However, such distinction may not be necessary in this 
context, as the act of inhuman treatment already suffices to warrant 
protection for subcontracted agricultural workers. Furthermore, it must 
be pointed out that reference of the right to be free from torture and 
inhuman treatment in the context of this research must be made only to 
the more general prohibition stated in the ICCPR340, as the definition of 
torture provided by the CAT requires the involvement of public 
official341. Therefore, subcontracted agricultural workers must not be 
subjected to any form of inhuman treatment and, if applicable, torture, 
while sugar producers must also respect the right to be free from torture 
and inhuman treatment, as provided in the International Bill of Human 
Rights. 
 
 
 
                                                
338 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 7 and 10; C.A.T., supra note 184. 
339 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, art. 7 
(Elements of Crimes) and arts. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1 and 8(2)(c)(i)-4; see also U.N., 
supra note 334, at 179. 
340 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 7. 
341 C.A.T., supra note 184, art. 1(1) (Article 1(1), “For the purposes of this 
Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.”). 
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2. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work 
 
Specifically mentioned in the UNGP, the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was adopted in 1998 at the 
86th ILO Conference. The ILO Declaration clearly states that certain 
principles and rights are universal, and all Member States are committed 
to promote such principles and rights regardless of the level of economic 
development342. Such principles and rights are namely (1) the elimination 
of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, (2) the effective abolition of 
child labor, (3) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation, and (4) the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, 343. By this 
effect, the UNGP impose such principles and rights to be respected on 
business enterprises 344 . In the context of this research, thus sugar 
producers must respect the four principles and rights mentioned in the 
ILO Declaration, while subcontracted agricultural workers are entitled to 
seek remedy based on such principles and rights.  
 
Details of the four principles and rights are provided in the specific ILO 
Conventions. As of 2017, Thailand is a party to 5 ILO Conventions 
dealing with three of the four principles and rights stated in the ILO 
Declaration – (1) on the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor, the Forced Labor Convention (C029) 345  and the Abolition of 
Forced Labor Convention (C105)346; (2) on the effective abolition of 
child labor, the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (C182)347 and 
                                                
342 I.L.O., Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Sept. 
27, 2017, 9:40 AM), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm. 
343 Id., Principle 2. 
344 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 12, at 13-14. 
345 I.L.O. Convention, Forced Labor Convention (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 
U.N.T.S. 55, in force for Thailand on Feb. 26, 1969. 
346 I.L.O. Convention, Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), June 
25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291, in force for Thailand on 2 Dec 1969. 
347 I.L.O. Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182), 
June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161, in force for Thailand on Feb. 16, 2001. 
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the Minimum Age Convention (C138)348; and (3) on the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, the Equal 
Remuneration Convention (C100) 349 . From 13 June 2018, the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (C111) 350 
will enter into force in Thailand. Obligations under other ILO 
Conventions to which Thailand is a party, namely the Employment 
Policy Convention (C122)351, the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 
(C014) 352 , the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) 
Convention (C019)353, the Final Articles Revision Convention (C080)354, 
the Employment Service Convention (C088)355, the Abolition of Penal 
Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention (C104) 356 , the Final 
Articles Revision Convention (C116) 357 , the Maximum Weight 
Convention (C127)358, the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment 
                                                
348 I.L.O. Convention, Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), June 26, 1973, 
1015 U.N.T.S. 297, in force for Thailand on May 11, 2004. 
349 I.L.O. Convention, Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), June 29, 
1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303, in force for Thailand on Feb. 8, 1999. 
350 I.L.O. Convention, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention (No. 111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, not yet in force for 
Thailand. 
351 I.L.O. Convention, Employment Policy Convention (No. 122), Jul. 9, 1964, 
569 U.N.T.S. 66, in force for Thailand on Feb. 26, 1969. 
352 I.L.O. Convention, Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention (No. 14), Nov. 17, 
1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 187, in force for Thailand on Apr. 5, 1968. 
353 I.L.O. Convention, Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) 
Convention (No. 19), June 5, 1925, 38 U.N.T.S. 229, in force for Thailand on 
Apr. 5, 1968. 
354 I.L.O. Convention, Final Articles Revision Convention (No. 80), Oct. 9, 
1946, 38 U.N.T.S. 3, in force for Thailand on Dec. 5, 1947. 
355 I.L.O. Convention, Employment Service Convention (No. 88), Jul. 9, 1948, 
70 U.N.T.S. 85, in force for Thailand on Feb. 26, 1969. 
356 I.L.O. Convention, Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) 
Convention (No. 104), June 21, 1955, 305 U.N.T.S. 265, in force for Thailand 
on Jul. 29, 1964. 
357 I.L.O. Convention, Final Articles Revision Convention (No. 116), June 26, 
1961, 423 U.N.T.S. 11, in force for Thailand on Sep. 24, 1962. 
358 I.L.O. Convention, Maximum Weight Convention (No.127), June 28, 1967, 
721 U.N.T.S. 39, in force for Thailand on Feb. 26, 1969. 
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(Disabled Persons) Convention (C159) 359 , the Maritime Labor 
Convention (MLC2006) 360 , and the Promotional Framework for 
Occupational Safety and Health Convention (C187)361, may be useful for 
subcontracted agricultural workers to form a basis for their claims in 
Thailand, but these obligations are outside of scope of the UNGP.  
 
 
a. Elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labor 
 
Sugar producers should avoid causing or contributing to, or should seek 
to prevent or mitigate impacts caused by all forms of forced or 
compulsory labor. Likewise, subcontracted agricultural workers should 
not be subjected to all forms of forced or compulsory labor. The 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor evolves from one 
of the most fundamental human rights – the freedom from slavery. 
Enshrined in the ICCPR, slavery is “the status or condition of a person 
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised”362. The practice of slavery is still prevalent in certain parts 
of the world, where people are debt-bonded to their “masters” 363 . 
However, “forced or compulsory labor” differs from slavery due to the 
absence of ownership, so the ILO State Parties created a new instrument 
specifically addressing this alarming problem.  
 
                                                
359 I.L.O. Convention, Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled 
Persons) Convention (No. 159), June 20, 1983, 1401 U.N.T.S. 235, in force for 
Thailand on Oct. 11, 2007. 
360 I.L.O. Convention, Maritime Labor Convention (MLC2006), Feb. 23, 2006, 
I-51299, in force for Thailand on June 7, 2016. 
361 I.L.O. Convention, Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and 
Health Convention (No. 187), June 15, 2006, 2564 U.N.T.S. 4, in force for 
Thailand on Mar. 23, 2016. 
362 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 8(1). 
363 Fons Coomans, Education and Work, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 253 (Daniel Moeckli et.al. eds., 2014); see also Anti-Slavery, Forced 
Labor (Jul. 12, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-
today/forced-labour/. 
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While the ILO Declaration accords the universal applicability of the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, details of what 
constitutes “forced or compulsory labor” are provided in the C029. In 
C029, “forced or compulsory labor” means “all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”364, with the exception 
of work or services performed pursuant to compulsory military service, 
normal civic obligations of citizens, a conviction in a court of law, 
requests in cases of emergency 365. Permitted forced labor shall not be 
imposed for the benefit of private individuals, companies, or 
associations366, and only adult able-bodied males who are of an apparent 
age of not less than 18 and not more than 45 years may be called upon 
for permitted forced or compulsory labor367. In addition, C105 prohibits 
State Parties from utilizing permitted force or compulsory labor as a 
means of political coercion, mobilizing economic development, labor 
discipline, punishment for having participated in strikes, and of racial, 
social, national or religious discrimination368. Consequently, subject to 
the exceptions prescribed by C029 and C105, no subcontracted 
agricultural workers shall be subjected to any forms of forced or 
compulsory labor in the sugar cane supply-chain. 
 
 
b. Abolition of child labor 
 
Sugar producers should ensure that there is no practice of child labor in 
their supply-chain. Supplementing the details for the effective abolition 
of child labor enshrined in the ILO Declaration, the C182 defines the 
practices of child labor that are considered “the worst forms”. According 
to the C182, the worst forms of child labors comprise all forms of slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, such as children trafficking and forced or 
compulsory child labor; the use of a child for prostitution or 
                                                
364 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 345, art. 2(1). 
365 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 345, art. 2(2). 
366 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 345, art. 4(1). 
367 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 345, art. 11. 
368 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 346, art. 1. 
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pornography-related activities; the use of a child for illicit activities such 
as drug trafficking; and other work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, 
safety or morals of children369. While the C182 sets the age of eighteen 
as the benchmark for eligibility to being considered a child, Thailand 
specifies a minimum age of fifteen years as part of its declaration relating 
to the ratification of the C138370. To this effect, the minimum age of 
fifteen years is applicable for the following branches of economic 
activities: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; 
electricity, gas and water; sanitary services; transport, storage and 
communication; plantations and other agricultural undertakings mainly 
producing for commercial purposes, but excluding family and small-
scale holdings producing for local consumption and not regularly 
employing hired workers 371 . As the sugar cane supply-chain is 
undoubtedly a form of “agricultural undertaking mainly producing for 
commercial purposes”, there should not be any laborer under the age of 
fifteen years performing any type of work in sugar cane plantations.  
 
 
c. Elimination of work-related discrimination 
 
As an overarching principle 372  and core right 373 , subcontracted 
agricultural workers shall not be subjected to discrimination of any form 
in respect of their employment and occupation. One of the most prevalent 
issues relating to non-discrimination is the obligation to ensure equal 
remuneration. The ILO Declaration and C100374 share a similar objective 
as the ICESCR; that equal remuneration must be ensured “for work of 
equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being 
                                                
369 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 347, art. 3. 
370 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 347, art. 2. 
371 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 347, art. 5. 
372 Moeckli, supra note 321, at 164. 
373 International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, June 18, 1998 (Aug. 7, 2017, 
10:55 AM), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang-
-en/index.htm, preamble 2. 
374 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 349, art. 2. 
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guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men”375. 
Equal remuneration for work of equal value, which includes ordinary, 
basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments376, for 
work of equal value refers to rates of remuneration established without 
discrimination based on sex377. Furthermore, C019 obliges State Parties 
to ensure the equality of treatment between their nationals and foreign 
workers and their dependents in relation to workmen’s compensation for 
accidents378. In addition, from 13 June 2018, the C111 will enter into 
force in Thailand. The C111 obliges State Parties to eliminate any 
discrimination pursuant to the equality of opportunity principle in respect 
of employment and occupation379. Mirroring the prohibited grounds of 
distinction in other core international human rights treaties380, the C111 
lists the following prohibited grounds of distinction which have the effect 
of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation: race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin 381 . Consequently, subcontracted 
agricultural workers must be treated equally and without any form of 
discrimination in respect of their employment and occupation, with 
emphasis being placed on discrimination based on sex and nationality. 
 
 
 
B. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THAILAND’S NATIONAL 
LEGISLATIONS 
 
References to internationally recognized human rights as admissible 
grievances to the operational-level grievance mechanism can be made 
not only pursuant to the International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO 
Declaration as stated by the UNGP, but also in relation to domestic laws. 
                                                
375 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 7(a)(i). 
376 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 1(a). 
377 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 36, art. 1(b). 
378 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 353, art. 1. 
379 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 350, art. 2. 
380 See Section IV.A.1 “International Bill of Human Rights”. 
381 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 350, art. 1(a). 
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The relationship between international human rights obligations and 
domestic laws depends on the approach adopted by each State: monism 
or dualism. For monist States, international human rights obligations and 
domestic laws operate within the same single legal system, where 
international human rights obligations prevail over domestic laws382. 
Thailand, however, adopts the dualism theory. Under the dualism theory, 
there are two separate legal systems – international and domestic. 
International law governs relations and obligations among “independent 
and theoretically equal sovereign States”, whereas domestic law governs 
domestic affairs within a sovereign State. To apply a specific rule of 
international law at the national level, this rule must be transformed into 
national legislation following appropriate procedure. To use a rule within 
a domestic judicial grievance mechanism, a national judge will refer to 
the rule of national legislation, not the rule of international law383.  
 
International human rights obligations are no exception. They must be 
transformed into Thai national legislation before being applied nationally 
by domestic judges. The procedure for transforming international law 
into national legislation is provided by the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) (hereinafter referred to as “The 
Constitution”)384. Section 178 of the Constitution accords the power to 
conclude treaties with other countries and international organizations to 
be within the prerogative of the King385. However, the transformation 
process is traditionally executed by the Government, subject to the 
King’s approval. The Constitution lists certain conditions, under which 
the ratification by the Parliament is mandatory. Thus a treaty that meets 
one of the four conditions required by the current Constitution must be 
ratified by the Parliament: first, a treaty containing provision(s) that 
would result in a change of the Thai territory or extraterritorial area over 
which Thailand is competent to exercise sovereignty in virtue of another 
treaty or international law; second, a treaty whose implementation 
requires the passing of an Act; third, a treaty containing provision(s) that 
                                                
382 Eileen Denza, The Relationship between International and National Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 ((Malcolm D. Evans, 2nd ed. 2006). 
383 Id., at 429. 
384 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286. 
385 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 178. 
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would extensively impact the national economic or social security; and 
fourth, a treaty containing provisions that would considerably bind the 
national trade or investment 386 . In practice, transforming Thailand’s 
international human rights obligations into national legislations has 
generally been a smooth endeavor, as the provisions in the treaties do not 
meet any conditions required by the enforcing Constitution at the time387. 
In fact, many existing domestic laws already mirrored the contents of the 
provisions in the treaties, apart from the ones in the CED. The integration 
of the CED requires a ratification by the Parliament, as its contents 
necessitate many changes in the domestic laws and ultimately require the 
passing of new Acts 388.  
 
Section 178 of the Constitution serves as a procedural medium for 
transforming Thailand’s international human rights obligations into 
Thailand’s national legislations. Cases brought before Thai courts, as 
well as before other non-judicial grievance mechanisms, can then refer 
to available human rights-related national legislation as their legal basis. 
The following subsections will provide a general mapping of Thailand’s 
domestic law relating to human rights and labor protection. 
 
 
1. Affirmation of rights and liberty under the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
 
In addition to serving as a procedural medium for transforming 
Thailand’s international human rights obligations into Thailand’s 
national legislations, the Constitution is a source of human rights 
obligations through its own affirmation of human rights. 
Notwithstanding the frequent repeals and/or revision of Thailand’s past 
                                                
386 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 178. 
387 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E. 2540 (1997), section 
224; CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E. 2550 (2007) (Thai.), 
section 190.  
388 VITIT MUNTARBHORN, THE CORE HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAILAND: A 
STUDY IN HONOR OF THE FACULTY OF LAW CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY 8 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2016). 
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Constitutions, the provisions relating to the rights of the Thai people 
remained largely unchanged. Provisions relating to fundamental human 
rights and work-related rights are enshrined in Chapter III of the 
Constitution entitled “Rights and Liberty of Thai People”.  
 
The Constitution affirms that “a person shall enjoy the rights and liberties 
to perform any act which is not prohibited or restricted by the 
Constitution or other laws, and shall be protected by the Constitution, 
insofar as the exercise of such rights or liberties does not affect or 
endanger the security of the State or public order or good moral, and does 
not violate the rights or liberties of other persons”389. The Constitution 
also affirms the principle of equality and non-discrimination before the 
law with evident emphasis on gender equality390, the right to life and 
liberty391, and the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor392. 
 
 
2. Laws relating to labor protection 
 
Thailand has an extensive list of legal provisions relating to labor 
protection; many of which reflect the obligations in the international 
human rights instruments to which Thailand is a party. This subsection 
provides a thematic list of Thailand’s domestic law relating to labor 
protection.  
 
 
a. General duties of employers and employees 
 
The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand (the CCC) contains 
provisions stipulating duties of both employers and employees. 
Generally, an employer must pay remuneration to an employee for the 
duration of the employment393, provide a certificate after completion of 
                                                
389 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 25. 
390 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 27. 
391 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 28. 
392 CONSTITUTION, supra note 286, section 30. 
393 CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF THAILAND, section 575.  
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the employment upon the employee’s request 394, and pay the cost of the 
return journey for an employee provided that the employer previously 
brought the employee to work from elsewhere at the expense of the 
employer 395 . In return, the employee must render services to the 
employer396, not be absent from work for an unreasonably long period397 
or without reasonable grounds398, not willfully disobey or habitually 
neglect the lawful command of the employer399, and not commit gross 
misconduct or other acts in a manner incompatible with the due and 
faithful discharge of his or her duty400. 
 
 
b. Equal treatment and non-discrimination based 
on gender 
 
The Labor Protection Act (LPA) contains several provisions that prohibit 
discrimination. First, an employer must treat both male and female 
employees equally unless such equal treatment is not possible due to the 
nature of the work401. Second, for work of equal value, quality, and 
quantity, an employer must prescribe wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, 
and holiday overtime pay equally without any gender discrimination402.  
 
 
c. Prohibition of sexual abuse 
 
An employer, a chief, a supervisor, or a work inspector shall be 
prohibited from committing sexual abuse, harassment, or sexual 
                                                
394 Id., section 576. 
395 Id., section 586. 
396 Id., section 575 
397 Id., section 579 
398 Id., section 583 
399 Id. 
400 Id. 
401 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 15. 
402 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 53. 
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nuisance against an employee403. This provision previously protected 
only female and child employees, but it has been revised following calls 
to extend protection to male employees by virtue of gender equality.  
 
 
d. Regulating general working conditions 
 
The LPA requires an employer to clearly notify normal working hours to 
an employee, specifying the beginning and end of each working day. The 
working hours shall not exceed eight hours per day and forty-eight hours 
per week404. For work that may cause harm to the health and safety of an 
employee, such as working in mines or relating to the production of 
hazardous chemicals, the maximum working hours must not exceed 
seven hours per day405. A minimum rest period of one hour must be 
provided for an employee after he or she has worked up to five 
consecutive hours406 . For overtime work of more than two hours, a 
minimum break of twenty minutes must be granted before commencing 
such overtime work407. An employer must provide a weekly holiday of 
not less than one day per week408, and guarantee no less than thirteen 
traditional holidays including the National Labor Day409, grant no less 
than six working days as annual holidays for an employee who has 
worked for an uninterrupted period of one year410, and allow for an 
unlimited number of sick leave although the presentation of a medical 
certificate may be required from an employee for sick leave of more than 
three consecutive days411. An employer must receive prior consent from 
an employee before asking him or her to perform overtime work412, 
                                                
403 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 16. 
404 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 23; see also MINISTERIAL 
REGULATION VOL. 2 B.E. 2541 (1998), art. 1 (Thai.). 
405 MINISTERIAL REGULATION VOL.2 B.E. 2541 (1998), art. 2 (Thai.). 
406 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 27. 
407 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 27. 
408 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 28. 
409 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 29. 
410 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 30. 
411 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 32. 
412 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 24. 
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unless, by nature of the work it must be performed continuously and the 
stoppage will cause damage to the work or it is an emergency, in which 
case the employer may require the employee to work overtime as 
necessary413. At any rate, the working hours for overtime work must not 
exceed thirty-six hours per week414. 
 
 
e. Provision of occupational safety, health, and 
environment 
 
Provision of occupational safety, health, and environment is stipulated in 
the Occupational Safety, Health and Environment Act B.E. 2554 (2011). 
Generally, an employer must provide safe and hygienic working 
conditions and environment for employees in his or her establishment, as 
well as promoting such conditions and environment that prevent 
employees from harm to life, physique, mentality, or health 415 . 
Moreover, an employer must also provide officers, personnel, or a 
working unit in charge of safety 416 . When working conditions or 
environment may pose harm to life, physique, mentality, or health of 
employees, the employer is obliged to inform the employees of such 
potential danger, to distribute a work manual to them prior to 
commencing work in such conditions or environment417, and to post 
warning symbols or other signage that concern occupational safety, 
health, and environment as well as rights and duties of both the employer 
and the employees at the establishment 418 . The employer must also 
provide the employees with standard personal protective equipment and 
maintain such equipment in good, working condition419.  
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The obligations under the Occupational Safety, Health and Environment 
Act resonate the obligations under several ILO Conventions to which 
Thailand is a party. For instance, the C187, which employs the term “the 
right to safe and healthy working environment”420, obliges State Parties 
to continuously improve occupational safety and health to prevent 
occupational injuries, diseases and deaths 421 , through their national 
policy422 and periodically reviewed national system423. Also, the C127 
obliges State Parties to ensure that no worker shall be required or 
permitted to engage in the manual transport of a load which, due to its 
weight, is likely to jeopardize his or her health or safety 424 . These 
obligations have been transformed into provisions in a series of 
Ministerial Regulations Concerning the Management of Occupational 
Safety, Health and Environment425. 
 
 
f. Guarantee of daily minimum wages 
 
As a general rule, an employer must pay wages to an employee for his or 
her services426. The payment must be made in the Thai currency (THB) 
unless agreed otherwise427 . Normally, the LPA does not specify the 
general minimum daily wage, as it is under the authority of the 
Committee on Wages at the Ministry of Labor to declare and/or update 
the minimum daily wage tailored to different types of work and working 
locations. The most-recent Declaration of Minimum Wages (No. 8) 
provides for a general minimum daily wage between 300 and 310 THB 
depending on working locations: 310 THB for Bangkok Metropolitan 
Area, its perimeter provinces, and Phuket; 308 THB for large provinces 
                                                
420 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 361, art. 3 (2). 
421 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 361, art. 2(1). 
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424 I.L.O. Convention, supra note 358, art. 3. 
425 For instance, MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS Concerning the Management of 
Occupational Safety, Health and Environment on Construction Work B.E. 
2551 (2008) (Thai.). 
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such as Chiang Mai and and Khon Kaen; 305 THB for most provinces 
including those in the northeastern region; and 300 THB for the eight 
smallest provinces mainly in the south region428. These rates have just 
become effective as of 1 January 2017. Minimum daily wages for 
specified types of skilled work may be higher than the ones prescribed 
generally, and the Committee on Wages declares these minimum wages 
separately. For instance, a welder of high-density polyethylene receives 
a minimum daily wage of 460 THB, whereas an aroma therapist (rank 2) 
receives 715 THB429. 
 
 
g. Provision of welfare 
 
The provision of welfare facilitates the realization of economic and 
social rights. Authorized by the LPA430, the Ministry of Labor issues the 
Ministerial Regulations Concerning the Provision of Welfare at a Place 
of Business B.E. 2548 (2005) detailing the requirements for employers 
to provide welfare to their employees. First, an employer must provide 
an adequate number of clean-water stations at the ratio of one station per 
forty employees, as well as sufficient number of toilets, which must be 
separated for both genders and must also accommodate employees with 
disabilities 431 . Second, depending on the size of the operation, an 
employer must provide a first-aid station, a small clinic, or a hospital 
equipped with basic medical facilities and personnel 432. Alternatively, 
subject to authorization by the Director of the Welfare and Labor 
Protection Department, an employer may conclude agreements with 
hospitals, which have 24-hour operations, to send employees for medical 
                                                
428 Comm. On Wages, Ministry of Labor, supra note 228. 
429 Comm. On Wages, Ministry of Labor, Declaration of Minimum Wages for 
Skilled Work No. 4, 
http://www.mol.go.th/sites/default/files/downloads/pdf/Wage_standard4_for22
May2014.pdf. 
430 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 95. 
431 MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS Concerning the Provision of Welfare at a 
Place of Business B.E. 2548 (2005), art. 1 (Thai.). 
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treatment, instead of operating its own medical facility433. The provision 
of additional welfare that is not legally required is encouraged, as it 
would contribute to a more pleasant work atmosphere.  
 
 
h. Prohibition of unfair dismissal 
 
An employer may terminate the employment relationship with an 
employee and is required by law to pay indemnity to the employee434 
unless the law foresees the grounds for termination without indemnity 
payment. Examples of permitted grounds include circumstances where 
the employee commits a criminal offence against the employer, willfully 
causes damage to the employer, violates the lawful work rules, or is 
absent from duty for three consecutive days without justifiable 
reasons 435 . In reality, an employer may still be able to terminate 
employment with an employee at will, even without such permitted 
grounds. However, an arbitrary termination may have a great, 
unexpected financial and social impact on an employee, and it is 
considered abusive in certain jurisdictions436. This practice is widely 
referred to as “unfair dismissal” and is prohibited. The LPA does not 
provide any definitions as to what constitutes an “unfair dismissal”, but 
the Establishment of the Labor Court and its Procedure Act B.E. 2522 
(1973)437 gives discretionary power to the Labor Court to determine what 
action may be considered an “unfair dismissal”. For instance, terminating 
employment with some employees without discrimination due to a 
severe operational loss is not considered an “unfair dismissal” 438 , 
whereas terminating employment with some employees due to a small 
                                                
433 Id., art. 3. 
434 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 118 para 2. 
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operational loss, which does not affect the survivability of the firm, is an 
“unfair dismissal”439. 
 
 
i. Special protection for women and children 
 
The protection of women and children in the LPA reflects Thailand’s 
international human rights obligations primarily under the CEDAW and 
the CRC. For example, the LPA prohibits an employer from engaging 
women to perform specific types of work, such as working in mines and 
tunnels440. The permitted maximum weight a female employee may lift 
is limited to 25 kilograms, compared to 55 kilograms for a male 
employee 441. Special protections are also given to pregnant employees, 
such as prohibition from working overtime or on holidays442, granting of 
maternity leave of no more than ninety days for each pregnancy443, and 
prohibition of dismissal due to pregnancy444. With regard to children, the 
LPA prohibits the employment of a child who is under fifteen years of 
age445, mirroring Thailand’s international human rights obligations under 
the C138446. A child who is between fifteen and eighteen years old shall 
not be employed to perform prohibited work, such as metal pressing and 
blowing as well as work involving heat, cold, vibration, or hazardous 
chemical substances447. The permitted maximum weight for a male child 
is 25 kilograms, and 20 kilograms for a female child448. The LPA also 
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grants other protections for a child employee by regulating working 
hours449, prohibited place of work450, and educational leave451. 
 
 
 
C. GRIEVANCES IN THAILAND’S SUGAR INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
 
In addition to identifying admissible grievances based on legal sources, 
this research will also explore grievances as encountered and identified 
by interviewed subcontracted agricultural workers, as well as grievances 
that are reported by the NHRC. The objective is to illustrate the typicality 
of certain grievances that subcontracted agricultural workers usually 
encounter, which could assist the administrators and/or operators of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms to pay closer attention to such 
grievances and consider them as admissible to their mechanism. 
However, to avoid controversy and as a disclaimer, this research affirms 
that all accounts herein, whether gathered from structured interviews or 
reported by the NHRC, merely serve as narrations. This research does 
not, by any means, attempt to allege or conclude that such accounts 
constitute human rights violations in relation to the UNGP. 
Determination of whether such accounts amount to human rights 
violations will need to be further decided by the available grievance 
mechanisms. 
 
 
1. Grievances as identified by the interviewed 
subcontracted agricultural workers and 
subcontractors 
 
The researcher conducted structured interviews of subcontracted 
agricultural workers at sugar cane plantations and subcontractors at sugar 
mills in Buriram and Khon Kaen provinces in the northeast of Thailand 
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during 22-26 August 2016. The researcher was led to the sugar cane 
plantations by subcontractors. However, to ensure the anonymity of 
responses given by the subcontracted agricultural workers, the 
subcontractors (as the employers of the interviewees), agreed to remain 
outside of the interview area at the sugar cane plantation. Due to 
language barriers, as most of the interviewees were unable to speak the 
standard (central) Thai dialect, the researcher asked Mr. Pormest 
Wongsatitporn (LL.M., Chulalongkorn) to serve as a translator from 
Northeastern (Esarn) local dialect into standard (central) Thai throughout 
all interviews. The structured interviews of subcontracted agricultural 
workers proceeded in three stages: preliminary, group, and individual. 
At the preliminary stage, the researcher informed and provided the 
interviewees with the following details: 1) full title of the project, 2) 
name and position of the researcher, 3) consent form, and 4) information 
sheet containing a brief object and purpose of the research and 
background information. The consent forms were distributed in English 
together with the Thai translation. The interviewees were asked to sign 
the English form. The details of the consent form are provided in 
Appendix C. Also, to assist the interviewees, Mr. Wongsatitporn read out 
the information sheet in the local dialect to the interviewees and 
confirmed their understanding. The interviewees indicated that their 
responses and their contribution to this research shall remain anonymous. 
At the second stage, the interviewees were collectively asked the 
preliminary questions. Then at the third stage, the researcher separated 
the interviewees and conducted the interviews individually. Each 
interviewee was asked the same series of questions, which were prepared 
prior to the interview. The structured interview questions are provided in 
Appendix B. During the third stage, the interviewees who had finished 
being interviewed were asked to remain separated from and not to share 
interview-related questions with other interviewees who had yet to be 
interviewed. Also, the subcontractors were asked not to ask the 
interviewees about the responses given during the interview. The 
structured interviews of subcontractors, however, deviated slightly from 
those of subcontracted agricultural workers. Due to the small number of 
subcontractors and limited time, the researcher combined the second and 
third stage. The prepared questions were used as guidelines, and follow-
up questions were asked. The table illustrating the structured interview 
methodology is provided in Appendix A. In the following are the 
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accounts given by the interviewees during the interview. Categorically, 
there are three issues that raise concerns. 
 
 
a. Income below daily minimum wage 
 
Throughout the interviews, subcontracted agricultural workers stated 
that they earned a daily wage of approximately between 200 THB and 
240 THB, depending on the rate (lunch or without lunch) they chose452. 
The subcontractors gave similar responses, as well as describing the 
relationship between the subcontractors and the sugar producers453.  
 
In the supply-chain, the subcontractors and the sugar producers conclude 
a buy/purchase of sugar cane agreement whereby the subcontractors are 
obliged to provide sugar cane to the sugar producers. Terms and 
conditions in the contract include prices, volumes, and quality. The 
subcontractors indicated that such terms and conditions generally were 
only loosely defined at the time of conclusion of contract. This gives 
sugar producers a wide range of discretion at the time of delivery. For 
instance, changes are constantly requested with regard to the acceptable 
weight and size of sugar canes. Also, some mills apply their subjective 
“quality” standards. Mostly, if not always, the subcontractors are not 
made aware of these changes prior to delivery, and it is challenging for 
them to anticipate what will be called for454. By failing to deliver the 
sugar canes that meet the ever-changing quality criteria, the 
subcontractors are pressured to accept the reduced prices, resulting in 
their earning less profit 455.  
 
After the harvest, sugar canes are normally transported to the sugar mills 
by truck. Transporting a large amount of sugar canes from the plantations 
to the mills can be burdensome, as this usually requires a strong fleet of 
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efficient vehicles. For some subcontractors with weaker financial ability, 
opting to use the mill-provided vehicles is a necessary and inevitable 
requirement. One of the interviewed subcontractors indicated that a 
transportation fee was levied on her, and the amount constantly 
fluctuated456. According to the interviewee, some sugar mills justify the 
extra charges by citing high oil prices, additional overtime payments for 
truck drivers, and, in some cases, some extra “contributions” requested 
by the highway police457. The sugar mills then forward these additional 
transportation costs to be absorbed by the subcontractors. 
 
Information gathered from the interviews reveals plausible factors 
causing or contributing to the daily wages being lower than that 
prescribed by law. As mentioned, the minimum daily wage is prescribed 
by the Committee of Wages at the Ministry of Labor. Absent of any 
applicable specific rate458, the normal minimum daily wage applies to 
agricultural workers in general. Therefore, the interviewed subcontracted 
agricultural workers in the provinces of Khon Kaen and Buriram are 
entitled to the minimum daily wage of at least 308 THB and 305 THB 
respectively459. One of these plausible factors is the necessity of the 
subcontractors to remain profitable in their operations or to prevent 
further losses resulting from the additional financial burden imposed by 
the sugar producers. Examples of such additional financial burdens 
identified from the interviews are the reduction of sugar cane prices upon 
delivery due to inconsistent acceptance criteria of sugar canes and the 
transportation fees, if the subcontractors opt to use the mill-provided 
trucks. The subcontractors then also forward these additional burdens to 
be absorbed by the subcontracted agricultural workers through the 
reduction of their daily wage in order to maintain profitability or prevent 
further losses.  
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b. “Mandatory” cooperation for extended working 
hours 
 
In the interviews, some subcontracted agricultural workers indicated that 
they worked approximately eight hours a day, from 8 AM to 5 PM with 
a one-hour lunch break. Other subcontracted agricultural workers who 
opted for the quantity rate were more flexible in timing, but the overall 
working hours normally did not exceed the eight-hour maximum 
restriction. However, there are occasions when the subcontracted 
agricultural workers are “asked” to work for a longer period exceeding 
the restriction460. The extension typically results in two to three working 
hours more than the permitted daily working hours; however, no 
overtime payment is paid. When the extended working hours are 
required, the subcontracted agricultural workers indicated that the 
subcontractors normally approach them and “kindly asked” if they could 
work “a little bit longer”461. Generally, they cooperate because they do 
not want to “upset” the subcontractors462.  
 
The subcontractors justified the extension of working hours by citing the 
occasional surge in demand for sugar canes 463. When the subcontractors 
are requested to provide more sugar canes to the sugar producers within 
a tight timeframe, they generally agree to the request to maintain an 
amicable relationship with the sugar producers, even though their normal 
operational capability may not accommodate the increase of sugar cane 
orders464.  
 
Extending the working hours beyond the maximum daily restriction is a 
violation of the Labor Protection Act. As already mentioned, the LPA 
limits the maximum working hours to eight hours per day and forty-eight 
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hours per week465. Nevertheless, plausible factors that cause the practice 
of extended working hours without overtime payment are the surge in 
demand for sugar canes and the non-confrontational culture of the Thai 
subcontracted agricultural workers. The “not wanting to upset” the 
subcontractors reflects the imbalance of the bargaining power between 
the subcontractors and the subcontracted agricultural workers, whereby 
the latter is in the inferior position due to the dire need to earn an 
income 466 . Therefore, while the cooperation may be perceived as 
voluntary, the decision process of the subcontracted agricultural workers 
is contaminated with the “kind” request to the degree that such 
cooperation, in fact, becomes “mandatory”. 
 
 
c. “Voluntary” child labor 
 
The interviews further revealed that the age of agricultural workers can 
range from early teenage years up to men and women in their seventies. 
The omission of the term “subcontracted” in this section is due to the 
legal minimum age of employment, where no one under the age of fifteen 
can be employed. In other words, agricultural workers who are under the 
age of fifteen cannot legally be “subcontracted”. For the interviewed 
agricultural workers, there is neither a retirement restriction, nor is there 
a minimum age for young farmers. While the customary age-range for 
agricultural workers is between 20 and 60, some young agricultural 
workers can be as young as 10 years old467. According to the interviews, 
some young agricultural workers work at the plantation before and after 
school. Often accompanying their parents with flexible working hours 
(the quantity option), these young agricultural workers may start working 
from as early as 4 AM until just before 8 AM when the school starts. 
Then after school, they proceed to the plantation at around 4 PM and 
finish their work for the day along with their parents. As stated in the 
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interviews, the young agricultural workers principally receive the same 
amount of payment as their adult counterparts, but whether they actually 
have access to the money remains unclear. Customarily, parents take the 
liberty to manage their children’s monetary property468. 
 
The interviewees provided some interesting accounts as to why they 
chose to work at the sugar cane plantations. First, some young 
agricultural workers offer to work primarily out of family gratitude. The 
family value of being grateful is extensively nurtured in Thai society. 
Young members of the family, including those who are considered 
juvenile, are expected to provide help to their guardians. In the families 
of agricultural workers, this expectation inevitably includes providing 
labor in the plantations whenever possible. Notwithstanding the 
voluntary nature of such assistance, expectations are often high and can 
be intuitively perceived as obligatory469. Second, some young 
agricultural workers perceived working in sugar cane plantations as an 
opportunity to gain extra earnings 470. 
 
Legally, the practice of having young agricultural workers under the age 
of fifteen working at the sugar cane plantation per se is prohibited by the 
LPA471, as well as by relevant international human rights obligation to 
which Thailand is a party472. While some young agricultural workers 
report their working on the plantation as being “voluntary” and without 
any abusive characters, the influence of the family’s “expectations” 
dilutes the purity of “voluntariness” of their decision. Consequently, the 
strict interpretation of the relevant legal provisions dictates that such 
practice is still illegal.  
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2. Grievance as reported by the NHRC 
 
In addition to grievances identified by the interviewees, the NHRC report 
is another useful platform to obtain information on other grievances 
relating to Thailand’s sugar industry. As previously mentioned, the 
NHRC is a State-based, non-judicial grievance mechanism, whose 
mandate is to serve as a contact point by receiving and forwarding 
complaints to relevant State agencies or private actors for compliance. 
 
To date, the most notable case pertaining to a grievance against 
Thailand’s sugar industry concerns alleged land grabbing. Recently, the 
NHRC received a complaint from a group of locals in Sakhon Nakhon 
province in the northeast of Thailand regarding an alleged trespass on 
national forest land and further land grabbing to make way for building 
new sugar mills and power plants473. In its preliminary investigation, the 
NHRC found that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the 
project in question was not carried out properly. The locals alleged that 
the EIA was quickly rushed through, so that the construction of the 
project could be completed before the new harvest season474. After the 
investigation, the NHRC recommended that a new EIA be carried out, 
and that the locals should be allowed to participate in such assessment. 
The NHRC organized a meeting to provide a platform for discussions 
among all relevant stakeholders. Participants to the meeting included 
representatives from the locals, the OCSB, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Public Work and 
Town and Country Planning, as well as the Governor of Sakhon Nakhon 
and the Mayor of the Um-jan Subdistrict Administration Organization475. 
At the time of writing, the lawfulness of constructing the project on the 
designated land plots remains disputed, but the deterring effect of the 
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NHRC’s recommendation to put a moratorium on the project, which 
allegedly violates human rights, should be noted476. 
 
In addition to this case, the NHRC released a final report on allegations 
regarding the forced evictions of hundreds of villagers in Sre Ambel, 
Koh Kong province in Cambodia to the benefit of a Thai sugar 
producer477. The complaint to the NHRC was filed in 2010 by villagers 
in affected communities alleging that a Thai sugar producer violated a 
Cambodian law and international human rights law, through its 
Cambodian subsidiaries, by illegally obtaining economic land 
concessions (ELCs) from the Cambodian government. In its final report, 
the NHRC confirmed that the forced evictions in this case violated “the 
right of life, the right to self-determination, and the right to 
development”478. This report reflected the outcome of another report by 
Professor Surya Subedi, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, which confirms that the ELCs 
had human rights impacts on locals, including villagers affected by the 
forced evictions initiated by the Thai sugar producer479. As reported by 
independent experts as well as the NHRC, it can be noted that grievances 
arising out of land-grabbing or forced evictions are typical impacts that 
sugar producers may cause or contribute to that harm many agricultural 
workers and locals. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter IV was dedicated to identifying grievances that would be 
considered admissible to operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
Section IV.A made reference to the international human rights 
instruments in the context of the UNGP – the International Bill of Human 
Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, and provided a list of the relevant human rights, such as the right 
to life, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, and 
the abolition of child labor. Section IV.B explored potentially admissible 
grievances based on Thailand’s national legislations, particularly on 
labor protection and labor standards. In addition to identifying 
admissible grievances based on legal sources, Section IV.C explored 
grievances as encountered and identified by interviewed subcontracted 
agricultural workers, as well as grievances that were reported by the 
NHRC. Consequently, this research argued that the identified admissible 
grievances could provide more consistency and assistance for the 
administrators and/or operators of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. At the same time, this consistency could provide 
reassurance for subcontracted agricultural workers who might question 
the admissibility of their grievances. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Involving Business Enterprises: 
Establishing the Nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business enterprises can cause or contribute to adverse human rights 
impacts through their business operations. As such, the UNGP advocate 
that they should address such impacts by, among others, providing 
remedy through their operational-level grievance mechanisms. In the 
context of this research, the ultimate objective is to show that sugar 
producers that have a certain degree of involvement in the adverse human 
rights impact on subcontracted agricultural workers should provide an 
operational-level grievance mechanism and ensure that subcontracted 
agricultural workers in the supply-chain effectively have access to it. To 
achieve this objective, this chapter will address two important nexuses. 
The first nexus is between business enterprises and grievances. Building 
on the list of admissible grievances as discussed in the previous chapter, 
this chapter will explore triggering conditions that link business 
enterprises with the admissible grievances. The second nexus is 
particularly important in the context of this research. With the absence 
of a formal employment relationship between sugar producers and 
subcontracted agricultural workers, this chapter will explore the potential 
basis for establishing a linkage between the two actors.  
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A. TRIGGERING CONDITIONS TO INVOLVE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES 
 
Fundamentally, business enterprises have the responsibility to refrain 
from harm. In addition, they also have a proactive responsibility “to 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”480. The 
UNGP are fair in this regard; business enterprises should only bear 
responsibility if they are involved in the adverse human rights impact. 
Anchoring responsibility on business enterprises without a certain degree 
of involvement would render such responsibility excessive. The key 
question is, what actions or activities are considered as involvement. The 
UNGP mention three distinct terms, which will be discussed in the 
following sub-sections. Each term refers to different expectations that are 
placed on business enterprises. These terms are: cause, contribute, 
directly linked. In light of the UNGP general principles, the interpretation 
of these terms is meant to reflect the remedial and voluntary nature of the 
UNGP, as opposed to the fault-based interpretation as commonly found 
in general tort or criminal law principles. 
 
 
1. Cause 
 
At the outset, the UNGP require that business enterprises avoid “causing 
or contributing” to adverse human rights impacts 481. The UNGP do not 
provide any practical definition as to what is considered “cause”. 
Referring to one of the highly regarded linguist authorities, the Oxford 
English Dictionary, it can be noted that to “cause” is to “make 
(something, especially something bad) happen”482. More specifically, a 
general legal analysis of the term “cause” would typically involve the 
discussion on the causation theory. As such, the conditio sine qua non 
test, or as known in common law jurisdictions the but-for test, requires 
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 	 123 
that the harmful result must occur as a result of the damaging event483. In 
other words, the causation is established if, but for the actions or the 
omissions of a party, the harmful result would not have occurred. In 
addition to causation, liability will only arise when such harmful result 
is foreseeable, judged in accordance with the knowledge and experience 
of a particularly prudent person484. However, this paradigm should not 
be used against the context of the UNGP. This is because the causation 
theory is fault-based, meaning that the objective of finding causation is 
to establish liability on the wrongdoer and impose punishment. As a 
result, the liability analysis must be done in a restrictive manner, which 
potentially reduces the probability of finding business enterprises liable. 
In the larger context, finding liability could also deter business 
enterprises from voluntarily getting involved in the UNGP scheme, as 
they tend to be cautious of unnecessarily binding themselves to any form 
of liability. 
 
On the other hand, the UNGP employ a remedial and voluntary approach. 
To discern the meaning of “cause” in line with the UNGP approach, 
referring to the Interpretive Guide to the UNGP 485 might be useful. The 
Interpretive Guide suggests that business enterprises can infringe human 
rights through their own activities “when they are not paying sufficient 
attention to this risk and how to reduce it”486, and “should cease or change 
the activity that is responsible, in order to prevent or mitigate the chance 
of impact occurring or recurring”487 . From this statement, it can be 
reflected that a business enterprise must have a certain degree of ability 
to manage the chance of impact from occurring or recurring, whether by 
preventing (before occurring) or mitigating (after occurring or recurring). 
Having such ability and not exercising it should already be sufficient 
reason to find that the business enterprise has caused a human rights 
                                                
483 CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 310 (2d ed. 2013). 
484 Franz Bydlinski, Methodological Approaches to the Tort Law of the ECHR, 
in TORT LAW IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 29, 75 (Attila Fenyves et al. eds., 2011). 
485 U. N. (2012). The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights – An 
Interpretive Guide. 
486 Id., at 11. 
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impact. Without establishing any liability, the business enterprise can 
still cause human rights impact even if it does not know or cannot foresee 
that such impact may occur or recur.  
 
Following this interpretation, a business enterprise can cause an adverse 
human rights impact, whether through its action or omission, when it 
does not exercise its ability to manage the chance of impact occurring or 
recurring. Reciting the general dictionary meaning, a business enterprise 
is considered to make such human rights impact happen by not exercising 
its said ability488. In the context of this research, a sugar producer could 
be considered as “having caused” adverse human rights impacts on 
subcontracted agricultural workers in its supply-chain when it can be 
established that 1) the sugar producer had a certain degree of ability to 
manage the chance of such impact from occurring or recurring and 2) the 
sugar producer did not exercise the said ability to avoid or address the 
adverse human rights impact. 
 
 
2. Contribute 
 
Comparable to the previous sub-section, business enterprises can also 
“contribute to” adverse human rights impact through their own 
activities”489, and “as a result of their business relationship with other 
parties”490. In other words, when one or more of the parties in a business 
relationship with the business enterprise cause adverse human rights 
impact, the business enterprise may be considered as “contributing to” 
such impact due to the existence of this relationship. Again, the UNGP 
does not provide any practical definition as to what is considered 
“contribution”. The general meaning of “contribute” is to “give 
(something) in order to help achieve or provide something”491. Typically, 
this would suggest that the business enterprise can be said to contribute 
                                                
488 Oxford, supra note 482. 
489 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary Principle 13, at 14-15. 
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to an adverse human rights impact merely by helping or providing 
something of an unclear magnitude. However, as the business enterprise 
itself does not cause an adverse human rights impact, to involve it into 
the scenario should principally require a certain material degree of 
involvement.  
 
The UNGP Commentary notes that a business enterprise that may 
contribute to an adverse human rights impact “should take the necessary 
steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate 
any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible”492. The addition of 
the leverage usage “to the greatest extent possible” suggests that a 
business enterprise does not have a complete ability to manage the 
chance of impact occurring or recurring. As such, while a business 
enterprise does not have a complete ability to cause an adverse human 
rights impact by itself, it can still contribute to such an impact when its 
contribution is “substantial”493. Substantial contribution may refer to, for 
instance, an activity that “facilitates or incentivizes another entity to 
cause an adverse impact”494.  
 
Following this interpretation, a business enterprise can contribute to an 
adverse human rights impact caused by an entity with which the business 
enterprise has a business relationship, provided that its involvement, 
whether through its activities or its omission to use leverage, has a certain 
material or substantial degree of influence in making such adverse 
human rights impact happen. In the context of this research, a sugar 
producer can be considered as “having contributed” to adverse human 
rights impacts on subcontracted agricultural workers in its supply-chain, 
if it can be established that 1) the sugar producer has a business 
relationship with the entity that has caused such adverse human rights 
impact and 2) the sugar producer has a certain material or substantial 
degree of influence in making such adverse human rights impact happen, 
such as facilitating or incentivizing the said entity to cause such impact. 
                                                
492 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary Principle 19, at 20-22. 
493 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., OECD-FAO GUIDANCE FOR 
RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY CHAINS 20 (2016), see also 
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3. Directly linked 
 
The last nexus to connect a business enterprise with an adverse human 
rights impact is relatively broad. The term used is “directly linked”, and 
it appears multiple times in the UNGP 495 . Principally, the UNGP 
Principle 13 requires business enterprises to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts, provided that such impacts are directly linked to 
their operations, products or services by their business relationship, 
“even if they have not contributed to those impacts”496. The UNGP 
Commentary explains further that business relationships “are understood 
to include relationships with business partners, entities in their value 
chain (supply chain), and any other non-State or State entity directly 
linked to its business operations, products or services”497. However, the 
UNGP do not provide any definition as to under what circumstances the 
business relationship should be regarded as being “directly linked”.  
 
Attempts to clarify the term “directly linked” have often been associated 
with the principle of vicarious, or no-fault, liability. In brief, vicarious 
liability imposes liability on an entity for the acts of its employee or 
business partner(s) even if such entity does not cause the injury498. The 
underlying justification for this no-fault liability stems from the 
presumption that all entities “are carrying on an undertaking in common 
and in concert”499, and the resulting benefits are commonly shared. By 
this very nature, all entities involved in a business undertaking should 
assume the risks arising from the activities that they benefit from500. 
However, it must be noted that applying the vicarious liability paradigm 
to justify the involvement of a business enterprise in an adverse human 
rights impact should be used with caution. Business enterprises often 
hesitate to associate themselves with any form of liability. Hence, the 
UNGP omit the use of the term “vicarious liability” and alternatively 
                                                
495 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principles 13, 16, 17, 19(b). 
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attempt to involve business enterprises through this new linkage 
paradigm.  
 
Borrowing the justification for involving business enterprises from the 
vicarious liability principle only explains the term “linked”. As 
discussed, the UNGP rigorously require that such linkage be direct. To 
find the meaning, consulting the well-established dictionary is inevitable. 
The general meaning of the term “directly” is “without changing 
direction or stopping” and “with nothing or no one in between” 501 . 
Reading this together with the justification for this linkage, an adverse 
human rights impact is deemed to be “directly linked” to a business 
enterprise when such business enterprise benefits from its business 
partner’s operations, products or services that cause the identified 
adverse human rights impact, provided that such benefit consistently 
remains in its original form without changing or without intervention. 
 
The three channels in which the UNGP envisage the involvement of 
business enterprises to bear responsibility for adverse human rights 
impacts create different consequences. Principally, business enterprises 
that cause or contribute to adverse human rights impacts are required to 
avoid doing so and address such impacts when they occur502. To a lesser 
extent, business enterprises are only required to seek to prevent or 
mitigate (as opposed to avoid or address) adverse human rights impacts 
when they are directly linked to their operations, products or services by 
their business relationships. However, the UNGP further recommend 
causers or contributors that they should provide for or cooperate in their 
remediation through legitimate process503, including through effective 
operational-level grievance mechanisms 504 . In the context of this 
research, a sugar producer can be considered as being “directly linked” 
to adverse human rights impacts on subcontracted agricultural workers 
in its supply-chain, if it can be established that 1) the sugar producer has 
a business relationship with the entity that has caused such adverse 
                                                
501 Oxford Dictionary, Definition “directly” (Jul. 24, 2017, 4:10 PM), 
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human rights impact and 2) the sugar producer benefits from the 
operations, products or services of such entity.  
 
 
 
B. ESTABLISHING LINKAGE BETWEEN BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES AND NON-EMPLOYEE COMPLAINANTS 
BEYOND THE EMPLOYMENT CONDITION 
 
This section explores the potential basis for establishing linkage between 
business enterprises and non-employee complainants beyond the 
employment condition in order to enhance the accessibility for these non-
employee complainants to operational-level grievance mechanisms 
administered or operated by business enterprises. In the context of this 
research, this would be the linkage between sugar producers and 
subcontracted agricultural workers. At present, the analyzed example of 
an operational-level grievance mechanism in Thailand’s sugar industry 
– the Mitr Phol mechanism – only allows Mitr Phol’s employees to 
access it. As such, subcontracted agricultural workers in the Mitr Phol 
supply-chain currently do not have access to this operational-level 
grievance mechanism. This limitation is inevitably due to the absence of 
a formal employment relationship between Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. and 
subcontracted agricultural workers in the Mitr Phol supply-chain. 
 
This research recognizes that in today’s world, one of the most popular 
business operation methods is the practice of “outsourcing”. In the 
interest of cost-saving, many business enterprises allocate certain jobs, 
tasks, or functions to be done externally, instead of handling them with 
their own employees 505 . Outsourcing can arguably contribute to a 
speedier business growth, while keeping the labor and overhead costs to 
a minimum506 . Typically, a business enterprise hires an independent 
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subcontractor to perform a task or complete a project507. Sugar producers 
in Thailand’s sugar cane supply-chain also adopt this business practice, 
as they hire several subcontractors to harvest and procure sugar canes for 
them. As previously explained, subcontractors then employ 
subcontracted agricultural workers to perform such task. 
 
In outsourcing there is no legal relationship between business enterprises 
and non-employee complainants. Business enterprises may be hesitant to 
bear responsibility for non-employee complainants, with whom they 
have neither formal nor legal connection. Therefore, it is vital to explore 
possible channels or grounds to circumvent this limitation in the interest 
of expanding access to remedy to encompass non-employee 
complainants, such as subcontracted agricultural workers. This research 
argues that the inclusiveness character of the UNGP provides a 
preliminary justification for establishing linkage between business 
enterprises and non-employee complainants. Furthermore, this research 
will study existing laws in several other jurisdictions to explore a 
potential legal basis that might provide reasoning for linking business 
enterprises to non-employee complainants. Due to the commonality with 
Thailand in terms of economy, labor economics and geographical 
location, the countries selected for examination are members of the 
ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – where Thailand 
is a member. Currently, there are ten ASEAN member countries: 
Thailand, Indonesia, the Phillippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, 
Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. 
 
 
1. The UNGP’s inclusiveness 
 
As can be expected, the UNGP advocate for embracing the participation 
of all actors, including business enterprises, towards achieving its 
objective. This inclusiveness approach is explicitly stated in the UNGP 
Principle 11, which suggests that “business enterprises should respect 
human rights”, “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others 
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and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved”508. Recalling the previous discussion in Section V.A, a business 
enterprise can become involved when it causes or contributes to an 
adverse human rights impact, or when such impact is directly linked to 
its operations, products or services by its business relationships. 
Potentially affected actors include its employees, customers, workers in 
the supply-chains or communities around its operations509. It must be 
noted that the categorization of potentially affected actors by the 
Interpretive Guide separates employees from workers in the supply-
chain. The specific mentioning of the term “workers” not only recognizes 
that potential limitations might arise from the lack of formal employment 
relationship, but also reinstates the fundamental inclusiveness objective 
of the UNGP that business enterprises should also be responsible to 
workers in their supply-chain, such as subcontracted agricultural 
workers, even if they do not have a formal employment relationship with 
them. 
 
 
2. Extending the scope of employer’s obligation and 
liabilities to non-employees: A brief look at labor 
laws in ASEAN countries 
 
The first basis for establishing linkage between business enterprises and 
non-employee complainants is the extension of the scope of employer’s 
obligation to non-employees. This extension is found in the labor laws 
of several ASEAN jurisdictions, reflecting the recognition of the practice 
of subcontracting work. Principally, an employer must perform certain 
obligations towards its employees, such as paying wages and providing 
welfare. However, when a supply-chain involves the subcontracting of 
work, labor laws in some jurisdictions oblige a business enterprise (as a 
client of a subcontractor) to perform obligations directly towards 
subcontracted workers based on certain conditions. In the context of this 
research, such labor laws would effectively oblige sugar producers to 
perform certain obligations towards subcontracted agricultural workers, 
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provided that the conditions prescribed in the respective labor law are 
met.  
 
The second basis for establishing linkage between business enterprises 
and non-employee complainants is the extension of the scope of 
employer’s liabilities to non-employees. Also found in the labor laws of 
several ASEAN jurisdictions, this extension circumvents the 
conventional restriction of requiring a formal employment relationship 
by resorting to the civil law principle of solidary liability. Alternatively 
referred to as solidary obligations, or an obligation in solido, the solidary 
liability allows one creditor to claim a full amount due from one of many 
debtors. In other words, each debtor, notwithstanding the agreed 
percentage of debt-sharing among many debtors, is liable for the whole 
amount of debt demanded by one creditor510. Once one of the debtors has 
performed an obligation, a performance by a single debtor releases the 
others towards the creditor 511 . In common law jurisdiction, this 
arrangement is comparatively referred to as the doctrine of joint and 
several liabilities. When more than one debtors are jointly and severally 
liable to a creditor, the creditor may pursue an entire obligation from one 
of the debtors as if all the debtors were jointly liable. Once one of the 
debtors have performed an obligation, this debtor must pursue the other 
debtors for a contribution to their share of the liability512.  
 
Putting this into the human rights context discussed herein, a 
subcontracted worker would be considered a creditor on the one end, and 
a business enterprise (a client) and a subcontractor would be considered 
joint debtors on the other end. Hence, the subcontracted worker could 
bypass the subcontractor and claim damage directly from the client. Once 
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the client has provided remedy to the subcontracted worker, it can then 
pursue the subcontractor for the latter’s share of liability. In the law of 
contract, the use of the solidary liability or the joint and several liabilities 
must be clearly indicated in the contract. However, in the human rights 
context, separate legal provisions are necessary to embed and activate 
the use of the principle of solidary liability or the joint and several 
liabilities to circumvent a conventional employment relationship 
restriction for the protection of subcontracted workers. Legal references 
to both principles differ from country to country. Some countries only 
have a small guideline for courts to exercise their discretion, while some 
countries have specific provisions addressing the principle of solidary 
liability or the doctrine of joint and several liabilities. 
 
This section will illustrate the extension of the scope of an employer’s 
obligation and liabilities to non-employees as found in the labor laws of 
the ASEAN countries. 
 
 
a. Indonesia 
 
Indonesian law is based on a civil legal system. Its main source of labor 
protection, the Act of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning 
Manpower 513 , requires that an employment relation or relationship 
(hubungan kerja) between a business enterprise (an employer/a client of 
a subcontractor) and a worker/laborer (an employee) must be based on a 
work/employment agreement, prescribing job-related aspects such as 
wages, orders, and instructions 514 . Principally, without such an 
agreement, a client cannot be regarded as having an employment 
relationship with a subcontracted worker, and therefore is not liable for 
any human rights impacts incurred. However, the Act recognizes the 
possibility of subcontracting work and stipulates specific provisions to 
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allow the performance of such practice515. Article 65 of the Act outlines 
several important elements of permitted subcontracting work. First, a 
subcontractor 516  must be a legal entity 517 . Second, permitted 
subcontracting work must be work that can be kept separate from the 
main business activity, that is to be undertaken by either a direct or 
indirect order of the client, that is an entirely auxiliary activity of the 
client, and that does not directly inhibit the production process of the 
client 518 . Third, the protection and working conditions provided to 
subcontracted workers must be the same as the ones provided by the 
client to its actual employees519. Hence, under the Indonesian labor law, 
a business enterprise (or a client) is obliged to provide protection and 
appropriate working conditions to subcontracted workers, provided that 
all legal conditions are met. If the business enterprise provides an 
operational-level grievance mechanism to its employees as part of the 
working condition, this operational-level grievance mechanism should 
also be accessible by affected subcontracted workers. 
 
Failing to meet the criteria will result in the extension of the scope of 
liability. If it can be proven that a business enterprise did not provide the 
same protection and working conditions to subcontracted workers as to 
its actual employees, the business enterprise (the client) will be held 
legally responsible for them, as the law creates a new employment 
relationship between the client and the subcontracted workers520. As a 
result, the client must ensure that all criteria are met to avoid becoming 
legally responsible for the subcontracted workers. This setup incentivizes 
the client to offer the same level of protection and working conditions to 
subcontracted workers, along with other requirements. Thus, provided 
that all the criteria are met, the client is relieved from assuming legal 
responsibility for potential human rights impacts occurring over the 
course of work, and the subcontracted worker can only seek legal 
responsibility from its direct employer – the subcontractor. For 
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Indonesia, the principle of solidary liability applies conditionally, 
dependent on the satisfaction of such criteria. In the event of non-
satisfaction the client is legally responsible for the subcontracted workers 
and may choose to provide remedy for the subcontracted worker through 
its operational-level grievance mechanism. 
 
 
b. The Philippines 
 
The Philippines’ legal system is a combination of civil and Anglo-
American common law. The Labor Code of the Philippines 521 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Filipino Code”) provides a comprehensive 
collection with regard to the protection of rights of workers as well as the 
promotion of full employment and equal work opportunities 522 . 
Interestingly, the Filipino Code adopts a labor-friendly approach by 
clearly stating that any doubts in the implementation and interpretation 
of the provisions of the Code, including its implementing rules and 
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of laborer523. The Filipino Code 
also clarifies any potential doubts regarding its applicable personal 
scope, by clearly stating that both agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers shall benefit from the rights granted by the Code524. The labor-
friendly and inclusive character of the Filipino Code is further reiterated 
by its expansion of applicable personal scope to include unemployed 
workers. Article 13 of the Filipino Code defines “workers” as any 
member of the labor force, whether employed or unemployed525. This 
definition deviates from the conventional approach found in other 
jurisdictions where a status of employment is typically required to 
activate the labor protection of a worker under applicable laws. Instead, 
under this Code a worker with an employment contract is distinctly 
defined as “an employee”526. 
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Provisions relating to subcontracting work also reflect the protectionist 
nature of the Filipino Code. To start, it recognizes the practice of 
subcontracting work, where a client concludes a contract with a 
subcontractor, requiring the subcontractor’s employees (subcontracted 
workers) to perform the work for the client527. When the subcontractor, 
who is the direct employer of the subcontracted workers, fails to pay 
wages, the Filipino Code clearly imposes that the client shall be jointly 
and severally liable to pay wages to them to the extent that work has been 
performed under the contract. As such, the Filipino Code further requires 
the client to pay wages “in the same manner and extent that [the client] 
is liable to employees directly employed by [the client]” 528 . Unlike 
various comparable laws in other jurisdictions, the Filipino Code extends 
the protection of subcontracted workers beyond the issue of wage. 
Accordingly, the client is regarded as a direct employer of the 
subcontracted workers and, therefore, is responsible for them in the same 
manner and to the same extent as if the subcontracted workers were 
directly employed, on two conditions: first, the subcontractor does not 
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, 
machineries, work premises and so on; and second, the subcontracted 
workers are recruited and placed to perform activities which are directly 
related to the principal business of the client529. Essentially, these broad 
conditions are likely to mirror the actual scenario of most subcontracting 
work in the Philippines. As a result, most clients are deemed direct 
employers of the subcontracted workers and, therefore, are generally 
responsible for the subcontracted workers based on the provisions of the 
Code. In the unlikely event that the two conditions are not met, the 
Filipino Code imposes the solidary liability on the client by clearly 
stating that it “shall be held responsible with his [or her] subcontractor 
for any violation of any provision of the Code”, and for purposes of 
determining the extent of the civil liability, the client and his or her 
subcontractor shall be considered as direct employers to the 
subcontracted workers530. In addition, to avoid any circumvention of the 
provisions in this Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is 
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authorized to restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor on a case-
by-case basis to protect the rights of the workers established by the 
Code531. Consequently, when the solidary liability is activated, the client 
should provide remedy to the subcontracted workers through its 
operational-level grievance mechanism. 
 
 
c. Malaysia 
 
Due to the colonization by the British Empire in the 19th century, the law 
of Malaysia is historically based on the Common Law. In addition, the 
Parliament enacts federal laws that are applicable to the entire country, 
whereas each State Legislative Assembly enacts state laws, which are 
only applicable in the respective state. As a federal law, the Employment 
Act of 1955532 applies nationwide. The Employment Act requires that an 
employer-employee relationship be formed on a contractual basis, and 
the word “employ”, with its grammatical variations and cognate 
expressions, shall be construed accordingly 533 . Specifically, the 
Employment Act stipulates that any employment in agricultural 
undertakings can only be formed under a contract of service unless 
otherwise allowed by the Minister of Labor534. Subcontracting work is 
permitted, and the Employment Act expressly adopts a common-law 
principle of joint and several liabilities on a client (referred to in the Act 
as a principal) and a subcontractor regarding the issue of wage. Section 
33 of the Employment Act stipulates that when a wage is owed to a 
subcontracted worker for work done as part of the performance of the 
contract, the client and the subcontractor shall be jointly and severally 
liable to pay such wages “as if” the subcontracted worker “had been 
immediately employed” by the client535. A subcontracted worker must 
first institute a proceeding against the client for the recovery of wages to 
the Director General within 90 days from the date on which such wages 
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become due for payment536. Consequently, a subcontracted worker can 
claim the full amount of wages, however, only up to three consecutive 
months 537 , directly from the client, and the client can subsequently 
recover such payment from the subcontractor 538 . The extension of 
liability may encourage the client to provide remedy by devising its 
operational-level grievance mechanism and making it accessible to the 
subcontracted workers as an alternative to the proceeding prescribed by 
law.  
 
 
d. Singapore 
 
Historically a common law country, Singapore relies heavily on judge-
made law. To determine the validity and existence of an employment 
contract, referred to as “a contract of service”, one must preliminarily 
establish that there is an employer-employee relationship where an 
employee does business for an employer, the contract contains terms of 
employment, and the contract may be covered by the Employment 
Act539. Recognizing the fact that such guidelines are not conclusive, 
further discretion may be applied by considering the question of who has 
the control, who owns the factors of production, and other economic 
considerations540. If relevant factors are satisfied, the contract in question 
may be considered a contract of service, and the employer must be liable 
for damages caused to its employee. Alternatively, Singapore’s 
Employment Act541 adopts the common law principle of joint and several 
liabilities to address the liability of a client, an agency, and subcontracted 
workers. However, the scope of the statute is only for liability relating to 
salary. Section 65(1) of the Employment Act stipulates that “the principal 
(a client) and the contractor (an agency) and any such subcontractor (not 
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being the employer) shall be jointly and severally liable with the 
employer to pay the workman (the subcontracted workers) as if the 
workman had been immediately employed by him”542. Consequently, a 
subcontracted worker can claim the full amount of salary either from a 
client or from the agency. If the client is the pursued debtor, it can seek 
to have the amount of money it paid to the subcontracted worker 
reimbursed by the agency – the actual employer of the subcontracted 
worker. Other human rights-related issues beyond the reimbursement of 
salary are not included in the Employment Act. Like Malaysia, the 
extension of liability may encourage the client to provide remedy by 
devising its operational-level grievance mechanism and making it 
accessible to the subcontracted workers as an alternative option to the 
proceeding prescribed by law. 
 
 
e. Vietnam 
 
The Vietnamese legal system is heavily influenced by both the socialism 
legal theory and the French civil legal system543. The Labor Code of 1994 
is the core of the labor law in Vietnam544, articulating clearly that it is the 
responsibility of the Vietnamese government and society to ensure 
employment opportunities for everyone who has the capacity to work545. 
The Code applies to all workers under an employment contract546 in all 
economic sectors and all forms of ownership547. The Code allows the 
practice of subcontracting work. Principally, a subcontracted worker 
does not have an employment relationship with a client. However, the 
Code imposes two important obligations on the client despite the absence 
of a formal employment relationship with the subcontracted worker: 
first, the client must maintain a list of the names and addresses of 
                                                
542 Id., art. 65(1). 
543 Kenfox, Basic structure of Vietnam legal system (Oct. 7, 2017, 8 AM), 
http://www.kenfoxlaw.com/legal-topics/12958-basic-structure-of-vietnam-
legal-system.html. 
544 THE LABOR CODE (1994) (Viet.). 
545 Id., art. 13. 
546 Id., art. 6. 
547 Id., art. 2. 
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subcontracted workers along with the client’s own employees; second, 
the client must comply with the law on remuneration and occupational 
safety and health548. When a subcontractor fails to pay wages or fails to 
ensure other rights and interests of the subcontracted workers, they can 
demand the payment of their wages or the fulfillment of relevant rights 
and interests directly from the client549. Then, the client can demand 
compensation from the subcontractor by requesting competent 
authorities to settle the labor dispute, thus reflecting the use of the 
principle of solidary liability. In Vietnam, individual labor disputes are 
resolved at the Labor Conciliation Council, required by the Code to be 
established in every business enterprise employing ten or more workers 
and comprising an equal number of representatives from both the 
workers and the employers550. If the dispute cannot be resolved at this 
stage, parties can bring the case to the People’s Court551. In order to avoid 
the State-based proceeding, the client may opt to devise its own 
operational-level grievance mechanism and allow the subcontracted 
workers to have access to it. 
 
 
f. Brunei 
 
The legal system of Brunei is a combination of the British common law 
and the Islamic Sharia law. The Sharia law is predominantly applicable 
for Muslim citizens and supersedes the British common law on issues 
concerning family and property law552. For labor law, the main legal 
source is the Law of Brunei Chapter 93 on Labor Law553 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Brunei Code”). The Brunei Code also requires 
evidence of an agreement or a contract of employment for an 
employment relationship to be recognized by law, and only briefly 
                                                
548 Id., art. 65(1). 
549 Id., art. 65(2). 
550 Id., art. 163. 
551 Id., art. 166. 
552 Southeast Asian Research Guide, Introduction to Brunei and its Legal 
System (Oct. 8, 2017, 3 PM), 
http://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=402982&p=4622754. 
553 LAWS OF BRUNEI CHAPTER 93 LABOR (1954, revised 2002) (Brun.). 
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mentions the practice of subcontracting work in its interpretation of the 
term “employer”554. Under the Brunei Code, a business enterprise (a 
client) who enters into an agreement with a subcontractor “for the 
execution by or under the subcontractor of the whole or any part of any 
work undertaken by the client”, the client shall be liable for the payment 
of unpaid wages (up to the period of three months) to subcontracted 
workers555. Violation of this obligation may be investigated sua sponte 
by the Commissioner of Labor556, appointed by the King557. Hence, a 
business enterprise (a client) may be encouraged to establish its own 
operational-level grievance mechanism in order to provide remedy to 
subcontracted workers prior to being detected by the Commissioner of 
Labor. 
 
 
g. Cambodia 
 
Based on the French civil legal system, Cambodian law is predominantly 
statutory-based558. The main source of Cambodian labor law is the Labor 
Code adopted by the National Assembly in 1997559 (hereinafter referred 
to as “the Cambodian Code”). The Cambodian Code explicitly requires 
evidence of a written employment contract to be considered “in the sense 
of this law” as “workers”560. Subcontracting work is permissible, and an 
agreement to subcontract work between a business enterprise (a client or 
an entrepreneur) and a subcontractor must be made in writing 561. Under 
this scheme, subcontracted workers are, therefore, employees of the 
subcontractor and not of the business enterprise. Nevertheless, in case of 
insolvency or default by the subcontractor, the Cambodian Code obliges 
                                                
554 Id., art. 2. 
555 Id.  
556 Id., art. 7. 
557 Id., art. 3. 
558 Southeast Asian Research Guide, Introduction to Cambodia and its Legal 
System (Oct. 8, 2017, 4:30 PM), 
http://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=402982&p=4785153. 
559 THE LABOR CODE (1997) (Camb.). 
560 Id., art. 3.  
561 Id., art. 45. 
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the business enterprise (the client) to substitute and fulfill the obligations 
of the subcontractor for the subcontracted worker 562 . Also, the 
subcontracted worker in such case may file a claim directly against the 
business enterprise (the client)563. In effect, the Cambodian Code utilizes 
the solidary obligation to extend the scope of liability to the business 
enterprise. With this linkage, the business enterprise (the client) may be 
incentivized to establish its own operational-level grievance mechanism 
in order to provide remedy to subcontracted workers and avoid potential 
judicial proceedings. 
 
 
h. Laos 
 
The Laos legal system has a trace of influence from the French civil legal 
system, and legislation is a primary source of law564. In 2013, the new 
Labor Code, entitled the General Labor and Employment Acts, was 
enacted 565 . This Code requires evidence of a written employment 
contract for the determination of an employer-employee relationship 
status 566. However, it contains neither any references to the practice of 
subcontracting work, nor the extension of the scope of the business 
enterprises’ obligations and liabilities to their non-employees. 
 
 
i. Myanmar 
 
Myanmar adopts the common law system since the late nineteenth 
century following the colonization by the British Empire. Hence, the 
principal sources of Myanmar law are customary law, English common 
                                                
562 Id., art. 48 para 1.  
563 Id., art. 48 para 2. 
564 Southeast Asian Research Guide, Introduction to Laos PDR and its Legal 
System (Oct. 8, 2017, 6:10 PM), 
http://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=402982&p=4600311. 
565 LABOR CODES, GENERAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ACTS (2013) (Laos). 
566 Id., art. 3(3), 3(4). 
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law, legislations, and judicial decisions 567 . Despite its common-law 
background, Myanmar also has a list of labor-related laws that address 
various aspects of labor and employment. Under the Employment and 
Skill Development Law, every employee must be employed under a 
written contract 568 . On dispute resolution, the Settlement of Labor 
Dispute Law569 outlines a procedure that allows a worker to instigate a 
claim, starting from the workplace coordinating committee, the township 
conciliation body, and, if the claim remains unresolved, to competent 
courts. Notwithstanding the availability of rather well established state-
based grievance mechanisms, a subcontracted worker cannot instigate a 
claim against his or her non-employer – a business enterprise that 
subcontracts work to its subcontractor. To date, there is no reference in 
the Myanmar labor law that clearly addresses the practice of 
subcontracting work and the extension of the scope of the business 
enterprises’ obligations and liabilities to their non-employees. 
 
 
j. Thailand 
 
Compared to the relevant provisions on the principle of solidary liability 
in other jurisdictions where separate provisions are often required and 
used, the Labor Protection Act (LPA) addresses this matter by amending 
the definition of “employer”. In the recent 2008 amendment to the LPA, 
the term “employer” was given an additional definition. Previously, 
“employer” only meant an entity that employed an employee and paid 
wages accordingly, and such entity could be a person, an agent acting on 
behalf of a person, or a representative acting on behalf of a legal 
person 570 . After the amendment, the definition of “employer” was 
extended to include an entity (a client) that contracted out 
(subcontracted) the supervision of work and payment of wages, or 
assigned any person to recruit employees for work other than an 
                                                
567 Southeast Asian Research Guide, Introduction to Myanmar and its Legal 
System (Oct. 8, 2017, 6:45 PM), 
http://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=402982&p=4622248. 
568 EMPLOYMENT AND SKILL DEVELOPMENT LAW (2013) (Myan.). 
569 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE LAW (2012) (Myan.). 
570 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 5 para 1(1), 5 para 1(2). 
 	 143 
employment service, and in a manner that the work was part of the entire 
production or business under the responsibility of such entity (the client). 
In this regard, the entity was deemed to be an employer of the 
subcontracted workers571. More specifically on outsourcing, the LPA 
now provides that the client is deemed an employer of the employees of 
the outsourcing company (subcontracted workers), provided that the 
outsourcing company is not a job-procurement business, and the work of 
subcontracted workers is part of the manufacturing process of the client 
or is under the responsibility of the client 572 . To this effect, if the 
employees of the client and the subcontracted workers have similar job 
descriptions, the client must provide fair benefits and welfare to both 
groups without discrimination573. 
 
The LPA also provides a definition for subcontractors. Categorized in 
different tiers, a “first-level subcontractor” means a person who agrees 
to carry out all or part of a job for the benefit of the client, and other 
subcontractors who have an agreement with the first-level or an 
immediately preceding subcontractor to carry out all or part of a job 
under the responsibility of the first-level or immediately preceding 
subcontractor, regardless of how many tiers of sub-contractors there may 
be, is collectively called a “subcontractor”574. Hence, in practice there 
can be multiple tiers of subcontracting work within one supply-chain, 
and this practice is recognized by the LPA. 
 
Delegating liability among several subcontractors over multiple tiers in 
a supply-chain without clear legal certainty can be a complex task. As 
such, the LPA provides legal protection for subcontracted workers by 
making the subcontractors of all levels, from the immediately preceding 
subcontractor up to the first-level subcontractor, be jointly liable with the 
subcontractor who is their employer 575 . However, the scope of the 
solidary liability is limited to issues relating to wages, overtime pay, 
holiday pay, holiday overtime pay, compensation payments, special 
                                                
571 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 5 para 1(3). 
572 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 11/1 para 1. 
573 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 11/1 para 2. 
574 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 5 para 5. 
575 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 12 para 1. 
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compensation payments, savings, contributions or surcharges576. After 
one of the jointly liable subcontractors has paid the subcontracted 
workers in accordance with the prescribed scope, he or she shall have the 
right to seek redress from the subcontractor who is the immediate 
employer of the subcontracted workers577. 
 
 
3. Towards the UNGP’s inclusiveness: Strengthening 
the linkage 
 
While the UNGP advocate for the inclusiveness of all actors, they do not 
specify how this objective can be achieved. Several jurisdictions still 
have labor-related laws that may virtually contravene the inclusiveness 
approach of the UNGP. Conventionally, a formal employer-employee 
relationship can only be established by means of a written contract or 
agreement, and only through such formality shall an employer bear any 
legal responsibility to its employees and no-one else. However, to 
accommodate the business needs for lowering operational costs through 
outsourcing or subcontracting work, a separate scheme to establish 
linkage between a business enterprise and subcontracted workers 
becomes necessary. To circumvent this conventional restriction by 
extending the eligibility of access to remedy to subcontracted workers, 
some jurisdictions appear to already have a certain system in place that, 
in effect, accommodates this objective. 
 
The study of labor laws in ASEAN countries reveals that some of them 
extend the scope of the employer’s obligations and liabilities to its non-
employees by redefining the term “employer”, clearly imposing 
obligations towards non-employees based on certain conditions, or 
resorting to their respective joint liability schemes – the principle of 
solidary liability in the civil law countries and the doctrine of joint and 
several liabilities in the common law countries.  
 
                                                
576 Id. 
577 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 12 para 2. 
 	 145 
Despite the existence of some linkages, the application of such linkage 
remains limited in subject matter. While human rights violations 
(identified as grievances in this research) can occur in many ways, the 
study shows that the common ground for allowing the application of such 
linkages in the relevant laws is the issue of remuneration, particularly on 
wages. That is subcontracted workers are normally provided with a legal 
ground to seek remedy from a business enterprise (a client) when the 
subject matter concerns the non-payment of wages by their employer (a 
subcontractor). Other grounds, such as payment of compensation, the 
provision of welfare benefits and the protection of occupational safety 
and health, can only be found in some jurisdictions. The spectrum of 
protection varies from the ultimate protection virtually on all possible 
grounds “as if the subcontracted worker is employed by the client” as 
evident in the laws of the Philippines and Indonesia to limiting the 
protection only to non-payment of wages grounds as evident in the laws 
of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. For Thailand, there are some 
obstacles, both legal and practical, that potentially hinder the access to 
remedy for subcontracted workers. First, as mentioned, the scope of 
issues that can trigger the solidary liability is only limited to non-
payment of wages, whereas other potential adverse human rights impacts 
could involve other issues such as working conditions and child labor. 
Second, while the LPA imposes joint liability on several levels of 
subcontractors, it leaves out the client from the liability scheme. In the 
context of this research, subcontracted agricultural workers can only seek 
redress from a pool of subcontractors, if they cannot claim their rights 
from the subcontractor who is their direct employer. Third, although the 
LPA requires the client to provide benefits and welfare to subcontracted 
agricultural workers, whose work is part of the manufacturing process or 
under the responsibility of the client, the provision of such benefits and 
welfare is conditioned on having the same job description as the 
employees of the client578. In practice, sugar producers rarely employ 
agricultural workers, and if they do, the data comparison of benefits and 
welfare between employed agricultural workers and subcontracted 
agricultural workers is inaccessible.    
 
                                                
578 LABOR PROTECTION ACT, supra note 230, art. 11/1 para. 2.  
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Moreover, some jurisdictions have legal provisions addressing dispute 
resolution between the client and the subcontracted workers. For 
instance, Brunei grants the competence to the Commissioner of Labor to 
investigate the violation of the Brunei Code sua sponte 579 , whereas 
Vietnam requires the use of the Labor Conciliation Council as dispute 
resolution arena 580 . By subjecting the dispute resolution to public 
authority, business enterprises risk encountering some lengthy remedy 
process and a potentially negative effect on their public relations image. 
This could incentivize business enterprises to resort to resolving disputes 
through their own operational-level grievance mechanisms.  
 
Consequently, the extension of the scope of employer obligations and 
liabilities found in the labor laws of some ASEAN countries provides a 
legal basis that establishes the linkage between business enterprises and 
their non-employees. This linkage could send a message to business 
enterprises that it may be more advisable for them to resolve disputes and 
provide remedy for non-employees, e.g. subcontracted workers, in their 
supply-chain through their own operational-level grievance mechanisms 
in order to avoid encountering potential negative publicity. As such, it is 
essential to ensure that non-employees, such as subcontracted 
agricultural workers, can effectively access operational-level grievances 
mechanisms, and potential barriers are removed or reduced. 
  
                                                
579 LABOR CODE, supra note 553, art. 7. 
580 ACT, supra note 544, art. 163. 
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Figure 10 -  
Labor Laws in ASEAN Countries Providing Linkage between 
Business Enterprises and Non-Employee Complainants beyond the 
Employment Condition 
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Approaches           
Written employment contract required ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Subcontracting works permitted ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?   ? 
Extension of obligations ? ? ? ? ?  ?   ? 
Extension of liabilities ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ??
Protections           
Wage ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ??
Other remunerations e.g. overtime  ? ?   ?  ?   ??
Working conditions e.g. days, hours ? ?     ?   ??
Occupational safety and health ? ?   ?  ?   ??
Welfare benefits ? ?     ?   ??
Dispute resolution     ? ?   ?  
 
*In Thailand, provision of benefits and welfare by the client for 
subcontracted agricultural workers depends on the existence of benefits and 
welfare the client provides for its own employees working under the same 
job description. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter V was dedicated to establishing a linkage between sugar 
producers and subcontracted agricultural workers in order to argue that, 
with the existence of certain linkage, sugar producer would be in a better 
position if they provided an operational-level grievance mechanism and 
ensured that subcontracted agricultural workers in the supply-chain 
effectively had access to it. Section V.A explored the first nexus between 
business enterprises and admissible grievances. Based on the UNGP, the 
research discussed the three channels of involvement, which are “cause”, 
“contribute”, and “directly linked”. Section V.B explored the nexus 
between business enterprises and their non-employees. In the context of 
this research, this would be between sugar producers and subcontracted 
agricultural workers. The research consulted the labor laws in ASEAN 
countries and argued that the labor laws in some of these jurisdictions 
could be invoked to serve as a legal example for establishing the linkage, 
such as provisions extending the scope of employers’ obligations and 
liabilities for its non-employees based on certain conditions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Enhancing Effective Access to an 
Operational-level Grievance Mechanism: 
Addressing the Barriers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existence of an operational-level grievance mechanism provides an 
additional platform for rights-holders whose human rights are affected 
by business-related adverse human rights impact to seek remedy. 
Coexisting with other grievance mechanisms – whether State-based or 
non-State-based, an operational-level grievance mechanism has certain 
advantages that distinguish it from other types of grievance 
mechanisms 581 . Essentially, business enterprises may be willing to 
establish an operational-level grievance mechanisms for the following 
reasons. First, having effective operational-level grievance mechanisms 
accessible by all rights-holder whose rights are infringed reflects a good, 
human rights-promoting corporate image, which is beneficial to fulfilling 
their corporate social responsibility (CSR). In today’s world, a good 
corporate image or reputation is a highly important asset. Business 
enterprises with a good image tend to increase their worth and have a 
bigger competitive advantage 582 . Furthermore, consumers typically 
prefer business enterprises with a good reputation; therefore, the 
preferred business enterprises may be able to charge premium pricing 
over their competitors offering the same products or services, as well as 
                                                
581 See Section II.C “Doing business responsibly – Creating effectiveness 
criteria for operational-level grievance mechanisms” 
582 Kim Harrison, Why a good corporate reputation is important to your 
organization? (Aug. 15, 2017, 8:05 AM) 
http://www.cuttingedgepr.com/articles/corprep_important.asp. 
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being the first-choice company for loyal consumers583. Regarded as one 
of the components of organizational reputation used in reputation 
measurement systems 584, corporate social responsibility can be increased 
by providing operational-level grievance mechanisms. Second, resolving 
disputes using traditional means often requires the disclosure of 
information, which at times should rather be kept confidential. Usually 
hailed as the major advantage for alternative dispute resolution methods 
such as arbitration or mediation, protecting confidential business 
information and preventing business enterprises from reputational harm 
are also advantages that can be enjoyed when resolving disputes through 
an operational-level grievance mechanism. 
 
In light of these potential reputational benefits, business enterprises are 
encouraged to provide an operational-level grievance mechanism for all 
rights-holders in the supply-chain, whose rights are infringed by adverse 
human rights impact that business enterprises have caused, contributed 
or been directly linked to. However, such mechanisms are typically 
limited to internal use. In other words, only employees of the business 
enterprises are eligible to submit complaints to an available operational-
level grievance mechanism provided by their employer. In practice, as 
for example in the agricultural industry, where subcontracting work to 
external, non-employee (subcontracted) workers is the norm, 
subcontracted workers who perform this work are unaware of or 
excluded from the possibility of using an operational-level grievance 
mechanism provided by the business enterprise. To be more specific and 
avoid confusion, this research will employ the terms used in the sugar 
cane supply-chain to refer to different actors, namely sugar producers, 
subcontractors, subcontracted agricultural workers. An important 
question in this chapter is how to ensure that subcontracted agricultural 
workers can access to an operational-level grievance mechanism 
provided by sugar producers effectively. 
 
                                                
583 Leon Bracey, The importance of business reputation (Aug. 15, 2017, 8:20 
AM) http://www.businessinfocusmagazine.com/2012/10/the-importance-of-
business-reputation/. 
584 Id. 
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Reciting the UNGP accessibility criteria, operational-level grievance 
mechanisms should be “being known to all stakeholder groups for whose 
use they are intended, and providing adequate assistance for those who 
may face particular barriers to access”585. The four-step structure thus 
becomes: (1) identifying intended users, (2) being known, (3) identifying 
potential barriers to access, and (4) providing adequate assistance586. As 
a result, the subsections in this chapter will follow this structure. Again, 
it must be reiterated that information and recommendations stated in this 
research are context specific to Thailand’s sugar industry. 
 
 
 
A. PATH TO EFFECTIVE ACCESS – CRITERIA AND PRACTICES 
 
Principally, the establishing a nexus between grievances and victims of 
adverse human rights impact on the one end and business enterprises on 
the other end provides an essential ground for instigating a claim with 
regard to business-related human rights abuses. The previous chapter 
studied the establishment of linkage between business enterprises (sugar 
producers) and non-employee workers (subcontracted agricultural 
workers), whose legal relationship is not traditionally recognized due to 
the lack of a formal employment relationship. With the linkage, the next 
issue is to explore ways to ensure that affected subcontracted agricultural 
workers are provided with just remediation and have effective access to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms administered or operated by 
sugar producers. To start, this section explores the UNGP’s criteria on 
accessibility, as well as some existing practices that are currently in 
operation globally and individually. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
585 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 31, at 33-35. 
586 Id. 
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1. UNGP’s accessibility criteria revisited 
 
Previously mentioned in Section II.C.1, the UNGP advocate for the 
availability of effective non-judicial grievance mechanisms as an 
alternative complementing the existing judicial grievance mechanisms. 
For this purpose, the UNGP provide a list of effective criteria for non-
judicial grievance mechanisms, including operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. Reiterated again, the UNGP criteria suggest that effective 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms, both State-based and non-State-
based should be587: 
 
(a) Legitimate: enabling trust from the shareholder groups for 
whose use they are intended, and being accountable for the 
fair conduct of grievance processes; 
(b) Accessible: being known to all stakeholder groups for whose 
use they are intended, and providing adequate assistance for 
those who may face particular barriers to access; 
(c) Predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an 
indicative time frame for each stage, and clarity on the types 
of process and outcome available and means of monitoring 
implementation; 
(d) Equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have 
reasonable access to sources of information, advice and 
expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, 
informed and respectful terms; 
(e) Transparent: keeping parties to a grievance informed about 
its progress, and providing sufficient information about the 
mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its 
effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake; 
(f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies 
accord with internationally recognized human rights; 
(g) A source of continuous learning: drawing on relevant 
measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism 
and preventing future grievances and harms; 
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Operational-level mechanisms should also be: 
(h) Based on engagement and dialogue: consulting the 
stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended on their 
design and performance, and focusing on dialogue as the 
means to address and resolve grievances. 
 
While the criteria were proposed as a set and are arguably of equal 
importance588, this research only focuses on the “accessibility” criteria as 
the main subject of the study. While, the UNGP Commentary provides a 
brief explanation of how accessibility can be ensured589, this section 
attempts to interpret the application of the UNGP text in further details. 
From the text “being known to all stakeholder groups for whose use they 
are intended, and providing adequate assistance for those who may face 
particular barriers to access”, a textual categorization results in the four-
step test: (1) identifying intended users, (2) being known, (3) identifying 
potential barriers to access, and (4) providing adequate assistance. 
 
 
a. Identifying intended users 
 
Fundamentally, people in a supply-chain whose rights are infringed 
should be equally eligible as users to seek remedy for admissible 
grievances that they encounter at the available operational-level 
grievance mechanisms 590 . However, the limited capacity of the 
administrative entity may necessitate the imposition of certain measures 
to prevent the overflow of cases that are beyond their capacity to handle. 
One such measure is to clearly identify who are the intended users. For 
operational-level grievance mechanisms, business enterprises tend to 
limit the scope of operation to internal use. As a result, the intended users 
are limited only to their employees. Non-employees, such as 
subcontracted agricultural workers, are not eligible to seek remedy at the 
internal operational-level grievance mechanism. Another such measure 
                                                
588 RUGGIE, supra note 39, at 118-119. 
589 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary, at 34-35. 
590 See Section II.B “Importance of Pillar III – Ensuring the right to effective 
remedy for victims”. 
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is the limitation of the scope for eligible cases to only a few issues, such 
as wage payment. In some jurisdictions, this limitation has legal support; 
for instance, the Singapore Employment Act Section 65(1) limits the 
eligible claims only to the reimbursement of salary591. As a result, the 
intended users must be those impacted by a wage-related issue. 
Consequently, to ensure greater access to remedy, it is principally 
essential to expand the scope of intended users to include all potential 
victims impacted by all business-related human rights issues including 
subcontracted agricultural workers. This matter will be subsequently 
discussed in Section VI.B.  
 
 
b. Being known 
 
This requirement of knowledge is based on the perspective and 
understanding of the intended users – “all stakeholder groups for whose 
use they are intended” – not from the point of view of the business 
enterprises. To examine this requirement, references to the meaning of 
the term “known” must be illustrated.  
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “known”, in the past participle 
form of “know”, as “recognized, familiar, or within the scope of 
knowledge”592. Furthermore, being “recognized” is being acknowledged 
of existence, validity, and legality593, whereas being “familiar” is being 
“well-known from long, close association”594. This cluster of definitions 
suggests that the ordinary meaning of “being known” is “a quality of 
being acknowledged, earned from long, close association”.  
 
In light of the UNGP’s object and purpose, “being known” for a non-
judicial grievance mechanism activates a two-step test. First, an intended 
                                                
591 EMPLOYMENT ACT, supra note 541, art. 65(1). 
592 Oxford Dictionary, Definition “know” (Jul. 25, 2017, 8:10 AM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/know. 
593 Oxford Dictionary, Definition “recognize” (Jul. 25, 2017, 8:45 AM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/recognize. 
594 Oxford Dictionary, Definition “familiar” (Jul. 25, 2017, 10:15 AM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/familiar. 
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user must acknowledge the existence of the non-judicial grievance 
mechanism. Second, such acknowledgement must derive from long, 
close association between the intended user and the entity administrating 
the non-judicial grievance mechanism. For instance, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 595  (hereinafter “the OECD 
Guidelines”), which contain non-binding principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct 596 , stipulates that the National Contact 
Points (NCPs) are to make the OECD Guidelines known and available 
by appropriate means597. Their groups of intended users are relatively 
broad, ranging from business community, worker organizations, other 
non-governmental organizations, and other interested parties598. Having 
achieved the first step through the dissemination of the OECD 
Guidelines by the NCPs, the second step can be realized by establishing 
long, close associations through a series of fora for discussion and 
assistance599. Furthermore, such association can be strengthened when 
the UN Working Group introduced the Guidance on National Action 
Plans on Business and Human Rights600 (hereinafter “the UN Guidance”) 
which advises Governments to consider adhering to the OECD 
Guidelines601. The development of the National Action Plans (NAPs) 
requires a format for engagement and consultation with non-
governmental stakeholders602 and the identification of priority areas 603.  
 
For an operational-level grievance mechanism it is crucial that its 
intended users have fundamental information of its existence. At the very 
least, the intended users must know to whom, how, and where they can 
                                                
595 O.E.C.D., supra note 32. 
596 O.E.C.D., supra note 32, at 3. 
597 O.E.C.D., supra note 32, at 72. 
598 O.E.C.D., supra note 32.  
599 O.E.C.D., supra note 32.  
600 U.N. Working Group (2014), Guidance on National Action Plans on 
Business and Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance
.pdf.  
601 Id., Annex III “Non-exhaustive list of issues to consider including in 
NAPs”, at 18. 
602 Id., Phase 1: initiation (4), at i. 
603 Id., Phase 2: assessment and consultiation (7), at i. 
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initiate a contact with the administration of the operational-level 
grievance mechanism. Moreover, they should be allowed to participate 
in the discussion during the establishment of the operational-level 
grievance mechanism, as this could initiate the start of a long, close 
association between them and the business enterprise. Also, participants 
who are involved from the beginning of its establishment are likely to 
acknowledge the outcome of the process that they were party to. 
 
 
c. Identifying potential barriers to access 
 
As discussed in Section II.C.2, access to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms may be prevented by several barriers. The UNGP identify 
the following factors as potential barriers to access: a lack of awareness 
of the mechanism, language, literacy, costs, physical location, and fear 
of reprisal 604 . The Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper also 
identifies restrictions based on membership, resource-intensive and 
costly procedure, and additional measures to limit the number of 
incoming case filings as examples of potential barriers to access605. It is, 
therefore, the task of the creator of a non-judicial grievance mechanism 
to explore potential barriers and implement relevant measures to prevent 
them. Further discussion on barriers to access will be provided in Section 
VI.D. 
 
 
d. Providing adequate assistance 
 
This last requirement imposes a responsibility onto the administrator of 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms to provide intended users, especially 
those who may face particular barriers to access, with adequate 
assistance. Being “adequate” means “being satisfactory or acceptable in 
quantity or quality”606, and this requirement tends to be evaluated against 
                                                
604 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Commentary Principle 31, at 33-35. 
605 Rees, supra note 171. 
606 Oxford Dictionary, Definition “adequate” (Jul. 25, 2017, 4:20 PM), 
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the perception of the intended users. As such, the administrator can 
provide assistance to the impacted users in any manner that it deems 
appropriate, but, only if such assistance is provided to the extent that the 
impacted users are satisfied or accept it, can such assistance be seen as 
adequate. From this interpretation, it seems that the UNGP impose a 
relatively high threshold of responsibility on the administrator and equip 
the impacted users with a rather subjective evaluation power. To mitigate 
this subjective nature, opting to use the standard of an average reasonable 
person would be helpful607. Consequently, to provide adequate assistance 
to intended users, who may face particular barriers to access, the 
administrator should first identify potential barriers and the impacted 
users, and provide necessary assistance that can eradicate such barriers 
to the extent that an average reasonable person would be satisfied or 
accept it. 
 
 
2. Facilitating accessibility as seen in the current 
practice 
 
Non-judicial grievance mechanisms have also been in operation 
alongside the judicial grievance mechanisms. Whether developed for 
global or internal use or administered by a State agency or a private 
institution, several non-judicial grievance mechanisms set an exemplary 
benchmark for the subsequent development of future non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms. In fact, the OHCHR recognizes the importance 
of non-judicial grievance mechanisms and published a scoping paper as 
part of its Accountability and Remedy Project II608 (hereinafter referred 
                                                
607 John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person (Jul. 27, 2017, 9 
AM) 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The%20Many%
20Faces%20of%20the%20Reasonable%20Person.pdf. 
608 U.N. OHCHR, Access to Remedy for Business-related Human Rights 
Abuses: A scoping paper on State-based non-judicial mechanisms relevant for 
the respect by business enterprises for human rights: current issues, practices 
and challenges (Oct. 20, 2017, 9 AM), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/images/ARPII_FINAL%20Scoping%20Pap
er.pdf. 
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to as “the Scoping Paper”). The focus of the Scoping Paper, entitled 
“Access to Remedy for Business-related Human Rights Abuses”, is on 
State-based non-judicial mechanisms. Recently released in February 
2017, the Scoping Paper provides a preliminary assessment of current 
practices and challenges regarding the use of State-based non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms609. Despite being focused on State-based non-
judicial grievance mechanisms, information contained in the Scoping 
Paper is also beneficial to the study of non-State-based grievance 
mechanisms, especially operational-level grievance mechanisms. This 
subsection explores some dominant non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
in relation to business and human rights and specifically discusses the 
facilitation of their accessibility. This research explores some prominent 
examples of non-judicial grievance mechanisms both at the international 
and operational level. 
 
 
a. International practice 
 
The operations of some non-judicial grievance mechanisms are 
centralized. That is, whenever and wherever a claim is filed, it proceeds 
directly to the central body, which is then tasked to review, examine, 
investigate, report, and, if mandated, give recommendations. Existing 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms operated by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Bank 
Inspection Panel (WBIP) provide examples for this type of grievance 
mechanisms. 
 
 
i. OECD’s National Contact Points 
 
The OECD National Contact Points (NCPs) are a prime example for the 
centralized operation of non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Considered 
as a State-based operation, the NCPs are in fact agencies established by 
adhering governments to promote and implement the OECD 
                                                
609 Id., at 2. 
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Guidelines610, by undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries 
and contributing to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines611. They are to operate “in 
accordance with criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency and 
accountability”612. The OECD is relatively flexible with regard to the 
composition of the NCPs, while insisting on the fundamental goal of 
providing “an effective basis” for dealing with issues in the OECD 
Guidelines and developing and maintaining relations with business 
community, worker organizations and other interested parties613.  
 
One of the many roles of the NCPs is straightforward; the NCPs are 
tasked to contribute to the resolution of issues arising from the 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines614. As a centralized operation, 
issues are to be reported directly to the NCPs. From making an initial 
assessment and seeking consultations with various sources to issuing 
statements or reports on the matter to the public, the NCPs must perform 
their conduct in a manner that is “impartial, predictable, equitable and 
compatible with the principles and standards of the OECD 
Guidelines”615. 
 
Aside from the main role of contributing to the resolution of issues, the 
NCPs are required to ensure the accessibility of their mechanisms to the 
public at large, relevant stakeholders and other interested parties. 
Assessing against the UNGP accessibility criteria, the NCPs strive to 
make their mechanisms more effectively accessible in the following 
manner:   
 
                                                
610 O.E.C.D., supra note 32, at 3. 
611 O.E.C.D., Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: The National Contact Points from 2000 to 2015 (Oct. 10, 2017, 
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Identifying intended users – The NCPs identify that their intended 
users span across a broad range of stakeholders. Evidently, they seek the 
active support of “social partners including the business community, 
worker organizations, other non-governmental organizations and other 
interested parties616”. The NCPs are required to deal with issues raised 
by these intended users “in an efficient and timely manner” and “in 
accordance with applicable law”617. 
 
Being known – As previously mentioned, the NCPs strive to make the 
OECD Guidelines known and available by appropriate means, which 
include disseminating the OECD Guidelines through on-line information 
and in various national languages618. Already, the English and French 
language versions of the OECD Guidelines are provided on the OECD 
website 619 . In addition, to increase awareness and acknowledgment 
through establishing long, close association with intended users, the 
NCPs are tasked to cooperate with a wide variety of organizations and 
individuals620. Specifically mentioned in the Commentary, the NCPs are 
required to communicate and respond to legitimate inquiries made by 
other NCPs from other adhering governments, business communities, 
worker organizations, other non-governmental organizations, the public, 
and governments of non-adhering countries 621 . Also contributing to 
making the NCPs known is the requirement to make the results of the 
NCPs procedures publicly available, provided that such disclosure 
protect sensitive information of business and other stakeholders622.  
 
Identifying potential barriers to access – The OECD Guidelines 
implicitly identify potential barriers to access throughout the 
Commentary. For instance, the OECD Guidelines recognize potential 
obstacles that may arise from issues concerning activities taking place in 
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619 Id., Commentary 14, at 80. 
620 Id., Commentary 16, at 80. 
621 Id., Commentary 17, at 80. 
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several adhering countries623. When this occurs, it is inevitable to engage 
the NCPs from all these countries, and a strong cooperation, which may 
be fostered through consistent joint peer learning activities 624 , may 
mitigate the impact of this barrier. Furthermore, the potential release of 
sensitive business information may be a strong barrier preventing 
business enterprises from engaging in the NCPs process. To address this 
potential barrier, the NCPs are required to take appropriate steps to 
protect sensitive business information, as well as sensitive individual 
information such as the identity of victims625. 
 
Providing adequate assistance – To empower trust in the mechanism, 
the NCPs employ the principle of “good offices” in their discussions and 
collaboration with the parties involved626. The “good offices” practice 
includes seeking valuable advice from relevant authorities and 
stakeholders. The NCPs also assist parties involved by facilitating access 
to consensual and non-adversarial procedures upon common agreement 
between both parties. Such procedures may include mediation and 
conciliation627. Protection of identity is also facilitated, as the disclosure 
of identity may be detrimental to the parties involved628. Generally, the 
NCPs are required to provide assistance to the parties in as many aspects 
as they see appropriate. 
 
 
ii. The World Bank Inspection Panel 
 
Another example of a centralized operation of non-judicial grievance 
mechanism is the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP). Unlike the 
NCPs, the WBIP is operated by an independent body created by the 
World Bank Board of Executive Directors629 and is, therefore, a non-
                                                
623 Id., Commentary 24, at 82. 
624 Id., Commentary 19, at 81. 
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628 Id., Commentary 30, at 84. 
629 The World Bank, How to file a request for inspection to the World Bank 
Inspection Panel: General Guideline (Jul. 29, 2017, 10:30 AM) 
 	 162 
State-based operation. The main purpose of the WBIP is to promote 
accountability at the World Bank by ensuring that its operations in 
various Bank-funded projects duly follow the World Bank’s operational 
policies and procedures630. In brief, the WBIP receives a complaint, 
termed “Request for Inspection”, from eligible requestors. The Request 
for Inspection must illustrate the harm, the project in question, the action 
or omission by the Bank, and the prior steps taken to inform the Bank of 
such harm631. Once the WBIP concludes the inspection, it reports the 
findings to the Board on whether an action or omission resulting from a 
particular Bank-funded project causes or contributes to the harm as 
alleged by the requestors, and whether such action or omission totally or 
partially results from the failure of the World Bank to comply with its 
operational policies and procedures632. To ensure that the requestors have 
access to the grievance mechanism, the WBIP outlines several channels 
and procedures. They somewhat mirror the UNGP accessibility criteria 
in the following manner: 
 
Identifying intended users – As previously mentioned, the WBIP 
targets the parties who are adversely affected by Bank-funded projects. 
Referred to as “requestors”, they can be any group of two or more people 
adversely affected by the Bank-funded project, a duly appointed local 
representative or a foreign representative acting on explicit instructions 
as the agent of adversely affected people, or an Executive Director of the 
Bank in special cases of serious alleged violations of the World Bank’s 
policies and procedures633. Moreover, the WBIP only has competence to 
inspect Bank-funded projects, which are projects financed by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group, 
as well as Trust Funds managed by the World Bank634.  
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631 Id., at 3. 
632 Id., at 1. 
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Being known – The existence of the WBIP is made publicly known on 
the World Bank’s website635 as well as on paperin several World Bank-
issued documents. Also provided on the website are the guidelines to use 
the WBIP, including where, when and how to contact it. 
 
Identifying potential barriers to access – The WBIP also implicitly 
identifies potential barriers to access throughout its guidelines. Such 
barriers include the language barrier, lack of legal writing experience, 
fear of identity disclosure, and no access to online facilities. 
 
Providing adequate assistance – The WBIP provides various forms of 
assistance to requestors who may face barriers to access. First, the WBIP 
does not require a specific format for writing a Request for Inspection. 
However, it provides a suggested format636 for requestors, whose legal 
writing experience may be lacking or limited, to use. Second, the WBIP 
allows the Request for Inspection to be submitted in the requestors’ local 
language to accommodate requestors who lack or have limited English 
language competency637. Third, the WBIP assures the requestors that 
their identity shall be kept confidential, provided they express this 
request along with the Request for Inspection 638 . Lastly, the WBIP 
provides several channels to which the requestors may submit a Request 
for Inspection. Online submission is encouraged due to its expedited 
nature. Furthermore, the hard-copy version can be sent to the Executive 
Secretary of the Inspection Panel in Washington, D.C., or alternatively 
to the World Bank’s local office in the country where the Bank-funded 
project is located, in order to avoid high postage costs639.  
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b. Fledgling operational-level grievance 
mechanisms 
 
Information on access to operational-level grievance mechanisms is 
limited and often kept internally. While this may hinder the study of the 
subject, several academic researches have attempted to provide as much 
information as was available. At the time of writing, there was no 
information on operational-level grievance mechanisms in any 
agricultural industry publicly available or accessible. Therefore, 
examples provided or mentioned in this research in order to illustrate the 
current practice are taken from certain operational-level grievance 
mechanisms in other industries, as this information was publicly 
accessible.  
 
 
i. Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Center for 
Reflection and Action on Labor Issues 
(CEREAL) 
 
The Center for Reflection and Action on Labor Issues (CEREAL) is a 
Mexican NGO that provides an operational-level grievance mechanism 
on labor-related issues. Previously exclusive to Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
company workers, the CEREAL can now be accessed publicly 640 . 
Mandated to resolve labor-related issues, the CEREAL serves as the first 
point of contact for HP workers, including subcontracted workers, whose 
attempts to communicate and resolve the issues with their Union or direct 
employers have been unsuccessful641. The CEREAL then undertakes the 
necessary investigation and directly engages with the factory 
management. If there is neither immediate resolution nor direct 
agreement reached, the CEREAL can bring the issue forward to the 
Mexican Chamber of the Electronics Industry (CANIETI). If there is no 
                                                
640 Caroline Rees and David Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the 
Business and Human Rights Arena, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
INITIATIVE, (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy School of Government. 
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satisfactory outcome at the CANIETI, the brand company that uses the 
service of the factory in question will then be notified. When a legitimate 
grievance remains unresolved, the brand company will be asked to 
withdraw from using the service of the factory in question642.  
 
As far as the accessibility is concerned, any worker can instigate a claim 
or register a grievance at the CEREAL. To embed awareness of its 
existence, the CEREAL provides regular training on labor-related rights 
to the electronic sector. It also provides free advice and represents 
workers to the factory management in order to prevent potential financial 
barriers to access. Also, the identity of workers participating in the 
CEREAL process will be kept confidential643. 
 
 
ii. Gap Inc. 
 
Gap Inc. (Gap) provides a guideline to its factories to establish their own 
grievance mechanisms, as well as conducting training for personnel 
managers responsible for the implementation 644. The Union can instigate 
a claim on the workers’ behalf to Gap’s Social Responsibility Manager 
for the region, in which the factory is located. If the case cannot be 
resolved, procedures including investigations by immediate supervisors, 
departmental manager and company manager follow respectively in line 
with the provided guideline645. The decision of the company manager is 
final, and dissatisfied claimants can bring the case further to other 
external legal channels in their respective country. 
 
With regard to accessibility, Gap designates the Social Responsibility 
Manager as the main contact point for receiving claims. However, when 
possible, a direct verbal engagement between workers and their 
employers or the management to resolve the dispute is encouraged646.  
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iii. Siemens AG 
 
Siemens releases the “Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines”, which 
generally cover principles concerning respect for human rights of the 
employees 647 . Reflecting various international standards found, for 
instance, in the UN and the ILO documents, the Siemens Business 
Conduct Guidelines require suppliers to respect the employment rights 
of their employees, including paying fair remuneration with minimum 
wage guaranteed and ensuring the right of employees to join a trade 
union648. To monitor compliance, Siemens installs a reporting system 
consisting of several channels to which the employees can lodge 
complaints. For instance, employees can use the hotline “Tell Us” by 
telephone or the Internet to file complaints anonymously 649 . 
Alternatively, employees can opt to file complaints to an external 
ombudsperson650. 
 
With regard to accessibility, Siemens has implemented various measures 
to improve access to its existing reporting channels. To reduce language 
barriers, the hotline is made available in 13 languages to accommodate 
the possibly limited language skills of some employees651. Furthermore, 
it can be accessed at any time, and does not use Siemens intranet in order 
to protect confidentiality and prevent possible intervention 652. 
 
 
 
                                                
647 Siemens, Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines (Jul. 30, 2017, 5 PM) 
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B. SCOPING THE ELIGIBILITY – IDENTIFYING ELIGIBLE 
INTENDED USERS AND ADMISSIBLE GRIEVANCES 
 
Having examined the UNGP accessibility criteria and explored current 
practice on accessibility based on two prominent non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms – the OECD and the WBIP, as well as selected operational-
level grievance mechanisms, this section will be dedicated to addressing 
an important issue that could enhance accessibility to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms: the scope of eligible intended users and 
admissible grievances. Addressing the scope of an operational-level 
grievance mechanism is an important task, when designing and ensuring 
effective access to such mechanism. Ideally, on the personal scope, all 
rights-holders in the supply-chain, whose rights are infringed, should be 
eligible users and have the right to access the operational-level grievance 
mechanism provided by a sugar producer. This should effectively 
include subcontracted agricultural workers who perform works, though 
directly under the employment relationship with subcontractors, for the 
benefit of sugar producers. On the material scope, the types of issues to 
be admissible to the operational-level grievance mechanism should be 
clearly defined. Defining both types of scope facilitates the access to the 
operational-level grievance mechanism, as it assists the decision-making 
process for subcontracted agricultural workers on whether to file a 
complaint at the operational-level grievance mechanism or not. This also 
benefits sugar producers. Having a clear scope could expedite the 
processes of the operational-level grievance mechanism by filtering out 
unwarranted, inappropriate, or inadmissible claims. Consequently, this 
subsection will discuss the aspects concerning the definition of both 
personal and material scopes that would optimize the access of 
subcontracted agricultural workers to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. 
 
 
1. Defining personal scope – Subcontracted 
agricultural workers as eligible complainants  
 
In most operational-level grievance mechanisms, only the employees of 
the business enterprise that administers the mechanism are eligible to file 
 	 168 
complaints, as it is regarded as an internal mechanism for complainants 
having formal employment relationship. As such, the employees of the 
sugar producer that administers an operational-level grievance 
mechanism are eligible to file complaints. However, in a world of 
supply-chain and outsourcing, rights-holders whose rights are infringed 
could potentially encompass non-employees of the sugar producers. As 
such, subcontracted agricultural workers should be eligible 
complainants. Additionally, potential complainants can also be other 
affected individuals or local communities collectively, or could be 
extended to include other groups such as NGOs and trade unions653, as 
well as for other vulnerable or marginalized individuals654. The list of 
potential complainants must be clearly defined in order to prevent undue 
proliferation. In this research, the focus is limited to subcontracted 
agricultural workers. 
 
For subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand to become eligible 
complainants, there are two supporting perspectives. First, subcontracted 
agricultural workers can already be viewed as “by-law” employees of a 
sugar producer. Under the current definition of “employer” in the 
LPA 655 , a sugar producer that has subcontracted out the work of 
harvesting sugar canes to subcontractors is deemed to be the employer of 
the subcontracted agricultural workers. With this perspective, an 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the sugar producer 
would remain an internal mechanism. As “by-law” employees, 
subcontracted agricultural workers are already eligible to file claims to 
the operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the sugar 
producer. Second, the sugar producer can opt for the extension of 
eligibility to subcontracted agricultural workers as a voluntary gesture. 
This option seems to be preferred by the sugar producers as it supports 
and materializes their CSR initiatives. As subcontracted agricultural 
                                                
653 Shift, Remediation, Grievance Mechanisms and the Corporate 
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workers are often viewed as vulnerable and marginalized actors in the 
supply-chain, they may be disempowered from or in doubt about raising 
complaints. Assuring their eligibility to the operational-level grievance 
mechanism could empower them to speak up for themselves and voice 
their concerns or grievances, which could potentially lead to the 
mitigation or future reduction of adverse human rights impacts in the 
supply-chain. Also under this aspect, the sugar producers could avoid 
being “too closely associated with” subcontracted agricultural workers 
to the degree that the public could mistakenly perceive them as the 
human rights violators and it could potentially affect their corporate 
image and reputation 656.  
 
Another consideration is whether to restrict the type of complainants to 
individuals, or alternatively allow collective complaints. In the sugar 
producers’ view, there is not much difference between the two types in 
terms of administration 657 . Collective complaints can expedite the 
dispute resolution and lessen the administrative burden by having 
potentially fewer numbers of complaints arising from the same cause. 
Moreover, filing complaints collectively could become a useful strategy. 
In addition to potentially reducing resolution cost for each individual 
complainant 658 , it indicates or emphasizes the greater gravity of the 
situation, prompting the expedition of dispute resolution. Although not 
entirely comparable to the context of this research due to the differences 
in geographical location and type of industry, the case of unions and 
workers in various economic sectors in Colombia filing claims 
collectively against their employers at the Colombian Ministry of Labor 
illustrates the magnitude of a collective complaints strategy. The results 
of these collective complaints receive more immediate responses from 
the relevant authorities, which are known for being inefficient and 
delaying the process 659. 
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2. Defining material scope – Screening admissible 
grievances 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, grievances can vary from a minor 
discomfort to a human rights violation based on internationally 
recognized human rights instruments. For an operational-level grievance 
mechanism to be in line with the UNGP, references must be made to 
internationally recognized human rights – “understood, at a minimum, as 
those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International 
Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work” 660 . Therefore, an UNGP-complying operational-level 
grievance mechanism must have a clearly defined material scope that 
reflects the above instruments affirmed by the UNGP. Siemens AG, for 
instance, developed the “Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines” that 
make clear reference to the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
ILO Declaration 661 , as well as other documents such as the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises662, the UN Global Compact663, 
and the Agenda 21 on Sustainable Development 664 . Actors in the 
Siemens’ supply-chain are expected to comply with the Siemens 
Business Conduct Guidelines, and non-compliance is a ground to file 
complaints 665 . Likewise, Statoil also directly references the UNGP, 
particularly the International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO 
Declaration, in its stand-alone human rights policy 666. To operationalize 
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its human rights policy, Statoil established the Human Rights Steering 
Committee in 2015 to oversee the development and implementation of 
its human rights policy, as well as exploring Statoil’s responses to human 
rights-related cases linked to its business operation and its human rights 
policy. Non-compliance with the human rights policy is a ground to file 
complaints to its operational-level grievance mechanism. H&M also 
makes direct reference to the UNGP, the International Bill of Human 
Rights and the ILO Declaration, as well as other international human 
rights documents in its human rights policy667. Samsung specifically 
mentions the UNGP, the “international human rights principles and 
standards set for in the UDHR”, and the ILO Declaration in its Migrant 
Worker Guidelines 668 . The practices at Siemens, Statoil, H&M and 
Samsung are examples of human rights policies and illustrate definitions 
of material scope that clearly comply with the UNGP. 
 
While defining the material scope in line with the UNGP is encouraged, 
other business enterprises have adopted a variety of approaches to make 
reference to internationally recognized human rights, when defining the 
material scope for their respective operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. Nestlé, for instance, references specific ILO Conventions, 
in addition to the general reference to “all human rights, including labor 
rights” in its Supplier Code669. Among the specifically-mentioned ILO 
Conventions are C029 and C105 (on forced labor), C139 and C182 (on 
child labor), and C111 (on fair and equal treatment). Inditex, a clothing 
company that owns many famous clothing brands such as Zara, Massimo 
Dutti, Bershka, and Pull&Bear, defines minimum standards of ethical 
and responsible behavior required to be met by its manufacturers and 
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668 Samsung, Migrant Worker Guidelines (Version 1.0, Dec. 2016) (Oct. 11, 
2017, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/sustainability/sustainablemanagem
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669 Nestlé, Supplier Code (Oct. 11, 2017, 12:15 PM), 
https://www.nestle.com/asset-
library/documents/library/documents/suppliers/supplier-code-english.pdf, at 2.  
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suppliers in its supply-chain in its Inditex Code of Conduct. Instead of 
referring to any specific international human rights documents, Inditex 
lists a number of human rights that all actors in its supply-chain must 
respect. Among the listed human rights are no forced labor, no child 
labor, no discrimination, safe and hygienic working conditions, and 
assurance of remuneration, among others670.  
 
However, references to human rights are sometimes made in a rather 
subtle manner. For instance, the Egyptian Refining Company grievance 
mechanism states that it may receive complaints “such as those about 
local hiring, environmental concerns (e.g. air quality, noise, and traffic 
congestion), unfulfilled expectations regarding employment and 
procurement/sale of goods, opportunities, and infrastructure damage”671 
without specific reference to any sources from international human rights 
instruments. Alternatively, some operational-level grievance 
mechanisms may opt for the more expansive approach. In other words, 
they do not specify which human rights issues are within the scope of 
their operational-level grievance mechanism. Rather, they accord 
discretionary power to the screening committee to decide on the 
admissibility of each issue. For instance, the Chevron Myanmar 
Grievance Mechanism Procedure clearly states that “there are no 
restrictions on the type of issue a stakeholder can raise under this 
procedure”. To determine the admissible issues, the screening committee 
“reserves the right not to address a complaint which it reasonably 
considers amounts to no more than general, unspecified, and therefore 
un-actionable dissatisfaction with the company, is otherwise malicious 
in nature, or concerns a matter for which the company has no formal 
responsibility”672. Interestingly, the screening categories used by the 
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Chevron Myanmar Grievance Mechanism Procedure are divided into 
three levels, based on the potential impacts on Chevron Myanmar’s 
reputation. Issues categorized as Level 1 are those, for which answers 
can be provided immediately or have previously been approved by the 
management. Level 2 refers to one-time situation grievances, for which 
the screening committee determines that they will not impact Chevron 
Myanmar’s reputation, whereas Level 3 refers to recurring, widespread 
or high-profile grievances that may result in a negative impact on 
Chevron Myanmar’s business activities and/or reputation, such as the 
breach of Chevron Myanmar’s policy or Myanmar law673.  
 
Whichever approach operational-level grievance mechanisms may 
adopt, scoping admissible issues with direct and express references to the 
UNGP, the International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration 
is recommended. This would not only streamline the material scope of 
most, if not all, operational-level grievance mechanisms, it would also 
provide certainty, consistency, and, in effect, extension of the material 
scope beyond the legal basis found in several jurisdictions. For instance, 
Thai sugar producers would only be required by the Thai LPA to be liable 
for the non-provision of benefits and welfare for subcontracted 
agricultural workers, if they provides such benefits and welfare to their 
own employees working under a similar job description 674 . An 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by a Thai sugar 
producer may have its material scope limited only to what it is liable for 
under the LPA. Technically, if the sugar producer does not employ any 
agricultural workers, it would result in it not having any responsibility to 
provide benefits and welfare to subcontracted agricultural workers either. 
Thus, the sugar producer could dismiss any claims by subcontracted 
agricultural workers relating to the non-provision of benefits and 
welfare. The sugar producer may also dismiss such claims even when the 
subcontractors do not provide benefits and welfare, and this decision-
making is purely discretionary. On the other hand, if the material scope 
of the operational-level grievance mechanism mirrors that of the UNGP, 
the Thai sugar producers would have to accept the claim of non-provision 
of benefits and welfare as admissible, even though they themselves did 
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not employ any agricultural workers, since the non-provision is 
attributed to its subcontractors. Consequently, an operational-level 
grievance whose material scope mirrors that of the UNGP can enhance 
accessibility for subcontracted agricultural workers, as it extends the 
admissibility of claims beyond the legal limitations.  
 
 
 
C. BUILDING AWARENESS – MAKING AN OPERATIONAL-
LEVEL GRIEVANCE MECHANISM KNOWN TO 
SUBCONTRACTED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
 
In addition to the appropriate definition of personal and material scopes, 
the accessibility of an operational-level grievance mechanism can be 
greatly improved by building greater awareness among its intended users 
– in this case the subcontracted agricultural workers. Evidently, an 
operational-level grievance mechanism that is well known among its 
intended users is more likely to be utilized. As discussed, “being known” 
is a quality of being acknowledged, earned from long, close 
association 675 . Therefore, in this context, subcontracted agricultural 
workers must acknowledge the existence of the operational-level 
grievance mechanism provided by the sugar producers, and such 
acknowledgement must derive from long, close association between 
them. To promote or empower the acknowledgement of the operational-
level grievance mechanism among subcontracted agricultural workers, 
two important issues need to be addressed. First, the sugar producers 
need to ensure the effective dissemination of information regarding its 
operational-level grievance mechanism, particularly by selecting 
appropriate methods and ensuring comprehension of subcontracted 
agricultural workers. Second, the sugar producers must establish long, 
close association with subcontracted agricultural workers and potentially 
engage them in the design stage of the operational-level grievance 
mechanism. Further details on these issues are provided in the following 
subsections. 
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1. Dissemination of information 
 
Clearly, the ultimate objective of disseminating information regarding 
the existence of an operational-level grievance mechanism is to ensure 
that subcontracted agricultural workers acknowledge it. Moreover, mere 
acknowledgement is insufficient without the assurance of their 
comprehension. Therefore, this subsection will explore several methods 
that could be used to disseminate such information, as well as ways to 
ensure the comprehension of subcontracted agricultural workers 
regarding the existence of the operational-level grievance mechanism.  
 
 
a. Methods of dissemination 
 
Methods to disseminate the information on the existence of operational-
level grievance mechanisms can range from having a small bulletin 
posted at sugar cane plantations to conducting various organized 
trainings. The key issue here is the practicality and appropriateness of 
each potential methods. This subsection explores different methods that 
are used in practice by a variety of existing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms.   
 
 
i. Human Rights Policy 
 
At the broadest scale, disseminating the information on the existence of 
an operational-level grievance mechanism can be done by the 
promulgation of a company-wide human rights policy or sustainability 
report, whereby business enterprises expect all its actors in their supply-
chain, especially the subcontractors or the suppliers, to be fully aware of 
the company’s commitment to ensure the protection of human rights 676. 
Typically, a company-wide human rights policy contains a section on the 
existence and availability of an operational-level grievance mechanism, 
along with information on how the intended users can access it. For 
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instance, Siemens includes this information in its “G. Complaint and 
comment” section of the Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines677 and 
clearly provides information on reporting channels. Likewise, Statoil 
highlights the availability of its operational-level grievance mechanism 
in its Sustainability Report678  and provides information on reporting 
channels in its “Reporting and handling concerns” section679. Mitr Phol 
Corp. also utilizes this approach and states the availability of an 
operational-level grievance mechanism in its Sustainability Report 680. 
Consistently, business enterprises that provide operational-level 
grievance mechanisms, such as H&M and Inditex, utilize their human 
rights policy and/or their sustainability report as the primary method of 
disseminating the information on the existence and availability of their 
operational-level grievance mechanisms.  
 
 
ii. Subcontractors/Suppliers Guide  
 
In addition to using a company-wide human rights policy, some business 
enterprises create their version of supplier-level guidelines to protect 
human rights and disseminate the information on the availability of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. For instance, Coca Cola 
introduced a “Supplier Guiding Principles” to communicate Coca Cola’s 
values and expectations 681 . As part of the contractual agreements 
between Coca Cola and its suppliers, the Supplier Guiding Principles list 
human rights values and expectations that its suppliers must follow and 
communicate to their employees, which include the elimination of 
discrimination, the prohibition of forced or abused labor, the provision 
of a safe and healthy working place, and the availability of a grievance 
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http://www.coca-
colacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/fileassets/pdf/unknown/u
nknown/SGP_Brochure_ENG.pdf. 
 	 177 
mechanism682. In effect, Coca Cola uses its suppliers to disseminate 
information on the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. Nestlé also adopts this method by means of its Nestlé 
Supplier Code683. Subcontractors of the Egyptian Refinery Company are 
also “expected to be familiar with and support the company grievance 
mechanism and its processes” including participating in reporting of 
complaints and communicating with members of the local 
communities684.  
 
 
iii. Community Relations Team 
 
The use of a community relations team may be a useful tool to 
disseminate information on the availability of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms beyond the paper-based methods. This is 
particularly important when the target audiences of the information are 
not the business enterprises’ employees or subcontractors, but are 
subcontracted agricultural workers who typically are locals in 
communities. A community relations team engages in discussions 
directly with locals about grievances they may encounter and advises on 
the availability of operational-level grievance mechanisms. For instance, 
a community relations team at Barrick Gold Corporation, a gold-mining 
company, engaged with locals in Peru and implemented the operational-
level grievance mechanism on site685.  
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iv. A Labor-rights Representation 
 
A labor-rights representation serves as an intermediary between the 
business enterprises and subcontracted workers with regard to 
disseminating the information on the availability of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms to subcontracted workers. For instance, Siemens 
requires its suppliers to have a form of labor-rights representation, such 
as a workers’ council, at the suppliers’ place of business686. Through their 
closer ties with subcontracted workers, members of the labor-rights 
representation are arguably in a better position to disseminate the 
information on the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms or even encourage the use of such mechanism. 
 
 
v. Training 
 
Regular trainings of staff members and subcontractors are useful to 
ensure their awareness of the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. For instance, Chevron explicitly indicates in its Grievance 
Mechanism Procedure that “all Chevron Myanmar staff members and 
subcontractors that interact with external stakeholders should be made 
familiar with the grievance mechanism on an annual basis”687. Hence, 
staff members and subcontractors at Chevron Myanmar are expected to 
undergo annual reviews by the senior management on their awareness 
and understanding of Chevron Myanmar’s grievance mechanism, as well 
as its expectations to disseminate the information on the availability of 
such mechanism to external stakeholders, including subcontracted 
workers. 
 
The methods discussed above reveal that an important key to effectively 
disseminate the information on the availability of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms is the use of an intermediary, such as 
subcontractors/suppliers, community relations team and a labor-rights 
representation. Thus, it can be argued that the closer the intermediary is 
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with subcontracted workers, the more effective the dissemination process 
could potentially be. Consequently, in the context of this research, sugar 
producers should design a system of intermediaries that would assist 
them in disseminating the information on the availability of operational-
level grievance mechanisms to subcontracted agricultural workers. 
 
 
b. Ensuring the comprehension of intended users 
 
Another important aspect for the effective dissemination of the 
information on the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms is to ensure the comprehension of their intended users. 
Studies have shown that one of the common challenges that prevent 
accessibility of communities to operational-level grievance mechanisms 
is language688. Literacy is also identified as a major barrier preventing 
effective access to operational-level grievance mechanisms 689 . Thus, 
language and literacy barriers should be addressed when designing 
methods of dissemination.  
 
With regard to language, several operational-level grievance 
mechanisms address this matter explicitly. For instance, Siemens 
provides its “Tell Us” hotline in 13 languages 690, whereas Coca Cola 
translates its Suppliers Guiding Principles into 12 languages691. Also, 
Inditex mandates its suppliers to display a copy of the Code of Conduct, 
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which has been translated into the local language, in locations accessible 
to all workers 692 . In addition to translating into local languages, 
simplifying the disseminated message is also beneficial. As such, 
attention must be given to how the message is conveyed to its target 
audiences693. Also, the Scoping Paper reiterates the importance of this 
issue by stating that “information for workers on their rights and how to 
enforce them [must be] properly displayed and effectively communicate 
in an understandable format and in appropriate language”694. 
 
The absence of the ability to read and write, i.e. the level of literacy, also 
poses a major barrier to accessing operational-level grievance 
mechanisms for many, including subcontracted agricultural workers. To 
alleviate the impact of this barrier, some business enterprises implement 
useful approaches. For instance, by recognizing the low level of literacy 
among its migrant workers, Samsung conducts pre-departure training 
prior to signing the employment contract in the sending country and post-
arrival training before commencing employment in the receiving 
country. The purpose of these trainings is to ensure that the migrant 
workers understand Samsung’s Migrant Workers Guidelines, which 
affirm their legal rights and their eligibility to access the operational-
level grievance mechanism, through the training conducted in their 
native languages695.  
 
For subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand’s sugar industry, both 
language and literacy pose major obstacles that hinder their 
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comprehension of the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. The structured interviews revealed that most, if not all, 
subcontracted agricultural workers neither speak the Thai standard 
dialect, nor do they have sufficient ability to read696. Consequently, sugar 
producers should ensure that the information on the availability of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms is simplified for ease of 
understanding, as well as having trainings conducted in the local dialect.  
 
 
2. Engaging intended users during the design stage 
 
Continuing from the previous subsection, the acknowledgment of the 
availability of operational-level grievance mechanisms should be earned 
from long, close association. Hence, sugar producers need to establish 
association with subcontracted agricultural workers. Establishing a long, 
close association requires an accumulation of trust over time. At the 
broad level, such long, close association can be achieved by means of 
organizing regular trainings and conducting inspections provided by the 
sugar producer. More specifically, a study shows that another approach 
to establish such long, close association with the aim of achieving 
acknowledgment of the availability of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms is by means of engaging the intended users – the 
subcontracted agricultural workers – during the design stage of the 
operational-level grievance mechanisms697. 
 
According to the study by the Office of the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)698, it is indispensable to establish a design 
team that comprises and maintains a good balance of representations 
from all stakeholders, such as individuals of mixed levels and functions 
in the company. Importantly, representatives from the community and 
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actors in the supply-chain should be included 699 . Engaging 
representatives from the community and actors in the supply-chain 
during the design stage provides several advantages. First, the design 
team can gather valuable input and feedback from the representatives. 
With such input, the design team can develop an operational-level 
grievance mechanism that takes into account cultural and other 
considerations that may be sensitive to the community or actors in the 
supply-chain and prevent them from potentially disturbing the process. 
Second, the collaboration in the design team between members from the 
business enterprise and the community could generate a closer bond and 
convey the business enterprise’s approachable and amicable intentions 
to the community. Third, the knowledge co-learned by all members of 
the design team during the design stage could be subsequently 
disseminated to the community or actors in the supply-chain more 
accurately and directly.  
 
In Thailand’s sugar industry, sugar producers should engage 
subcontracted agricultural workers during the design stage of their 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. This could be done by inviting 
representatives from subcontracted agricultural workers to provide input. 
If it is not possible for subcontracted agricultural workers to provide 
input during the design stage for any reasons, such as the lack of literacy 
or trust, sugar producers can still attempt to establish a long, close 
association with subcontracted agricultural workers through organizing 
regular trainings and conducting inspections.  
 
 
 
D. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL BARRIERS THAT PREVENT 
EFFECTIVE ACCESS 
 
Effective access to operational-level grievance mechanisms can be 
enhanced by eradicating potential barriers. As referred to in the UNGP 
Commentary, barriers to access may include “a lack of awareness of the 
mechanism, language, literacy, costs, physical location and fear of 
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reprisal”700 . The first three potential barriers listed by the UNGP – 
namely, a lack of awareness, language, and literacy – have already been 
dealt with in the previous section. This section, therefore, addresses the 
remaining barriers – costs, physical location, and fear of reprisal. 
Additionally, barriers resulting from cultural considerations will also be 
examined.  
 
 
1. Cost  
 
The OHCHR has confirmed in its previous works that the cost of 
instigating claims is one of the greatest barriers to accessing grievance 
mechanisms, including operational-level grievance mechanisms701. The 
issue of cost is two-fold and should be examined from the perspective of 
both subcontracted agricultural workers and sugar producers. For 
subcontracted agricultural workers, in principle, seeking remedy through 
an operational-level grievance mechanism should be cost-free. In other 
words, the operational-level grievance mechanism should neither levy 
any fees onto the complainants, nor impose any stringent requirements 
that ultimately render the process costly. For instance, a process of 
preparing a formal complaint could require an investment of financial 
and human resources, especially if the complainant’s level of literacy is 
insufficient. Being cost-free, the operational-level grievance mechanism 
provides an advantage over judicial grievance mechanisms, as the latter’s 
process is typically lengthy, and its associated costs are beyond the 
capability of the less-privileged communities or workers to afford702. In 
addition, being cost-free could incentivize subcontracted agricultural 
workers to seek remedy at operational-level grievance mechanisms, thus 
resulting in the mechanisms’ greater accessibility. This character is 
resonated in the International Finance Corporation’s Five Principles for 
designing a good “project-based” grievance mechanism. As one of the 
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five principles, an operational-level grievance mechanism with effective 
accessibility is the one that is clear and understandable, and “is accessible 
to all segments of the affected communities at no cost”703. Likewise, the 
workshops organized by Fauna & Flora International (FFI) in response 
to designing an operational-level grievance mechanism at the Awacachi 
Corridor Project in Ecuador reveals that the locals should not incur any 
financial costs in lodging complaints704. 
 
The interviewed subcontracted agricultural workers also expressed their 
concerns about cost. From the structured interview, some subcontracted 
agricultural workers were of the view that filing complaints at 
“anywhere” would cost them “ten to hundred thousand [THB]”705, and 
expressed their unwillingness to go through any types of grievance 
mechanisms. Their responses on cost seem to indicate their false 
perception on operational-level grievance mechanisms. While being 
costly may be accurate for judicial grievance mechanisms, the 
subcontracted agricultural workers seem not to be given sufficient 
information on the difference between judicial grievance mechanisms 
and operational-level grievance mechanisms. Hence, they may not be 
able to anticipate how low-cost or cost-free the operational-level 
grievance mechanism can potentially be when it is created.  
 
For sugar producers, on the other hand, the key issue on cost is the 
maintenance of the companies’ financial feasibility while operating an 
operational-level grievance mechanism that does not levy any financial 
contribution from subcontracted agricultural workers. To manage the 
operating cost, the International Finance Corporation suggests that the 
budget should be estimated and allocated on a regular basis706. Hence, 
the source of funding should be “ring-fenced” regularly, such as 
annually, or at the stage of establishing the operational-level grievance 
mechanism707. In other words, the availability of funding should not be 
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decided on a case-by-case basis708. From the interview, Mitr Phol Corp. 
acknowledged the issue of cost, and indicated that the company will 
work on managing the potential cost of operating an operational-level 
grievance mechanism that is accessible to subcontracted agricultural 
workers709. 
 
 
2. Distant physical location 
 
Subcontracted agricultural workers are normally in physical locations far 
away from the sugar producers’ headquarters. The distance between the 
cluster of northeastern provinces and Bangkok is approximately 450 
kilometers – a distance equivalent to a 6-hour drive, an 8-hour bus ride, 
or a 55-minute flight from Bangkok to some major airports in the area. 
From Zurich, such distance would equally amount to a trip to Frankfurt, 
Germany or to Lyon, France. Distant physical location undoubtedly 
imposes a major barrier to access. Traveling requires money and time, 
and subcontracted agricultural workers are usually not able to afford such 
luxury. One interviewed subcontracted agricultural worker indicated that 
if she had to travel to Bangkok to lodge complaints, it would be better 
for her and her family not to act or do anything710. 
 
Conventionally, complaints must be submitted in person and without 
anonymity. Sandfire Resources NL, for instance, obliges employees to 
complete a Grievance Lodgment Form, which provides that the 
grievance is received “face to face or over the phone”711. However, with 
the constraints caused by the distant physical location, various 
operational-level grievance mechanisms adopt several measures aiming 
to eradicate this barrier. Many operators of operational-level grievance 
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mechanisms allow complaints to be submitted by post, such as 
Siemens712, Chevron Myanmar713, Adidas714, and New Britain Palm Oil 
Ltd 715 . Other methods are also used. In the age of globalization, 
technology is what links people together. In theory, utilizing technology 
could eradicate the distant gap between subcontracted agricultural 
workers and sugar producers by not requiring subcontracted agricultural 
workers to travel to file complaints in person. This subsection explores 
several methods that are currently offered by existing operational-level 
grievance mechanisms. 
 
Hotline – The telephone has been a telecommunication device since its 
invention in 1876, and today, approximately 4.77 billion people use 
mobile phones 716 . Most operators of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms enlist their telephone numbers for calls during office hours 
or offer 24-hour Hotline services to receive complaints. Examples of 
hotlines as a method of receiving and registering complaints are 
Siemens’ “Tell Us” Hotline717 and Statoil’s Ethic Helpline718.  
 
E-mail – The use of electronic mail, or e-mail, has been proven popular 
among people of today’s working generations. Radicati, a US-based 
technology market research firm, estimated that approximately 225.3 
billion e-mails were sent and received each day in 2017, with a 
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worldwide number of e-mail accounts at 4,920 billion, and the number 
is continuing to grow 719. Several operators of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms tap into this growing trend by offering a channel of 
receiving complaints by e-mail. Examples of operators allowing the 
submission of complaints by e-mail are Chevron Myanmar 720  and 
Adidas721.  
 
Online Submission – Submitting complaints via the online platform is 
another possible option. As of June 2017, approximately 51.7% of the 
world population uses the Internet 722 . Typically, information and 
instructions regarding the online submission of complaints are made 
available on the operators’ websites. Examples of operators using this 
approach are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD)723, and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)724.  
 
Other methods – Other methods to eradicate the barrier to access due to 
the distant physical location are mentioned in the Scoping Paper725 . 
Despite originally addressing State-based non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms, examples of methods mentioned in the Scoping Paper 
could provide useful information. To eradicate the barrier to access due 
to the distant physical location, the Scoping Paper mentions the use of 
“traveling” tribunals or adjudicating panels commonly used in the field 
of environmental protection and the decentralization of panels into 
regional bodies commonly used in consumer protection cases726. 
                                                
719 Radicati, Email Statistics Report 2015-2019 (Oct. 14, 2017, 11 AM), 
http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-
Report-2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
720 Chevron Myanmar, supra note 672, at 4. 
721 Adidas, supra note 714. 
722 Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage and Population Statistics (Oct. 
14, 2017, 11:20 AM), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
723 E.B.R.D., How to Submit a Complaint (Oct. 14, 2017, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/project-finance/project-complaint-
mechanism/submit-a-complaint.html. 
724 TAP, Online Grievance Upload (Oct. 14, 2017, 11:10 AM), 
https://www.tap-ag.com/grievance. 
725 U.N. OHCHR, supra note 608. 
726 U.N. OHCHR, supra note 608, at 39. 
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Using telephone and the Internet is a fast, efficient tool for transmitting 
complaints to the operators of operational-level grievance mechanisms, 
and on the other end allows the operators to quickly respond to and 
manage the complaints. However, this can only be effective when the 
target users of operational-level grievance mechanism have the 
capability to use these channels. Fauna & Flora International identified 
that Internet or phone-based systems of reporting were not feasible 
because much of the local population did not have access to 
technology 727 . From the structured interviews with subcontracted 
agricultural workers, it was revealed that most, if not all, of them did not 
own either home or mobile phones 728. The subcontracted agricultural 
workers cited their low income as the main reason for not owning any 
type of phone. Furthermore, they were unfamiliar with using the Internet, 
which is also too costly729. They neither own a computer, nor do they 
have any knowledge of using the Internet 730 . Consequently, using 
technology as a channel for filing complaints is highly likely to be 
impractical for subcontracted agricultural workers. 
 
 
3. Fear of reprisal 
 
Reprisal is an act of retaliation731, which is an action of harming someone 
because they have harmed oneself732. In the context of this research, 
reprisal refers to any action that a respondent takes – whether a 
subcontractor, a sugar producer, or other actors in the supply-chain – to 
harm a subcontracted agricultural worker, because they filed a complaint 
against them. Generally, reprisal can range from loss of job, demotion, 
                                                
727 F.F.I., supra note 704, at 3. 
728 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
729 Id. 
730 Id. 
731 Oxford Dictionary, Reprisal (Oct. 14, 2017, 1:50 PM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reprisal. 
732 Oxford Dictionary, Retaliation (Oct 14, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/retaliation. 
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involuntary transfer, and harassment to intimidation 733 . For 
subcontracted agricultural workers, the interviewees speculated that 
reprisal might occur in the form of limited job opportunity in the future 
and possible threat or intimidation against their households734. Reprisal, 
therefore, becomes a major barrier that deters subcontracted agricultural 
workers from filing complaints.  
 
The fear of reprisal barrier must be seriously addressed. The International 
Finance Corporation advocates that an operational-level grievance 
mechanism should have “a clear policy of non-retaliation measures”735. 
As such, operators of operational-level grievance mechanisms should 
“take steps to prevent retaliation against complainants”736. However, 
ensuring non-retaliation currently seems to be at a very premature stage. 
Normally, a clause mentioning the non-retaliation policy is the only 
indicator of a step being taken by operators of operational-level 
grievance mechanisms. For instance, Samsung stipulates that migrant 
workers “shall be able to raise grievance without fear of discrimination, 
intimidation, retaliation or any other penalty”737, but no further details 
are provided. Likewise, the grievance mechanism at Acacia Mining only 
briefly mentions that the mechanism must “help to overcome barriers 
people may face in accessing the mechanism” including “fear of 
retribution or reprisal”738. 
 
Adidas, on the other hand, appears to have advanced in addressing the 
fear of reprisal barrier. In its Third-Party Complaint Process, Adidas 
states that it “recognizes the risk of retaliation facing workers making 
complaints about their employment conditions, or individuals raising 
                                                
733 SkillBrief, Forms of Retaliation (Oct. 14, 2017, 2:10 PM), 
https://ccpublibrary.skillport.com/ccpub/marriottcc/web/Content/cca/zmar_01_
a04_lcc_enus/output/html/sb/sblch_01_a04_lc_enus144238.html. 
734 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
735 I.F.C., supra note 693, at 15. 
736 I.H.R.B., supra note 654. 
737 Samsung, supra note 668, at 10. 
738 Acacia Mining, Community Grievance Management and Resolution 
Procedure (Oct. 14, 2017, 3:05 PM), 
http://intranet.abg.local/polproc/SitePages/Policies.aspx, at 8. 
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issues related to human rights violations” 739 . To prevent possible 
retaliation, Adidas does not disclose the identity of complainants when it 
believes that such disclosure would likely lead to intimidation or 
victimization740. Adidas released its Anti-Retaliation Policy to provide 
guidance to complainants who are at risk of being retaliated against. 
According to the Anti-Retaliation Policy, a complainant that believes he 
or she has been subject to retaliation after registering a complaint can 
contact and provide specific details to Adidas immediately. If the 
investigation reveals evidence of retaliation, appropriate actions will be 
taken against the retaliator, such as issuing a warning letter or bringing 
the case to the relevant judicial mechanism741. 
 
Ensuring non-retaliation is essential for subcontracted agricultural 
workers. As they identified during the structured interviews, fear of 
reprisal plays a major role in discouraging them from potentially voicing 
their complaints to any entity, including an operational-level grievance 
mechanism provided by sugar producers742. Primarily, they express the 
fear of possibly losing future job opportunities at the sugar cane 
plantations, as those who lodge complaints are likely to be viewed as 
aggressive, arrogant, or disobedient743. In their view, subcontractors tend 
to prefer hiring agricultural workers who are obedient and quiet 744 . 
According to the interviewees, once subcontractors perceive certain 
agricultural workers as being troublesome, they may not hire those 
agricultural workers in the future or decide to arbitrarily dismiss them745. 
Additionally, they also fear for the safety of their family and households 
if they choose to make complaints746.   
 
                                                
739 Adidas, supra note 714. 
740 Adidas, supra note 714, at 5. 
741 Adidas, supra note 714, at 11. 
742 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
743 Id. 
744 Id. 
745 Id. 
746 Id. 
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The above information suggests that sugar producers should provide 
assurance to subcontracted agricultural workers that they will not be 
subject to any form of retaliation when they submit complaints to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. Issuing an Anti-Retaliation 
policy should be encouraged, as well as designing deterrence measures 
to take against subcontractors who are found to be retaliating against 
subcontracted agricultural workers. Such measures may range from 
issuing a warning letter to terminating current or future contracts. 
 
 
4. Cultural Considerations 
 
Culture, customs, and traditions in each geographical location are factors 
that should be carefully considered when designing an operational-level 
grievance mechanism. The UNGP Commentary does not specifically 
mention cultural considerations as one of the barriers to access, but the 
use of the word “may include” preceding the UNGP list747 suggests that 
the UNGP is open for other possible barriers, including cultural 
considerations. Fundamentally, an operational-level grievance 
mechanism could become well accepted by the intended users if they 
perceived it as being “trustworthy and responsive to their customary 
ways” 748 . Cultural appropriateness is also listed as one of the five 
principles of a Good Grievance Mechanism 749 , suggesting that an 
operational-level grievance mechanism should be designed by “taking 
into account culturally appropriate ways of handling community 
concerns”750. To achieve cultural appropriateness, an operational-level 
grievance mechanism should seek input on culturally acceptable ways 
from different groups within the communities, understand cultural 
attributes, customs and traditions, and agree on the best ways to access 
grievance mechanisms “taking into consideration the way communities 
express and deal with grievances”751. 
                                                
747 U.N.G.P., supra note 3, Principle 31, at 34. 
748 I.F.C., supra note 693, at. 2. 
749 I.F.C., supra note 693, at 3.  
750 Id. 
751 I.F.C., supra note 693, at 9. 
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Generally, cultural considerations can be examined by studying the 
structure of the society where the intended users reside. For instance, if 
the society is hierarchical-based, it is recommended that the design team 
have discussions with and seek initial support from community leaders 
or key persons752. If institutionalized forms of segregation of roles and 
responsibilities based on specific factors, such as religious, political or 
social biases, are prevalent, the design team should ensure the 
participation of the respected persons during the development of the 
operational-level grievance mechanism753. If the intended users of the 
operational-level grievance mechanism are indigenous people, attention 
should be given to some of their sensitive issues, such as customary land 
rights and the impact on natural resources or cultural property754. 
 
In Thai society, culture, customs, and traditions are ingrained and 
inseparable from the Thai way of living. It forms the cultural identity of 
Thai people, and it is unique and different from other societies. In fact, 
certain parts of Thai law incorporate culture and traditions into the legal 
text. For instance, in Family Law, a groom is required to provide 
marriage gifts (sinsod) and engagement gifts (khongman) to his bride and 
her parents, adopter, or guardian, as the case may be755. Typically not 
found in other jurisdictions, the Civil and Commercial Code steps into 
governing this local tradition of offering marriage and engagement gifts 
by regulating the ownership of the gifts and the grounds to return them 
to the groom756. For this research, it is essential to study the local culture 
of the subcontracted agricultural workers in the sugar cane supply-chain, 
in order to identify potential cultural considerations that may present 
barriers to access. The structured interviews revealed that there are 
certain considerations that warrant a closer analysis. First, when asked 
for the reasons behind their decisions to seek or not to seek remedy at the 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the sugar producer, 
most interviewees responded that they “did not want to get involved or 
                                                
752 I.F.C., supra note 693, at 10. 
753 Id. 
754 Id. 
755 CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF THAILAND, section 1437. 
756 Id. 
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create conflict with the subcontractors”757. In their view, they did not 
want to create any trouble for the subcontractors because after all “the 
subcontractors were the ones who gave them job opportunity” and that 
they “should be grateful for the opportunity they had been given”758. 
When asked the follow-up question on whether the seriousness of 
grievances would change their mind and they would decide to file claims, 
the interviewees said that they would rather forgive and let karma do its 
work, as they would still have to cohabit in the same geographical 
location with the subcontractor as a community 759 . However, if the 
interviewees would be given a full guarantee of non-retaliation from the 
subcontractors, most of them responded that they “might consider filing 
claims”760. 
 
Information gathered from the structured interviews reveals several 
interesting observations. The most apparent Thai social custom is the 
tendency to avoid emotional extremes, especially on expressing anger. 
Arguably, this character stems from the Buddhist belief in reincarnation 
and the concept of karma761. According to Oxford Dictionary, karma 
refers to the sum of a person’s actions in this and previous states of 
existence, viewed as deciding their fate in future existence 762. To avoid 
bad karma, it is advised not to express anger or engage in other bad 
behaviors towards others in order to prevent others from returning 
similar actions in the future. In this context, the concept of karma works 
in three-fold ways. First, it deters subcontracted agricultural workers 
from filing complaints, as they fear that they may face similar action 
against them in the future. Second, subcontracted agricultural workers 
tend to believe that subcontractors will face similar action in the future 
resulting from their “bad behaviors” or karma as a consequence of their 
                                                
757 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram. 
758 Id. 
759 Id. 
760 Id. 
761 Arne Kislenko, CULTURE AND CUSTOM OF THAILAND 162 (Greenwood 
Publising). 
762 Oxford Dictionary, karma, (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:15 AM), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/karma. 
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actions against them. Third, subcontracted agricultural workers may 
believe that the grievances they face are a consequence of their past 
actions.  
 
Another dimension of the Thai culture that may explain the 
subcontracted agricultural workers’ hesitation to file complaints is the 
concept of respect towards elders and those of higher status763. In brief, 
several political and social analyses emphasize the differences between 
the middle class (chon chan klang) and the lower class (chon chan 
lang) 764 . The middle class refers to “an affluent class consisting of 
homogenous urban-based elites”, while examples of the lower class are 
“farmers and other lower rungs of the society’s ladder”765. Differences in 
income also serve as a dividing line between the two categories, as the 
middle class earns significantly more than the lower class766. Hence, in 
this context, subcontracted agricultural workers who generally earn less 
income are regarded as members of the lower class, whereas 
subcontractors who generally generate higher income are considered to 
be in the middle class. As a result, subcontracted agricultural workers are 
likely to feel inferior to subcontractors, to the point that they should 
respect the subcontractors owing to the latter’s arguably higher societal 
status, and, therefore, should not “disturb” or “cause the person of higher 
status to lose his or her dignity”767. 
 
Deeply ingrained in the Thai culture, the notion of “avoiding 
confrontation” is widely practiced in the Thai society. Commonly, Thai 
                                                
763 Kislengo, supra note 761, at 162. 
764 Tsuruyo Funatsu, Theories of the Middle Class in Thailand, Institute of 
Developing Economies (Chiba, 2000). 
765 Id.  
766 Tsuruyo Funatsu and Kazuhiro Kagoya, The Middle Classes in Thailand: 
The Rise of the Urban Intellectual Elite and Their Social Consciousness (Oct. 
15, 2017, 9:50 AM), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1746-
1049.2003.tb00940.x/asset/j.1746-
1049.2003.tb00940.x.pdf;jsessionid=00744239E6F6E387F697EC1AE10BDE
45.f01t04?v=1&t=j8sfy6sn&s=a8ca85c3412445300ea0be46ccca890ed59384f
b. 
767 Interview with subcontractors and subcontracted agricultural workers, in 
Khon Kaen and Buriram.; see also Kislengo, supra note 761, at 162. 
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people tend to avoid confrontation by telling the angered person to have 
“a cool heart” or jai yen yen, or to dismiss the grievance as “it is just 
nothing, or it is just doesn’t matter” or mai pen rai768. Some academics 
justify these relaxed attitude as deriving from the “Buddhist perceptions 
of impermanence and transitory nature of life”769, as they advocate that 
the feeling of anger is impermanent, and one should reincarnate to the 
next life free of any anger or worry. Consequently, subcontracted 
agricultural workers tend to have a high threshold with regard to deciding 
factors on whether to dismiss a grievance as mai pen rai, or to file 
complaints to any grievance mechanism, including an operational-level 
grievance mechanism. 
 
Based on these observations, sugar producers should incorporate the 
cultural considerations that are unique to subcontracted agricultural 
workers when designing an operational-level grievance mechanism. In 
general, the barriers to access resulting from identified cultural 
considerations revolve around the hesitation to file complaints. Thus, it 
is essential for the design team to address such barrier accordingly. First, 
to accommodate the notion of avoiding confrontation, the operational-
level grievance mechanism should ensure the anonymity of 
complainants. This suggestion has been implemented by several 
operators of operational-level grievance mechanisms, such as Adidas770, 
Chevron Myanmar 771 , and the EBRD 772 , and is affirmed by the 
International Finance Corporation as a recommended approach 773 . 
Second, it may be useful for sugar producers to directly communicate, 
preferably in the local dialect, with subcontracted agricultural workers 
with the aim to recast their thinking – for example by explaining that 
claiming justice or their rights should not be fused with the fear of karma, 
the feeling of inferiority, or the societal expectation to avoid 
confrontation. Third, sugar producers may provide certain assurance of 
                                                
768 Kislengo, supra note 761, at 162. 
769 WILLIAM J. KLAUSNER, REFLECTIONS ON THAI CULTURE 78-85, 245-249 
(1993). 
770 Adidas, supra note 739. 
771 Chevron Myanmar, supra note 672. 
772 E.B.R.D., supra note 723. 
773 I.F.C., supra note 693, at 11. 
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non-retaliation to subcontracted agricultural workers. For instance, sugar 
producers could enforce their anti-retaliation policy on their 
subcontractors. Alternatively, when damage may have occurred resulting 
from any form of retaliation, the sugar producers may mitigate the impact 
by assisting the affected subcontracted agricultural workers to find new 
employers. Whichever method the sugar producers may employ, cultural 
considerations remain one of the major barriers to access that they cannot 
afford to neglect when designing an operational-level grievance 
mechanism that ensures effective access. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter VI was dedicated to exploring issues concerning the 
enhancement of effective access of subcontracted agricultural workers to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms administered or operated by 
sugar producers. Section VI.A first revisited the UNGP’s accessibility 
criteria and scrutinized its elements – identifying intended users, being 
known, identifying potential barriers, and providing adequate assistance. 
Using information from Chapter IV, Section VI.B discussed the 
identification of eligible intended users and argued that subcontracted 
agricultural workers should be considered as eligible intended users and 
admissible grievances clearly defined. Then, Section VI.C explored 
methods of building awareness among subcontracted agricultural 
workers, such as methods of disseminating information on the 
availability of an operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the 
sugar producers. Finally, Section VI.D identified potential barriers to 
access, based on the UNGP Commentary and structured interviews. 
Examined barriers were cost, physical location, fear of reprisal, and 
cultural considerations. Chapter VI concluded that all explored issues 
should be examined at an early stage, particularly prior to designing an 
operational-level grievance mechanism, in order to ensure that most, if 
not all, barriers were already addressed and eradicated. By doing so, this 
research argued that this could enhance the accessibility of the intended 
users – subcontracted agricultural workers – to the operational-level 
grievance mechanisms administered or operated by sugar producers. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout this research, focus was targeted on addressing the problem 
of subcontracted agricultural workers not being able to access 
operational-level grievance mechanisms that are administered or 
operated by sugar producers. This research found that subcontracted 
agricultural workers often encountered situations which could be 
considered as grievances, such as receiving payments below the legal 
daily minimum-wage and working beyond the maximum permitted daily 
work-hours. This research reported that certain types of grievance 
mechanisms were available to subcontracted agricultural workers, but 
each of them had its unique limitations. For instance, operational-level 
grievance mechanisms administered or operated by sugar producers are 
limited to internal use. In other words, only employees of the sugar 
producers can access these operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
This is due to the structure of the supply-chain, where sugar producers 
subcontract the harvest work to subcontractors, who then employ 
subcontracted agricultural workers to perform such work. Hence, the 
subcontracted agricultural workers do not have any formal employment 
relationship with the sugar producers. The crux of this issue is whether 
the sugar producers should extend the applicability of their operational-
level grievance mechanisms to non-employees in their supply-chain, 
particularly the subcontracted agricultural workers, and on what 
grounds? Building from this preliminary question, this research asked 
several further questions with the ultimate objective of ensuring 
accessibility for subcontracted agricultural workers to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms.  
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A. ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The general theme of this research has been on area of business and 
human rights. Business and human rights have received global attention 
following the recognition that business enterprises can also cause or 
contribute to adverse human rights impact resulting from their business 
operations. With the limitation of the current international human rights 
law regime where none of the codified international human rights 
standards are formally applicable to non-State actors such as business 
enterprises, alternative channels to anchor corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights were explored. The iconic product of this initial 
exploration was the introduction of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (the UNGP). Since their introduction in 
2008, the UNGP have received widespread attention from both States 
and business enterprises. Academic papers have been written and many 
other initiatives have been carried out to study the implementation of 
these principles. While not creating new international law obligations or 
undermining any States’ existing legal obligations, most, if not all, 
academic literature and initiatives in the field of business and human 
rights have grounded their research on the principles advocated by the 
UNGP – the de facto most authoritative document in this field. This 
research also used the UNGP as its basis for study. Chapter II revisited 
the global standard for access to remedy and outlined the structure of the 
UNGP. 
 
While all three Pillars of the UNGP – the State duty to protect human 
rights, the corporate respect of human rights, and access to remedy – are 
arguably of equal importance and interlinked, academic efforts and 
initiatives have focused on the first two Pillars. “Access to remedy” has 
largely been overlooked, and has only recently started to receive more 
attention. To date, the most recent comprehensive work on Access to 
Remedy is the work of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights’s Accountability and Remedy Project II, which discussed 
current issues, practices and challenges on access to remedy at State-
based non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Yet, academic literature, 
which specifically addressed operational-level grievance mechanisms, 
remains limited in number. Thus, this research grasped the void in the 
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academic works and studied the implementation aspect of the UNGP 
Pillar III Access to Remedy, specifically on operational-level grievance 
mechanisms.  
 
This research conducted a qualitative and documentary study in the 
context of Thailand’s sugar industry. All background information on 
Thailand’s reaction to the UNGP and Thailand’s sugar industry, such as 
identifying actors and mapping the supply-chain, were provided in 
Chapter III. With the background information stated, this research 
provided answers to the research Question 1, which asked: 
 
Are there any operational-level grievance mechanisms that 
are currently available for and accessible by subcontracted 
agricultural workers in Thailand’s sugar industry, and, if 
yes, what are they? 
 
In Chapter III, it was illustrated that there are several grievance 
mechanisms available for subcontracted agricultural workers, excluding 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. This is because, currently, the 
only operational-level grievance mechanism in Thailand’s sugar industry 
based on the available information at the time of writing is the one 
administered and operated by the Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. (the Mitr Phol 
mechanism). Regrettably, the Mitr Phol mechanism is only available for 
Mitr Phol’s employees.  
 
As for the other types of grievance mechanisms, this research has 
mapped them in Chapter III Section III.D “Existing Grievance 
Mechanisms in Thailand”. For State-based judicial grievance 
mechanisms, subcontracted agricultural workers can instigate their 
claims at the Courts of Justice. More explicitly, the Labor Court has 
specific jurisdiction over labor rights-related claims. While there are 
specific features that eradicate certain barriers such as cost and physical 
location at the Labor Court proceedings, subcontracted agricultural 
workers may only instigate their claims against their employers 
(subcontractors) and not against sugar producers. The Alternative 
Dispute Resolutions (ADR), such as arbitration (both court-annexed and 
ad hoc) and mediation, are perceived to be the “friendlier” options, but 
the lack of knowledge and financial ability often bar subcontracted 
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agricultural workers from gaining access to the ADRs. With regard to 
State-based non-judicial grievance mechanism, subcontracted 
agricultural workers can instigate their claims at the Sugar Cane Workers 
Institutes at the Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (OCSB), the Right 
and Liberties Protection Department (RLPD), and the National Human 
Rights Commissions of Thailand (NHRC). Nevertheless, barriers to 
access these State-based non-judicial grievance mechanism remain 
major obstacles. For instance, the OCSB Mechanism is perceived as 
untrustworthy and not transparent, whereas the RLPD and the NHRC 
lack adjudicative power and must rely on the cooperation with other 
relevant authorities. 
 
From the finding, this research argued that the limitations and barriers 
associated with State-based, both judicial and non-judicial, grievance 
mechanisms are difficult to overcome or circumvent. Therefore, it was 
suggested that the use of operational-level grievance mechanisms, 
particularly the ones administered or operated by sugar producers, could 
be a more effective method of providing remedy to subcontracted 
agricultural workers. With the limitations and barriers to access 
operational-level grievance mechanisms identified, this research has 
provided answers to the research Question 2, which asked: 
 
What are legal and practical barriers that could potentially 
prevent subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand’s 
sugar industry from gaining access to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms, and how can the barriers be reduced 
or eliminated? 
 
Providing answers to this question required a series of analyses on 
different aspects of the issue. This research argued that there are several 
barriers that currently prevent subcontracted agricultural workers in 
Thailand’s sugar industry from gaining access to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms administered or operated by sugar producers. 
These barriers have been addressed as follows: 
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Uncertainty of admissible grievances 
 
Chapter IV was dedicated to addressing this barrier. It was founded on 
the presumption that the uncertainty of admissible grievances posed a 
barrier to access, as subcontracted agricultural workers were unsure 
whether their grievances would be admissible to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms administered or operated by sugar producers. As 
a result of this ambiguity, subcontracted agricultural workers might 
choose not to sacrifice their limited resources, such as time and money, 
to seek access to remedy from such operational-level grievance 
mechanisms. To eradicate this barrier, a documentary study was 
conducted to map potential grievances that should be considered 
admissible to the operational-level grievance mechanisms.  
 
Before commencing the study, it was noted that grievances could occur 
in a variety of forms. Their magnitude could range from a minor 
discomfort arising from undesirable working conditions to a human 
rights violation based on internationally recognized human rights 
instruments. In other words, human rights violations are grievances, but 
not every grievance is based on a human rights violation. This research, 
therefore, chose to limit the scope of study to the context of the UNGP. 
The UNGP creates the responsibility of business enterprises to respect 
human rights e based on internationally recognized human rights – 
“understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill 
of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set 
out in the International Labor Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”. Other sources of possible 
grievances are based on relevant human rights protection promulgated in 
Thailand’s national legislations, those identified by subcontracted 
agricultural workers through a series of structured interviews, and those 
reported by the NHRC.  
 
This research argued that sugar producers should create a non-exhaustive 
list of admissible grievances to their operational-level grievance 
mechanisms based on the sources identified. Therefore, this non-
exhaustive list should contain, and not be limited to, grievances that 
affect the following: 
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Sources Admissible grievances 
International Bill of 
Human Rights 
Grievances that affect: 
• The right to equality and non-
discrimination, especially on work-
related discrimination 
• The right to life 
• The right to be free from torture and 
inhuman treatment 
• The right not to be subject to all 
forms of forced or compulsory 
• The right not to be subject to child 
labor 
Human Rights Protection 
in Thailand National 
Legislations 
Grievances relating to: 
• Unequal treatment and gender 
discrimination 
• Sexual abuse 
• Illegal working conditions 
• Non-provision of occupational 
safety, health, and environment 
• Payment below minimum daily 
wage 
• Non-provision of welfare 
• Unfair dismissal 
• Non-performance of duty of 
employers (subcontractors) 
• Non-provision of special protection 
(for female employees)  
Interviewees Grievances concerning: 
• Wage payment below daily 
minimum wage 
• Extended working hours beyond 
maximum daily working hours 
• The use of child labor 
The NHRC Report Grievances concerning: 
• Trespass of national forest and land 
grabbing 
• Forced eviction from land 
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Consequently, it was argued that identified admissible grievances could 
provide transparency and consistency, as well as assisting the 
administrator and/or the operator of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms during the preliminary review on the admissibility of the 
filed grievances. At the same time, this consistency could provide 
reassurance to subcontracted agricultural workers who may no longer 
question the admissibility of their grievances, thereby increasing their 
confidence for filing claims. 
 
Missing link between sugar producers and grievances 
 
Chapter V Section A was dedicated to addressing this barrier. Pursuant 
to the UNGP’s suggestion on corporate responsibility (that business 
enterprises should have proactive responsibility “to avoid infringing on 
the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights 
impacts with which they are involved”), this chapter departed from the 
presumption that business enterprises should only bear such 
responsibility if they were actually involved in the adverse human rights 
impact that resulted in the claimed grievances. In the context of this 
research, there should therefore be a linkage to determine the 
involvement of sugar producers with grievances claimed by 
subcontracted agricultural workers. To establish this linkage, the 
research explored the triggering conditions advocated by the UNGP – 
cause, contribute, and directly linked. For cause, this research argued that 
for a sugar producer to be considered as “having caused” an adverse 
human rights impact on subcontracted agricultural workers in their 
supply-chain, it should be established that 1) the sugar producers had a 
certain degree of ability to manage the chance of the impact from 
occurring or recurring and 2) that the sugar producer did not execute such 
ability, whether through its action or omission, to avoid or address the 
impact. For contribute, it was argued that for a sugar producer to be 
considered as “having contributed” to an adverse human rights impact 
on subcontracted agricultural workers in its supply-chain, it should be 
established that 1) the sugar producer had a business relationship with 
the entity that caused such adverse human rights impact and 2) the sugar 
producer had a certain material or substantial degree of influence in 
making such adverse human rights impact happen, such as facilitating or 
incentivizing the said entity to cause such impact. For directly linked, 
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this research argued that a sugar producer could be “directly linked” to 
an adverse human rights impact on subcontracted agricultural workers in 
its supply-chain if it could be established that 1) the sugar producer had 
a business relationship with the entity that caused such adverse human 
rights impact and 2) the sugar producer benefitted from the operations, 
products or services of such entity.  
 
Consequently, it was argued that, in the context of this research, sugar 
producers could be both directly and indirectly involved with adverse 
human rights impact on subcontracted agricultural workers depending on 
the nature and/or the causer of the reported grievances. In the most likely 
scenario when subcontractors caused adverse human rights impact 
(admissible grievances) to subcontracted agricultural workers, sugar 
producers could be considered as having contributed to such impact 
because 1) the sugar producers had a business relationship with the 
subcontractors and 2) the sugar producers typically had a substantial 
degree of influence over subcontractors to cause the alleged impact, as 
the interviewees reported during the structured interviews that sugar 
producers at times apparently applied inconsistent acceptance criteria for 
sugar cane and charged high transportation fees. With the increased 
financial burden, the subcontractors then typically passed on the costs to 
be absorbed by the subcontracted agricultural workers through a 
reduction of the daily wage in order to maintain profitability or prevent 
further losses. Alternatively, sugar producers that did not have a 
substantial degree of influence over the subcontractors could become 
involved by being directly linked to the adverse human rights impact 
through benefitting from the operations of the subcontractors that caused 
such impact. 
 
Missing link between sugar producers and subcontracted agricultural 
workers 
 
Chapter V Section B was dedicated to addressing this barrier. Based on 
their position in the supply-chain and the fact that legally sugar producers 
do not have an employment relationship with subcontracted agricultural 
workers, this chapter departed from the presumption that sugar producers 
should extend the applicability of their operational-level grievance 
mechanisms to non-employees in their supply-chain – subcontracted 
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agricultural workers. To establish this linkage, the research explored the 
potential legal basis that could provide a connection between business 
enterprises and non-employee complainants. Due to the commonality 
with Thailand in terms of economy, labor economics and geographical 
location, the countries selected for comparison were members of the 
ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which Thailand 
is a member of. 
 
The first basis for establishing linkage between business enterprises and 
non-employee complainants is the extension of the scope of employer’s 
obligations to non-employees. This extension was found in the labor laws 
of several ASEAN jurisdictions, which also reflected the recognition of 
the practice of subcontracting work. This extension obliges a business 
enterprise (who is a client of a subcontractor) to fulfill obligations 
directly to subcontracted workers based on certain conditions, such as 
the requirement that the work that subcontracted workers perform must 
be part of the manufacturing process of the business enterprise. The 
second basis for establishing linkage between business enterprises and 
non-employee complainants is the extension of the scope of employer’s 
liabilities to non-employees. Also found in the labor laws of several 
ASEAN jurisdictions, this extension circumvents the conventional 
restriction of requiring a formal employment relationship by resorting to 
the civil law principle of solidary liability and the common law principle 
of joint and several liabilities, depending on the jurisdiction. In the 
context of this research, a subcontracted agricultural worker would be 
considered a creditor on the one end, and a sugar producer and a 
subcontractor would be considered joint debtors on the other end. Hence, 
the subcontracted agricultural worker could bypass the subcontractor and 
claim damage directly from the sugar producer. Once the sugar producer 
provided remedy to the subcontracted agricultural worker, the sugar 
producer could then pursue the subcontractor for the latter’s share of 
liability. 
 
This research found that despite the existence of some linkages, their 
application remains limited in subject matter. While human rights 
violations (identified as grievances in this research) can occur in many 
ways, the study showed that the common ground, in which relevant laws 
allow for the application of such linkages, is the issue of remuneration, 
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particularly on wages. Other grounds, such as payment of compensation, 
the provision of welfare benefits and the protection of occupational 
safety and health, can only be found in some jurisdictions. The spectrum 
of protection varies from the ultimate protection virtually on all possible 
grounds “as if the subcontracted worker is employed by the client” as 
evident in the laws of the Philippines and Indonesia to the limited 
protection only on the non-payment of wages ground as evident in the 
laws of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. For Thailand, there are a few 
obstacles, both legal and practical, that could potentially hinder the 
access to remedy for subcontracted agricultural workers. First, as 
mentioned, the scope of issue that can trigger solidary liability is only 
limited to non-payment of wages, whereas other potential adverse human 
rights violations could, in fact, involve other issues such as working 
conditions and child labor. Second, while the Labor Protection Act 
imposes the solidary liability on several levels of subcontractors, it leaves 
out the client from the liability scheme. In the context of this research, 
subcontracted agricultural workers can only seek redress from a pool of 
subcontractors, if not initially satisfied from the subcontractor who is 
their direct employer. Third, although the Labor Protection Act requires 
the sugar producers to provide benefits and welfare to subcontracted 
agricultural workers whose work is part of their manufacturing process 
or under their responsibility. However, the condition for the sugar 
producers’ having to provide such benefits and welfare to subcontracted 
agricultural workers is the existence of the same job description as the 
one for its own employees. Since sugar producers do not typically 
employ agricultural workers, references to employees having the same 
job description are difficult to establish. 
 
Consequently, this research argued that the extension of the scope of 
employer’s obligations and liabilities found in the labor laws of some 
ASEAN countries provided a legal basis for establishing the linkage 
between business enterprises and their non-employees. Such linkages 
provide an argument for non-employees, including subcontracted 
agricultural workers, to engage business enterprises into their claims. 
Additionally, not only could such linkages remind business enterprises 
that they are, in fact, obliged by law to address the grievances, they could 
also send a message to business enterprises that it may be more advisable 
for them to resolve disputes and provide remedy for non-employees in 
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their supply-chain through their own operational-level grievance 
mechanisms to avoid encountering potential negative publicity. In the 
context of this research, sugar producers should thus address the 
grievances and be encouraged to provide operational-level grievance 
mechanisms to subcontracted agricultural workers, as well as ensure that 
subcontracted agricultural workers can effectively access them. 
 
Practical barriers identified by the UNGP 
 
Chapter VI Section D was dedicated to addressing the practical barriers 
identified by the UNGP. It departed from the presumption that the 
eradication of such practical barriers could ensure that affected 
subcontracted agricultural workers would be provided with just 
remediation and have effective access to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms administered or operated by sugar producers. To eradicate 
such barriers, this research conducted the documentary study on the 
UNGP Principle 31 to scrutinize the identified barriers – cost, distant 
physical location, and fear of reprisal – as well as exploring some 
operational-level grievance mechanisms provided by business 
enterprises in other industries, depending on the availability and 
accessibility of the information. On cost, the research argued that 
business enterprises should ensure that the use of their operational-level 
grievance mechanisms should be cost-free. While this research also 
recognized that the operation of operational-level grievance mechanisms 
can place a financial burden on business enterprises, it was suggested 
that the solution to maintaining financial stability could be that the source 
of funding should be “ring-fenced” regularly, such as on an annual basis, 
instead of being decided on a case-by-case basis. On distant physical 
location, this research provided examples of practices from other 
operational-level grievance mechanisms in different industries, such as 
the use of a hotline and the Internet, that aim to eradicate the distance 
barrier. However, it was noted that while the use of the Internet has 
become the typical solution, it might not be feasible in the context of this 
research, as most, if not all, subcontracted agricultural workers neither 
owned phones nor could they afford to use the Internet. It was thus 
suggested that to eradicate the distance barrier in the context of this 
research, the sugar producers should resort to more conventional 
methods, such as appointing a local representative who is well-received 
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by subcontracted agricultural workers to serve as an intermediary 
between sugar producers and subcontracted agricultural workers, or 
using the so-called “traveling tribunal”. On fear of reprisal, it was argued 
that sugar producers should provide assurance to subcontracted 
agricultural workers that they would not be subject to any forms of 
retaliation when they submitted complaints to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms. Issuing an Anti-Retaliation policy should be 
encouraged, as well as designing deterrence measures to impose against 
subcontractors who are found to be retaliating against subcontracted 
agricultural workers. Such measures may range from issuing a warning 
letter to terminating current or future contracts. 
 
From the findings, it was established that legal and practical barriers that 
prevent subcontracted agricultural workers in Thailand’s sugar industry 
from gaining access to operational-level grievance mechanisms 
administered or operated by sugar producers should be addressed. 
Among all potential barriers, this research argued that barriers 
concerning uncertainty of admissible grievances, missing linkage 
between sugar producers and admissible grievances, missing linkage 
between sugar producers and subcontracted agricultural workers, as well 
as barriers addressed by the UNGP are important and should be tackled 
first. Moreover, this research acknowledged that there could not be a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to resolving the issues on barriers to access 
entirely. With such acknowledgement and the issue contextualized, this 
research provided answers to the research Question 3, which asked: 
 
Can an operational-level grievance mechanism based on the 
UNGP accessibility criteria and/or guidelines be developed 
in a manner that are contextually appropriate and tailored 
to Thailand’s sugar industry, and, if yes, how? 
 
Building on the previous chapters, which addressed the issues on barriers 
to access, Chapter VI was dedicated to examining and discerning the 
elements of the UNGP accessibility criteria. A categorization of the text 
“being known to all stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, 
and providing adequate assistance for those who may face particular 
barriers to access”, resulted in the four-step test: (1) identifying intended 
users, (2) being known, (3) identifying potential barriers to access, and 
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(4) providing adequate assistance. Based on these elements, it was 
argued that to ensure effective access to an operational-level grievance 
mechanism, the administrator and/or the operator must clearly identify 
the intended user (and this should extend to non-employees, such as 
subcontracted agricultural workers), disseminate information and ensure 
the comprehension of the intended users regarding the existence of the 
operational-level grievance mechanism so that it is known to the 
intended users (discussed in details in Chapter VI Section C), identify 
and address potential barriers to access, and provide adequate assistance 
to the intended users. This research also examined the current practices 
and challenges regarding the use of operational-level grievance 
mechanisms with the help of publicly available information from various 
business enterprises, as well as studying two prominent mechanisms at 
the OECD and the World Bank (the WBIP).  
 
Chapter VI Section D.4 revealed several barriers that were contextually 
applicable to Thailand’s sugar industry, as well as Thailand in general. 
Entitled “cultural considerations”, this section provided a narration on 
the uniqueness of Thai people’s perception with regard to dispute 
resolution as well as ways to address these cultural considerations. Based 
on these observations, the research argued that sugar producers should 
incorporate the cultural considerations that are unique to subcontracted 
agricultural workers when designing an operational-level grievance 
mechanism, for example by ensuring anonymity of complainants in order 
to avoid confrontation, providing direct communication channels, 
preferably in the local dialect, with the aim to recast their thinking – that 
claiming for justice should not be fused with the fear of karma, the 
feeling of inferiority, or the societal expectation to avoid confrontation.  
Moreover, sugar producers should provide certain assurance of non-
retaliation to subcontracted agricultural workers, such as enforcing their 
anti-retaliation policy on their subcontractors or assisting affected 
subcontracted agricultural workers to find new employers. 
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B. LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This study acknowledged several limitations, which could be further 
addressed and strengthened in future research. First, the information on 
operational-level grievance mechanisms specifically used in the 
agricultural industry, if there were any, was not publicly accessible at the 
time of writing. Hence, this research referred to operational-level 
grievance mechanisms used in other industries in order to explore current 
practices and identify barriers. Second, this research was contextualized 
to Thailand’s sugar industry. While the results and recommendations 
may not be entirely applicable to other industries or geographical 
locations, it was argued that most of the fundamental principles should 
be universally applicable and usable. On contributions, this research was 
conducted just at the time when the OHCHR released its Accountability 
and Remedy Project II on State-based non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms. As the OHCHR Project has yet to address the issue of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms, this research hopes that the 
results and recommendations herein are beneficial and can contribute to 
the completion of the OHCHR’s future Project, potentially on 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. At the same time, the results 
and recommendations of this research could be helpful for business 
enterprises looking to establish and particularly enhance the accessibility 
to their operational-level grievance mechanisms for actors in their 
supply-chain, including subcontracted workers.  
 
 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations provided herein should be useful for business 
enterprises that are currently developing their operational-level 
grievance mechanisms to address adverse human rights impacts 
occurring in their supply-chain. Specifically, the recommendations 
address the issue of accessibility to such mechanisms for non-employees, 
such as subcontracted workers. This research, therefore, recommends 
that in developing operational-level grievance mechanisms that ensure 
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accessibility for all actors in the supply-chain, business enterprises 
should: 
 
1. Map all actors in their supply-chain. This is to ensure that no actors 
are excluded or neglected from being eligible to access the 
operational-level grievance mechanism. 
2. Identify and list all admissible grievances. For the identification of 
admissible grievances references should be made to the International 
Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, relevant human rights protection 
promulgated in the respective countries, those identified by the 
actors in the supply-chain, as well as reports from relevant 
authorities such as the National Human Rights Commission. Such 
list should be non-exhaustive, as it should remain open for more 
interpretation and future inclusion. 
3. Identify and acknowledge their linkage with their business partners. 
This follows the categorization of involvement by the UNGP – 
cause, contribute, and directly linked. This acknowledgement serves 
as a basis for business enterprises to engage in addressing adverse 
human rights impacts by providing remedy through their 
operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
4. Adhere to the legal linkage based on the applicable laws in their 
respective jurisdiction. While it is beyond the competence and reach 
of this research to recommend States to adjust and/or strengthen their 
labor laws to accommodate the extension of the scope of employer’s 
obligations and liabilities, this research recommends that business 
enterprises should adhere to the applicable laws in their respective 
jurisdiction and provide remedy to non-employees in their supply 
chain based on, or even beyond, the legal requirements. 
5. Address and eradicate all potential barriers to access. All potential 
barriers to access, especially those listed in the UNGP Principle 31, 
should be seriously addressed and eradicated. Methods to eradicate 
should consider the practicality and feasibility of implementation. 
For instance, the dissemination of knowledge on the existence of 
operational-level grievance mechanisms should not entirely be based 
on the Internet or other technical means, as the intended users could 
not effectively benefit fromthese methods as they do not have the 
means or sufficient ability to use them. 
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6. Cultural considerations should be addressed for appropriateness. 
Each location has its own cultural characteristics, such as the societal 
structure and the peoples’ believes. Therefore, they should be 
appropriately taken into consideration and overcome. 
 
In conclusion, this research hopes to contribute to the current pool of 
academic literature on business and human rights by addressing the 
problem of inaccessibility to business enterprises’ operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for non-employees. Working in context, this 
research addressed the specific problem of inaccessibility for 
subcontracted agricultural workers to operational-level grievance 
mechanisms that are administered or operated by sugar producers. As 
grievances are most easily addressed and remediated with effective 
access to operational-level grievance mechanisms, it was argued that the 
rights to effective remedy of subcontracted agricultural workers would 
be guaranteed, and their livelihood and well-being improved, despite the 
fact that they continue to harvest sugar cane in Thailand’s plantations 
against the scorching heat of the mid-day sun. 
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APPENDIX A. 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
 
A1 CONTEXT 
 
Issues Subcontracted 
agricultural 
workers 
Subcontractor Sugar producer 
Type of location Sugar cane 
plantations 
Sugar mills Headquarter 
Number of 
interviewees 
See Appendix D. for further details. 
Location/Date Buriram 1 22.08.16 Buriram 22.08.16 1st 
interview 
30.08.16 
Buriram 2 23.08.16 
Khon 
Kaen 1 
25.08.16 Khon 
Kaen 
26.08.16 2nd 
interview 
28.06.17 
Khon 
Kaen 1 
26.08.16 
Access to 
interview 
locations 
Road transport to the sites, led by 
suppliers 
Boardroom meeting 
at Mitr Phol 
headquarter, with 
prior permission 
approved 
Anonymity of 
responses 
Employers 
(suppliers) 
agreed to remain 
outside of the 
interview area. 
n/a n/a 
Translation Mr. Pormest Wongsatitporn (LL.M., 
Chulalongkorn) served as a translator 
from Northeastern (Esarn) local dialect 
into standard (central) Thai throughout 
all interviews, as most of the 
interviewees were unable to speak the 
standard dialect.  
n/a 
Consent The consent form was distributed in English together with the 
Thai translation. The interviewees were asked to sign in the 
English form. The detail of the consent form is provided in the 
Appendix C. 
Confidentiality The interviewees indicated that their 
responses and their contribution to this 
research shall remain anonymous. 
n/a 
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A2 STRUCTURE OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Stages Subcontracted 
agricultural workers 
Subcontractor Sugar producer 
Stage 1 
Preliminary 
Before conducting each interview, the researcher informed and 
provided the interviewees with the following details: 
1) Full title of the project 
2) Name and position of the researcher	
3) Consent form (see Appendix C.)	
4) Information sheet containing a brief object and purpose of 
the research and background information (see Appendix 
E.)	
*Information sheet Mr. Wongsatitporn read out the 
information sheet in the local dialect to 
the interviewees and confirmed their 
understanding. 
The information 
sheet was sent to 
the interviewees 
via email prior to 
the interview. 
Stage 2 
Group 
The interviewees 
were collectively 
asked the 
preliminary 
questions.  
Due to the small number of the 
interviewees and limited time, the 
researcher combined Stage 2 and 3 and 
used the prepared questions as 
guidelines. Follow-up questions were 
asked. Stage 3 
Individual 
After Stage 2, the 
researcher separated 
the interviewees, 
and conducted 
interview 
individually. Each 
interviewee was 
asked the same 
series of questions, 
which were prepared 
prior to the 
interview. 
*Structured interview questions are provided in Appendix B. 
**During Stage 3, the interviewee who had finished being interviewed were asked 
to remain separated from and not to share interview-related questions with other 
interviewees who had yet been interviewed. Also, the employers were also asked not 
to inquire the interviewees about the responses given during the interview.  
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APPENDIX B. 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
B1 GROUP INTERVIEW 
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Getting general information     
What is your name and your role/position in your 
workplace? 
? ? ? 
Please describe your work position and/or responsibility. ? ? ? 
Please describe the general relationship between you and 
your employers (or employees). 
? ?  
Please describe the general relationship between you and the 
sugar producers. 
 ?  
Please describe the general relationship between you and 
your suppliers. 
? ? ? 
On supply-chain ? ?  
To your knowledge, please describe the supply-chain, e.g. 
what happens to all sugar canes once you deliver them to 
your employers (or sugar producers). 
? ?  
To your knowledge, please describe the entire supply-chain 
of your sugar producing business. 
  ? 
Besides working in the sugar cane plantations, do you also 
work somewhere else? If so, where? 
?   
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B2 INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW 
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Exploring negative impacts     
Please describe your current working condition, e.g. hours of 
work, wage, welfare, etc. 
?   
Please describe the working condition of your subcontracted 
agricultural workers. 
? ?? ? 
What is your level of satisfaction on your current working 
condition, on the scale of 1-10, and why? 
?? ?  
What is your level of satisfaction of the working condition of 
your subcontracted agricultural workers, on the scale of 1-
10, and why? 
? ?? ? 
If there are any problems associated with your current 
working condition, please specify. 
?? ?  
What are other problems, apart from your working 
condition? 
?? ?  
If there are any problems associated with the current working 
condition of your subcontracted agricultural workers, please 
specify. 
? ?? ? 
What are other problems, apart from the working condition 
of your subcontracted agricultural workers? 
? ?? ? 
On seeking remedy ?   
How do you respond to problems (if any)? ? ? ? 
What types of problems are the ones that you feel they must 
be reported, and why? 
?? ?  
What types of problems are the ones that you feel they 
should be addressed and resolved, and why? 
? ? ? 
What types of problems are the ones that you tend to 
disregard, and why? 
?   
What types of problems are the ones that you feel they are 
negligible, and why? 
? ? ? 
To whom did you report or, if occur, do you plan to report 
such problems, and why? 
?   
To your knowledge, what are available channels for you to 
seek remedy? 
?? ? ?
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What are currently available channels (or procedures) for 
your employees to seek remedy? 
? ?? ??
Are you familiar with resolving remedy through judicial 
grievance mechanism, such as Court? 
?? ?? ??
If you ever have to go to Court, what is the first step? And 
what are the following procedures? 
?? ? ?
What are advantages and disadvantages of existing judicial 
grievance mechanisms? 
?? ?? ??
What are reasons behind your decision to or not to go to 
Court to resolve the complaint? 
?? ?? ??
How was your experience, if any, with seeking remedy 
through judicial mechanisms? 
?? ? ?
How was your experience, if any, with resolving complaints 
through judicial mechanisms? 
? ?? ??
Have you ever considered seeking remedy through other 
non-judicial channels, such as the NHRC? 
?? ?? ??
On operational-level grievance mechanisms ? ? ?
To your knowledge, what is an operational-level grievance 
mechanism? 
?? ?? ??
What is your first impression when you learn of an 
operational-level grievance mechanism? 
?? ?? ??
Are your employers currently offering an operational-level 
grievance mechanism? 
?? ?  
Are you currently offering an operational-level grievance 
mechanism to your employees, and why? 
? ?? ??
Do you extend the applicability of your operational-level 
grievance mechanism to non-employees who work in your 
supply-chain, such as subcontracted agricultural workers? 
Why (or why not)? 
? ? ??
What are reasons behind your decision to or not to go to the 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by your 
employers to resolve the dispute? 
?? ? ?
What motivated you (your company) to develop procedures 
to address complaints from your employees and/or the 
affected non-employees such as subcontracted agricultural 
workers? 
? ? ??
Please describe the elements of your system, e.g. receiving 
and assessing complaints, addressing and resolving issues, 
etc. 
? ? ??
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How was your experience, if any, with seeking remedy 
through an operational-level grievance mechanism provided 
by your employers?  
?? ? ?
If you cannot seek remedy from your employers and Courts, 
who else would you try to seek remedy from? 
?? ? ?
Do you think the sugar producer, in general, should provide 
an operational-level grievance mechanism? What about the 
sugar producer which produce the sugar cane you harvest? 
?? ? ?
Do you know or have any connection with the sugar 
producers which produce the sugar cane you harvest? How 
and how well do you know or have such connection? 
?? ? ?
Do you know or have any connection with the subcontracted 
agricultural workers working in your supply-chain? How and 
how well do you know or have such connection? 
? ? ??
If applicable, how and how often do you communicate with 
the sugar producer? 
?? ? ?
If applicable, how and how often do you communicate with 
the subcontracted agricultural workers working in your 
supply-chain? 
? ? ??
Are the sugar producer (that you know or have connection 
with) currently offering an operational-level grievance 
mechanism? 
?? ? ?
To your knowledge, what are the procedures of an 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the 
sugar producer? 
?? ?? ?
What are reasons behind your decision to or not to go to the 
operational-level grievance mechanism provided by the 
sugar producer to resolve the dispute? What are your 
concerns? 
?? ?? ?
How was your experience, if any, with seeking remedy 
through an operational-level grievance mechanism provided 
by the sugar producer? 
?? ?? ?
If applicable, were there any barriers preventing you from 
accessing the operational-level grievance mechanism 
provided by the sugar producer? 
?? ? ?
Hypothetically, what are potential barriers preventing you 
from accessing the operational-level grievance mechanism 
provided by the sugar producer? 
?? ? ?
What would be your recommendations for establishing or 
improving the operational-level grievance mechanism 
provided by the sugar producer? 
?? ?? ?
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Between your employers and the sugar producer, who should 
be responsible for providing an operational-level grievance 
mechanism, and why? E.g. whom do you trust more? 
?? ? ?
(exclusively for sugar producer) ? ? ?
What is the overarching purpose of your operational-level 
grievance mechanism? 
? ? ??
Are you familiar with the UNGP?  ? ? ??
To your knowledge, what are the UNGP, particularly on the 
“effectiveness criteria” for operational-level grievance 
mechanism? 
? ? ??
What are (or should be) issues that are eligible to be 
addressed by your operational-level grievance mechanism? 
? ? ??
How were (or should) the procedures of the operational-level 
grievance mechanism developed? Unilaterally or in 
collaboration with other companies? 
? ? ??
Have you experienced any resistance both inside and outside 
of your company? 
? ? ??
Please describe the organization, the location and the staffing 
of your operational-level grievance mechanism. 
? ? ??
How do you ensure the effectiveness of your operational-
level grievance mechanism, e.g. staff training, community 
training, quality control and evaluation? 
? ? ??
Please describe the standard and/or criteria used to resolve 
complaints at your operational-level grievance mechanism. 
? ? ??
Please describe the dissemination/communication strategy. 
How do you promote the existence of your operational-level 
grievance mechanism? 
? ? ??
How do affected parties access to your operational-level 
grievance mechanism, e.g. filing complaints? 
? ? ??
Are affected parties using your operational-level grievance 
mechanism? 
? ? ??
What are barriers that prevent affected parties from using 
your operational-level grievance mechanism? 
? ? ??
What are challenges or consequences that your operational-
level grievance mechanism has encountered in the 
development and/or implementation process, e.g. cultural 
appropriateness, dissemination of knowledge, customary or 
traditional method of dispute resolution, budget? 
? ? ??
What are key issues that should be addressed for future 
development and improvement of operational-level 
grievance mechanism in general? 
? ? ??
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APPENDIX C. 
CONSENT FORM 
 
C1 CONSENT FORM 
 
Full title of Project:  
Ensuring Accessibility of Agricultural Workers to Non-State-Based, Non-Judicial Grievance 
Mechanisms: A Qualitative Study on Selected Agricultural Industry in Thailand 
 
Name and position of Researcher:  
Mr. Pawat Satayanurug, a PhD researcher at University of Zurich 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
for the above Study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that  
I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the above Study. 
 
 
Please initial box 
             Yes  No 
4. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being  
audio recorded. 
5. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being  
video recorded. 
6. I agree to the use in publications of statements I made,  
with full attribution to me. 
7. I agree to the use in publications of anonymized quotes of  
statements I made. 
8. I agree that my data gathered in this Study may be stored in  
a specialist data center and may be used for future research. 
 
 
  E-mail addresses:  
psatayanurug@gmail.com 
Contact number: 
+41 78 635 3553 (Swiss) 
+66 82 445 9955 (Thai)               
  
 
11 July 2016; 
Zürich, 
Switzerland 
  
 
Pawat Satayanurug 
Rämistrasse 74 
8001, Zürich, Switzerland 
   
Name and Address of Researcher  Contact Information  Date and Place  Signature 
 
Page 1 of 1 
 
  
  E-mail address:  
Contact number: 
     
  
 
     
Name and Designation of Participant  Contact Information  Date and Place  Signature  
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 C2 CONSENT FORM (Thai translation) 
 
หนังสือยินยอม  )แปล(  
 
ชื่อโครงการ  
การวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพเกี่ยวกับการเข้าถึงกระบวนการเยียวยาความเสียหายของแรงงานเกษตรในประเทศไทย ศึกษาเฉพาะ
กระบวนการที่จัดทำขึ้นโดยหน่วยงานที่ไม่ใช่ภาครัฐ 
 
ชื่อและตำแหน่งของผู้วิจัย  
นายภาวัฒน์ สัตยานุรักษ์ (นักวิจัยและนักศึกษาระดับปริญญาเอก มหาวิทยาลัยซูริค) 
            โปรดลงนาม )ย่อ(  
 
1. ข้าพเจ้ายืนยันว่า ข้าพเจ้าได้รับและเข้าใจข้อมูลเบื้องต้นของงานวิจัย  
และมีโอกาสซักถามผู้วิจัย 
2. ข้าพเจ้าเข้าใจว่า การเข้าร่วมในโครงการวิจัยนี้เป็นไปด้วยความสมัครใจ  
และสามารถเพิกถอนความสมัครใจนี้ได้ทุกเวลา โดยไม่ต้องระบุเหตุผล 
3. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมเข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัยนี ้
 
           โปรดลงนาม )ย่อ(  
             ยินยอม  ไม่ยินยอม 
 
4. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้มีการบันทึกเสียงการสัมภาษณ์ 
5. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้มีการบันทึกภาพการสัมภาษณ์ 
6. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้เผยแพร่และตีพมิพ์คำพูดของข้าพเจ้า 
โดยจะต้องมีการอ้างอิงอย่างถูกต้อง 
7. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้เผยแพร่และตีพิมพ์คำพูดของข้าพเจ้า 
โดยไม่เปิดเผยชื่อของข้าพเจ้า ในการตีพิมพ์งานวิจัยนี ้
8. ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้เก็บข้อมูลที่ข้าพเจ้าให้สัมภาษณ์เพื่อโครงการวิจัยนี ้
ในฐานข้อมูลพิเศษ และอาจนำข้อมูลดังกล่าวมาใช้สำหรับการวิจัยในอนาคตได ้
 
  อีเมล:  
เบอร์ติดต่อ: 
     
  
 
     
ชื่อและตำแหน่งของผู้เข้าร่วม  ข้อมูลติดต่อ  วันและสถานที่  ลงนาม  
 
  อีเมล:  
psatayanurug@gmail.com 
เบอร์ติดต่อ: 
+41 78 635 3553 (สวิส) 
+66 82 445 9955 (ไทย)               
  
 
11 ก.ค. 2559; 
ซูริค , 
สมาพันธรัฐสวิส 
  
 
นายภาวัฒน์ สัตยานุรักษ ์
Rämistrasse 74 
8001, Zürich, Switzerland 
   
ชื่อและที่อยู่ของผู้วิจัย  ข้อมูลติดต่อ  วันและสถานที่  ลงนาม 
 
หน้า 1 จาก 1
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APPENDIX D. 
DEMOGRAPHY OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
D1 SUBCONTRACTED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
 
Location Number of interviewees 
Buriram Plantation 1 7 
Plantation 2 5 
Khon Kaen Plantation 3 6 
Plantation 4 8 
Total 26 
*Due to request for anonymity, the names of interviewees are 
kept confidential.  
 
D2 SUBCONTRACTORS 
 
Location Number of interviewees 
Buriram 2 
Khon Kaen 1 
Total 3 
*Due to request for anonymity, the names of interviewees are 
kept confidential.  
 
D3 SUGAR PRODUCER 
 
Location Number of interviewees 
Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. Ltd 2 
Total 2 
Names of interviewees 
1) Dr. Sarayuth Saengchan, Senior Executive Vice-
President Finance Group Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. Ltd, 
Bangkok	
2) Mr. Boontham Wongprapinkul, Vice-President and 
Human Resources Department Mitr Phol Sugar Corp. 
Ltd, Bangkok	
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